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Executive summary 
The DYNAMIX project is a collaborative project within the 7th EU Framework Program (FP7). 
It aims to identify and assess dynamic and robust policy mixes that help shifting the European 
Union onto a pathway to absolute decoupling of long-term economic growth from resource 
use and environmental impacts. It also aims to support policy makers with advice on 
analytical frameworks and/or best procedures to identify and design appropriate policy mixes. 
This report documents the development of the three policy mixes that were developed for 
assessment in the project. These were designed within three different policy areas to address 
absolute decoupling in general and, specifically, the use of virgin metals, the use of arable 
land and freshwater, the input of the nutrients nitrogen and phosphorus, and emissions of 
greenhouse gases.  
Each policy mix was developed within a separate author team, using a common 
methodological framework. The policy mixes were developed based on previous findings in 
the project: we had investigated the current use of resources to identify and identified reasons 
for both efficient and inefficient resource use in the economy. Some of these findings are 
summarised in Section 2.3 of this report. We had also investigated current policies to find 
which features set apart an effective policy from a policy shortcoming (see Section 2.4). In 
addition, we discuss and draw conclusions, based on the analysis of the current situation, on 
how to achieve the paradigm shifts that are necessary to obtain an absolute decoupling 
(Chapter 3).  
Each author team presents the development of their policy mix in a separate chapter 
(Chapters 4-6). Specific drivers and barriers for resource use and resource efficiency are 
discussed in these chapters. Specific policy objectives and targets are also discussed before 
the actual policy mix is presented. This revised version of the report also includes a section 
for each policy mix presenting how the policy mix was revised after it had been assessed. 
One of the three policy mixes has an explicit overarching focus. It aims at reducing overall 
resource consumption in the EU and also at reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases and 
other pollutants. This policy mix includes a broad variety of instruments (see Chapter 4): 
• A circular tax trio consisting of taxes on the extraction of selected virgin materials and 
on landfilled and incinerated waste. 
• Feebate schemes for selected products. 
• Reduced value-added tax (VAT) for the most environmentally advantageous products 
and services. 
• Boost of the extended producer responsibility. 
• Skill enhancement programme. 
• Local currencies for labour-based services. 
• Enabling a shift from consumption to leisure.  
• Step-by-step restrictions of advertising and marketing.  
• Minimum requirements on the life-cycle performance of products. 
• Compulsory sustainability reporting for companies. 
The ex-ante assessment of this policy mix did not call for adding further instruments, but for 
adjustments in the design of individual instruments. Several instruments were revised to 
increase public acceptability and momentum. The circular tax trio should be presented as part 
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of a larger tax reform. The VAT reduction should be expanded into a wider VAT reform and 
coordinated with the feebate schemes. 
Another policy mix aims at reducing land use, freshwater use and nutrient surplus through 
improvements in food production, changes in diet, and reductions in food waste (Chapter 5). 
This policy mix emphasises five instruments to improve food production through, for example, 
revisions of already existing policy documents (Section 5.4):  
• Stronger and more effective environmental and climate dimension for EU land 
management in the Common Agricultural Policy.  
• Revised emissions levels in the National Emissions Ceilings Directive and additional 
measures for better management of the nitrogen cycle on farmland. 
• Promotion of Payment for Ecosystem Services programmes. 
• Revised regulation for land use, land-use change and forestry. 
• Revised Pesticides Directive, and guidance to farmers on pesticide management. 
These five key instruments are in the policy mix supported by a range of accompanying 
measures. These include, for example, increased prices on irrigation water, the establishment 
of an EU soil legislation, and the promotion of research and monitoring. 
The policy mix on land-use also includes three instruments to influence the food consumption 
and food waste (Section 5.5): 
• Targeted information campaigns on changing diets and on food waste. 
• Development of food redistribution programmes/food donation to reduce food waste. 
• Increased VAT on meat. 
The ex-ante assessment did not explicitly call for any additional instruments to be added to 
this policy mix; however, it highlighted the need to add clear objectives and quantitative 
targets to several of the instruments. For this purpose, the development of an indicator to 
reflect the net land use of the EU should be added as a key element in the policy mix. The 
development of an integrated long-term strategy for land use would also contribute to making 
this policy mix more effective and feasible.     
The third policy mix (Chapter 6) primarily aims at reducing the use of virgin metals in the EU 
through increased recycling and material efficiency. At the same time, it aims to avoid merely 
shifting burdens to the use of other resources or regions in the world, or to increase 
environmental impacts. For this reason, the metals policy mix was expanded to include also 
competing materials and includes several instruments of an overarching character. A key 
element in this policy mix is a gradual green fiscal reform, where tax revenues over time shift 
from labour to material use, resource use and environmental impacts.  
The structure of the policy mix was revised after the ex-ante assessment and other 
discussions. Extended producer responsibility and retraining programmes were added to the 
mix. The green fiscal reform was presented in a more disaggregate way to highlight the 
measures taken to alleviate the negative side-effects of material and environmental taxes. 
The instruments were also more clearly categorised into primary and supportive instruments. 
The following primary instruments are included in the revised policy mix on metals and 
competing materials (see Section 6.6): 
• A substantial tax on materials used in the EU, to increase material efficiency. 
• Extended producer responsibility, to increase global recycling. 
• Technical requirements, for materials substitution and efficiency. 
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• Increased environmental taxes, to reduce resource use and environmental impacts. 
The policy mix also includes a range of supportive instruments to reduce negative side-effects 
of the primary instruments and to make the policy more politically feasible: 
• Border tax adjustments, to reduce the impact on the competitiveness of EU industry. 
• Labour tax reductions, to stimulate employment. 
• Removal of harmful subsidies, for a coherent fiscal reform. 
• Spending on research and development, to facilitate changes in technology. 
• Retraining programmes, to facilitate a change in economic structure. 
• Information campaigns and infrastructure to facilitate changes in behaviour. 
• Sharing systems, to facilitate behavioural change. 
• Advanced recycling centres, also to facilitate behavioural change. 
• Fora for communication, to stimulate networking. 
• A common EU strategy, to harmonise legislation in Member States. 
The ex-ante assessment of the policy mixes indicates that they would contribute to reducing 
the use of virgin metals, arable land and freshwater, the input of nutrients, and the 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, any single policy mix would not be sufficient to reach all 
the predefined targets. All three could also not be implemented in parallel, as they are partly 
overlapping. The three policy mixes illustrates different ways to address the challenge of 
developing policy mixes for a resource-efficient future EU; however, further work is needed to 
combine and refine the policy mixes and to make them ready for implementation.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The DYNAMIX project 
The acronym DYNAMIX stands for “DYNAmic policy MIXes for absolute decoupling of 
environmental impacts of EU resource use from economic growth”. The DYNAMIX project is a 
collaborative project within the 7th EU Framework Program (FP7). The initially stated aim of 
the project is to identify and assess dynamic and robust policy mixes to shift the European 
Union (EU) onto a pathway to absolute decoupling of long-term economic growth from 
resource use and environmental impacts and to a sustainable future. To support this objective 
we established the following five targets for the year 2050 (Umpfenbach 2013): 
• consumption of virgin metals: to be reduced by 80 % compared to 2010 levels, 
measured as raw material consumption (RMC) in the EU. This target represents the 
scarcity of metals and environmental impacts caused by extraction, refinement, 
processing and disposal of metals; 
• greenhouse gas emissions: to be limited to 2 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per capita 
per year. This is to be measured as a footprint to reflect embedded emissions and 
also in terms of emissions generated within the EU. This target represents climate 
change impacts of greenhouse gas emissions through energy use as well as 
agricultural and industrial processes;  
• consumption of arable land: to reach zero net demand of non-EU arable land. This 
target represents, as a rough approximation, the impacts of biomass production on 
soil quality, water quality and biodiversity;  
• nutrients input: reducing nitrogen and phosphorus surpluses in the EU to levels that 
can be achieved by the best available techniques. This target represents the impacts 
of agricultural production on marine and freshwater quality as well as soil quality; and 
• freshwater use: no region should experience water stress. 
During the course of the project the following two project objectives were agreed upon: 
1) supporting policy makers with advice on analytical frameworks and/or best practices to 
identify and design appropriate policy mixes to achieve absolute decoupling; and 
2) designing a few policy-mixes and testing them against our own framework. 
The second objective will support the first. However, we do not aim to design policy mixes 
that policy makers can simply copy and adopt to achieve absolute decoupling in the EU by 
2050. Rather, a tailored approach to identifying and developing policy mixes is required 
depending on, for example, national circumstances, interests and political expediencies. The 
findings of the study seek to support policy makers in the process of identifying and 
developing appropriate policy mixes to meet their decoupling objectives.  
The DYNAMIX project began with an ex-post analysis of existing inefficiencies in resource 
use (Tan et al. 2013) and an assessment of current resource policies in several case studies 
across the EU (Mazza et al. 2013, Fedrigo-Fazio et al. 2014). These provide a basis for 
identifying what paradigm shifts are required in the way production and consumption is 
organised and regulated, and what policy mixes might be able to contribute significantly 
towards absolute decoupling in the EU by 2050.  
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Relevant findings from these previous steps provided a basis for shaping promising policy 
mixes for the future. These promising policy mixes were then tested through ex-ante 
assessments for effectiveness (benchmarked against absolute resource and impact 
decoupling), efficiency, sustainability and contribution to eco-innovation. The ex-ante 
assessment is in part done through environmental and economic quantitative modelling. Such 
models are powerful tools for assessing economic and environmental impacts in the EU and 
globally; however, models have limitations in representing various social, political and legal 
aspects, including factors influencing human behaviour. DYNAMIX thus also systematically 
integrates qualitative assessments to fully assess the real-world performance of the proposed 
policy mixes. We use the results from the ex-ante assessments to revise the proposed policy-
mixes. Recommendations and conclusions will then be based both on the analysis of the 
existing situation, the process of developing the policy mixes, and the results and insights 
from the assessments of the initial policy mixes.  
The primary target group for the project is policy-makers directly involved in designing and 
implementing policies addressing levels of resource use and related environmental impacts at 
the EU and national levels. The project strives at strengthening the capacity of these policy 
makers in selecting, identifying, designing and implementing effective policies to reduce EU 
resource use and its related environmental impacts. Accordingly, a group of policy-makers 
and key stakeholders has been involved in a systemic participatory process throughout the 
whole project. This process is designed to facilitate mutual learning and allow policy-makers, 
stakeholders and external researchers the opportunity to influence the project’s design based 
on their views. This approach will help increase the likelihood that the results of DYNAMIX 
can provide tangible support to EU policy-making for resource efficiency. 
1.2 The report 
This report is the main deliverable of Work Package (WP) 4 of the project. This WP forms the 
nexus between the ex-post analysis of current resource flows and existing policies on the one 
hand and the ex-ante assessment of promising policies identified by the project team on the 
other hand.  
The report presents the development of the three initial policy mixes. Each policy mix was 
developed within a separate author team, using a common methodological framework. This 
framework is presented in Chapter 2. Section 2.1 presents criteria for the selection and 
development of policy mixes in DYNAMIX. Section 2.2 presents and briefly discusses the 
three policy areas for which we develop policy mixes. Section 2.3 includes a general 
discussion on the drivers of resource use and barriers to resource efficiency. It also 
summarises some of the findings from the DYNAMIX WP2, where we investigated the current 
use of resources to identify and explained both efficient and inefficient resource use in today’s 
economy. In WP3 we investigated current policies to identify what features set apart an 
effective policy from an ineffective policy. These findings are summarised in Section 0. 
Section 2.5 discusses the need for the policy mixes to be adaptive in the light of the inherently 
uncertain future. Section 2.6 briefly presents the organisation of the work.  
Based on the analysis of the current situation, we discuss and draw conclusions on how to 
spark the paradigm shifts that are necessary to achieve an absolute decoupling in the EU. 
Chapter 3 presents the analysis of paradigms and paradigm shifts that also informed the 
author teams involved in the policy mix development. 
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Each author team presents the development of their policy mix in a separate chapter 
(Chapters 4-6). Specific drivers and barriers for resource use and resource efficiency are 
discussed in each of these chapter. Specific policy objectives and targets are also discussed 
before the actual policy mix is presented. All key element in the policy mix are then described 
in the common format of a policy fiche that details the design, scope, governance aspects and 
expected impacts of that policy element. Some of these policy fiches describe an individual 
policy instrument, while other fiches present broader policy activities. 
Although the methodological framework is common between the author teams, each 
implementation of the framework was partially independent from the others. As a result there 
are variations in the structure between Chapters 4-6. However, each of the chapters ends 
with a section that summarises how the policy mix is revised in response to the ex-ante 
assessment.  
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2 Method 
This chapter outlines the methodological framework for the development of policy mixes in 
DYNAMIX. The policy mixes were developed based on a list of criteria (see Section 2.1) and 
based on previous findings in the project (Sections 2.3-2.5 and Chapter 3). 
2.1 Overarching criteria and procedure  
The DYNAMIX project strives to provide advice on relevant policy decision frameworks to 
policy makers and assesses selected policy mixes. To make this possible, it is important that 
the policy mixes are not too complex to assess effectively. Furthermore, they should match 
the expertise and methods available to the project team. To best support the goals of the 
DYNAMIX project, the policy mixes should ideally also be: 
• expected to be effective (see Section 2.4), 
• diverse with, for example, emphasis on different types of policy instruments (see, e.g., 
Section 2.2), 
• addressing important drivers, barriers and lock-ins (Section 2.3), 
• adaptive (Section 2.5), 
• contributing to the needed paradigm changes (Chapter 3), 
• relevant to policy-makers and stakeholders, 
• addressing little-managed resources, 
• not sufficiently investigated and therefore providing knowledge gaps, and 
• at least in part offer the possibility for quantitative assessment. 
Some of these criteria are connected. Effective policies are, for example, likely to address 
important drivers and barriers and also to contribute to relevant paradigm shifts. As 
paradigms shift, some policy instruments can become effective while others may become less 
effective. This means that the policy mixes should be dynamic and adaptive, and that also the 
sequencing of different instruments is important to ensure maximum effectiveness.  
The research that has already been completed in DYNAMIX provides an important part of the 
basis for the development of the policy mixes. The analysis of the system drivers (e.g., Tan et 
al. 2013 from WP2) and the lessons from the ex-post analysis of existing policies for resource 
efficiency (e.g., Fedrigo-Fazio et al. 2014 from WP3), together with our wider knowledge 
about policy, give insights into what policy instruments are potentially effectice. This 
knowledge is essential to the development of our initial policy mixes. The following steps and 
measures are taken in the development of these policy mixes: 
• Define and prioritise drivers of particular patterns of consumption and production, and 
their resulting impacts; 
• define specific targets and objectives for each policy mix; 
• consider the potential linkages between different policy instruments in a mix; and 
• recall the evidence of the ex-post analysis of case studies carried out in DYNAMIX 
(Fedrigo-Fazio et al. 2014) as well as additional literature on effective and ineffective 
policy mixes. 
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2.2 Selecting the policy areas 
We decided to develop a policy mix in three policy areas addressing: metals, land-use, and 
overarching, structural drivers. These policy areas were selected to address the five targets to 
2050 that have been established in the project (Umpfenbach 2013; cf. Section 1.1). More 
specifically, a policy mix for metals use focuses on the reduction of primary metals. A land-
use policy mix is essential to address both the consumption of arable land, the input of 
nutrients, and freshwater use. An overarching policy mix is necessary for addressing 
emissions of greenhouse gases and also relevant for addressing the underlying, structural 
drivers affecting all of the key targets. This selection of policy mixes is divergent in terms of 
policy areas and complementary in terms of policy targets.  
However, there is a risk that a policy mix that focuses specifically on reducing the use of virgin 
metals in the EU can lead to an increase in the use of polymers, concrete and other materials, 
or to increasing the use of virgin metals outside the EU. To avoid such burden shifting, the 
metals policy mix is broadened to consider also the use of other materials. This means it 
includes strong overarching elements, which makes the metals policy mix more similar to the 
overarching policy mix. To keep them divergent, we deliberately strive to include in the two 
mixes different versions of instruments that on the surface appear to be similar. Specifically, 
the materials tax in the metals policy mix (Section 6.4.2) is very different from the raw 
materials tax in the overarching policy mix (see Section 4.4.1). Including both of these taxes 
in the study makes it possible for us to compare the two versions of the materials tax.    
2.3 Identifying the main drivers and barriers to resource 
(in)efficiency 
As a starting point for developing each specific policy mix, we identify the major drivers of 
resource use and barriers to change in the systems we address. For this purpose we need to 
be aware of the fact that there are many types of drivers. Figure 1 shows examples of some 
of the types of drivers that can be of interest, based on a typology presented by Tan et al. 
(2013). Some of these influence resource efficiency directly, while others have indirect or 
intermediate impacts on resource efficiency. Drivers and barriers also exist on different 
scales: macro-economic, or company, or household level. We face a challenge in deciding on 
the right level and scale of drivers for each policy mix. 
2.3.1 Main areas of inefficiency in resource use 
The DYNAMIX WP2 examined the main inefficiencies of resource use in the EU and 
investigated their drivers and underlying causes. It analysed resource inefficiencies from the 
perspective of individual resources (e.g., raw materials, energy, water, land, ecosystem 
services) as well as main sectors / consumption areas (e.g., food, buildings, transport). 
This analysis provides an excellent starting point to define objectives for the selected policy 
mixes. As we are analysing systems, it is relevant to define objectives for each policy mix in 
terms of the resulting set of (changed) drivers that we would like to see. This will enable us to 
estimate the impacts from the consumption and production patterns resulting from the 
changed set of drivers.  
The report from DYNAMIX WP2 (Tan et al. 2013) provides an overview of the main areas of 
inefficiency, which also correspond to the areas where significant potential for improving 
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of different drivers that affect (in)efficient resource use, 
based on a typology from Tan et al. (2013) 
 
resource efficiency and thereby achieving (absolute) decoupling seem to lie. For example, 
key areas in relation to food and metals are set out below: 
• The EU food system is particularly resource intensive in terms of biomass extracted, 
freshwater withdrawals, land use, application of fertilizers and wild fish catches. While 
there is significant potential to improve resource efficiency related to agriculture, 
fisheries and food production, the greatest potential seems to lie in addressing food 
consumption, including diets, overconsumption and food waste. 
• Compared to other resources, metals are generally the most valued within the 
economy. Despite being inherently recyclable, they are often sent to landfills at the 
end of their life cycle. In addition to reducing the demand for metal through better 
design and longer product lifetimes, closing material loops seem to have the greatest 
potential for increasing the resource efficiency of metals. 
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2.3.2 Analysis of underlying drivers and barriers 
Food, buildings, and transport are often identified as three major areas of consumption. Tan 
et al. (2013) analysed the underlying causes of inefficiency in each of these areas. The 
consumption of food is closely related to the land-use. This part of the findings of Tan et al. 
(2013) can be directly applicable in the development of a policy mix for land use. As an 
example, Figure 2 shows how different factors cause and drive unsustainable diets. Section 
5.2 in the WP2 report (Tan et al. 2013, pp. 58-70) provides more details and explanation on 
the food consumption.  
Sections 5.3-5.4 (Tan et al. 2013, pp. 71-94) present the analyses of drivers and causes 
related to buildings and transports. These are relevant for the development of the overarching 
policy mix and also for the policy mix on metals and other materials. 
When developing a policy mix, it may be more effective to select policy instruments that 
address the main drivers (e.g., food prices) or underlying causes (e.g., marketing) of what 
needs to be improved rather than the result (e.g., the diets). A main driver can be defined as a 
driver that either has an important contribution to the described inefficiency, or has significant 




Figure 2: Drivers and causes of unsustainable diets and resource inefficient food 
choices (Tan et al. 2013, p. 61) 
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The underlying causes might also reflect current paradigms and socio-economic trends, for 
example increasing preferences for meat consumption in China or India following the notion 
of westernised lifestyles. This could also be used as a starting point for identifying which 
paradigms need to change in order to achieve absolute decoupling. 
An attempt was made in WP2 to rank the key areas, drivers and causes of inefficiency in 
relation to the potential for decoupling, and also in relation to the feasibility or ease for EU 
policy to influence resource efficiency improvements (see Figure 3). This attempt included a 
discussion among the WP2 partners. However, the matter is very complex and the results 
should be regarded as preliminary indications rather than conclusive evidence on what areas 
are the most important. The diagram below sets out the results of this exercise in each 
sector/consumption area and indicates some of the most likely 'intervention areas' which, if 
changed, would make a significant difference to resource efficiency.  
The preliminary results in Figure 3 can help identify the key areas for intervention as well as 
the main drivers and causes relating to each policy mix. This identification of key drivers can 
provide initial thoughts on the selection of potential policy instruments that would be most 
effective to address them, in each context. 
Furthermore, the different nature of drivers and underlying causes provide an idea of what 
appropriate policy instruments could be. For example, food prices might point to using market 
based instruments, whereas education and information campaigns seem better suited to 
address the area of lack of knowledge. 
2.3.3 Systems of drivers and barriers 
Usually, policy assessments define the problem to be tackled as a market failure, which can 
be removed by the right policy. That has a nice linear chain of causation, between existing 
drivers, barrier removal and impact. Where there are several market failures, policy plans 
usually assume that you need to remove or address each of them - probably at around the 
same time - to obtain a functioning market. The chain of causation is still linear.  
For our policy mixes - which include attempts at paradigm change, and considerations of 
future political feasibility - we are more likely to be looking at several changes to drivers and 
barriers. These do not have linear causality but form an inter-related system. In addition to 
market failures, we are also aiming to tackle 'system failures'. The policy mixes will not have 
linear causality, as a change in the system of drivers and barriers is the result of more than 
one factor - and thus requires a different form of assessment. A systems perspective is 
particularly important as we need to take into account feedback mechanisms such as the 
rebound effect, and also because we are aiming at radical change.  
Within the current political-economic system, radical change is very difficult to achieve without 
systems change: there is lock-in to the existing production and consumption systems. 
Similarly, there are limitations on radical policy change within the political-economic system, 
which has its own inertia. This document starts from the position that 'systems lock-in' to the 
current socio-economic structures is an obstacle to the radical change we need to meet the 
identified 2050 targets. Thus, adopted policy mixes would need to overcome this systems 
lock-in (i.e., resistance to change). 
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Figure 3: A preliminary assessment of key areas of inefficiency in relation to potential 
for decoupling and policy intervention (Tan et al. 2013, pp. 111-112) 
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We recognise the complexity and challenge of considering the impact of a 'mix' of policies, 
rather than individual policies. To help address this, we can usefully form common 
frameworks for considering how drivers in the system interact and thus how policies might 
interact. The Sensitivity Model is a tool that can assist in structuring the knowledge on the 
interrelations and interdependencies of different variables in a complex system, such as the 
system that is affected by a policy mix (Vester 2007; see Box 1). Structuring this knowledge 
can be useful in the development of a radical policy mix and also valuable when planning for 
the ex-ante assessment of the policy mix.  
2.4 Effective policy instruments 
In many cases, a significant increase in resource efficiency can be obtained through the use 
of already existing technology. There is also often sufficient knowledge to implement 
incentives (such as taxes) to use this technology. However, a number of obstacles prevent 
the adoption of these technologies. Therefore, political and behavioural barriers can be more 
important than technological barriers as obstacles to greater resource efficiency. Thus, to 
improve the effectiveness of policy instruments they should be designed and presented in a 
way that eases political and consumer concerns, changes paradigms and thereby changes 
behaviours. To reduce political and/or behavioural barriers, the design of the policy 
instruments can be adapted to, for example: 
• Generating net benefits through 'resource' efficiency. 
• Contribute to altering worldviews - and so the value society gives to goods and 
time - thereby transforming how citizen’s consider the behavioural change being 
called for.  
• Promoting new ways to capture (or deliver) value. 
• Creating clear, credible political and market signals for alternative innovation paths 
(changing paradigms/business model expectation). 
• Reducing transition costs - timings to fit investment cycles, retraining etc. 
• Creating sufficiently politically strong groups of winners. 
• Compensating politically strong 'losers'. 
• Providing alternative and divergient incentives for those within existing aggregated 
political lobbies (e.g., industrial organisations). 
• Stimulating 'alternative' innovations/behaviours to come into commercial 
production/use. 
• Changing political institutions (e.g., silo-based departments) which lock-in policy. 
The DYNAMIX WP3 examined existing policies and their effectiveness for improving resource 
efficiency and obtaining decoupling. We assessed 16 cases of existing policy mixes. From 
these case studies Fedrigo-Fazio et al. (2014) gained insights into what is important for a 
policy mix to be effective and what can make a policy ineffective. To summarise, Fedrigo-
Fazio et al. (2014) identified the following key factors of success:  
• Policy mixes focused on a specific resource or sector are more likely to achieve 
decoupling.  
• The complexity of the resource through the economy is an overriding factor in the level 
of complexity of the policy mix.  
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Box 1: The use of the Sensitivity Model (Vester 2007) in DYNAMIX 
In this project we only apply the first four steps of the Sensitivity-Model procedure, namely: 
1. Identify 20 to 40 important variables (GDP, resource use, environmental pollution, etc.) in 
each policy field. 
2. Qualitatively estimate to what extent they affect each other with an Impact Matrix 
3. Analyse the systemic role of each variable to identify those that are the most sensitive (i.e., 
strongly affected by policy instruments or other variables), active (i.e., affect other variables 
strongly), or critical (i.e., strongly affected by and strongly affect other variables). 
4. Create an Effect System to illustrate the dependency among parameters, thereby allowing 
for the elimination of redundant variables. 
As an example, we identified the following important variables for the policy mix on metals (Chapter 
6): 
1. Steel use 
2. Copper use 
3. Gold use 
4. Aluminum use 
5. Use of critical metals 
6. Use of other materials 
7. Use of energy 
8. Global warming 
9. Pollution 
10. Construction of buildings (driver of, e.g., steel and aluminum use) 
11. Construction of infrastructure (driver of, e.g., steel and aluminum use) 
12. Energy infrastructure 
13. Size of car fleet (driver of, e.g., steel use) 
14. Consumption of electric products (driver of, e.g., copper and gold use) 
15. Use of coins and bars (driver of gold use) 
16. Consumption of jewellery (driver of gold use) 
17. Rate of technological innovation  
18. Development of new business models 
19. Recycling rate (drives, e.g., reductions in the use of energy and global warming) 
20. Material efficiency (drives, e.g., reductions in the use of energy and global warming) 
21. Economic growth (driver of, e.g., constructions and car fleet) 
22. Competitiveness (driver of, e.g., economic growth) 
23. Security of supply 
24. Economic instability (driver of the use of gold coins and bars) 
25. Demand for short-term profit 
26. Degree of materialism 
27. Strength of social norms 
28. Strength of environmental policy 
29. Well-being 
 
Some of these variables are common in all policy areas, but several variables are specific for the 
metals policy area: the use of different metals, the drivers for this use, etc.  
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• Policy mixes need to be designed in relation to the level and type of ‘lock-in’ to 
achieve transformation.  
• A clear understanding of targets, limits and thresholds helps move towards 
decoupling.  
• Internationally traded resources require policy mixes addressing global impacts of 
resource use, particularly imports.  
• Effective policy mixes struck the right balance between effectiveness and acceptance.  
• The efficiency of policy mixes increased with the predictability of their effects on, for 
example, prices, costs and/or behaviour.  
• Long-term effectiveness of policy mixes tends to be enhanced through clear targets 
and built-in monitoring, review and revision mechanisms. 
• Information instruments have proven to be useful supporting instruments but in 
isolation will usually fail to deliver the scale of change required for decoupling.  
Fedrigo-Fazio et al. (2014) also observed several shortcomings in the policy mixes examined 
and some key challenges for future policy design: 
• Lack of policy coherence or conflicting policy objectives.  
• Gaps and loopholes in the policy mixes. 
• Rebound effects are insufficiently taken into account in most of the policy mixes. 
• Targets and objectives that are unclear or inadequate undermine the progress 
towards decoupling. 
• Insufficient monitoring, control and adjustments over time. 
2.5 Adaptive policy mixes 
One important criteria for promising policy mixes is that they should be adaptive – i.e., that it 
should be possible to adapt the policy mixes to be adequate in a society that changes over 
time for other reasons than the policy mixes. In DYNAMIX Task 4.1, Gustavsson et al. (2013; 
Section 3.2) particularly discussed possible changes in the rate of innovation and in the 
predominant values and lifestyle of the population. While these changes can be affected by 
the policy mixes developed, they may also be strongly affected by other external factors. 
Such changes can, in turn, affect the need for and effectiveness of specific policy instruments 
within the policy mix, and may even have implications on the type of policy instruments that 
can be introduced.  
Gustavsson et al. (2013; Chapter 4) describe five possible background scenarios based on 
different assumptions regarding the rate of innovation and the predominant values. These 
include a reference scenario and four cornerstone scenarios (see Figure 4 and Box 2). When 
developing the policy mixes, we consider if and how the policy mix will be revised if in the 
year 2030 society is moving from the reference scenario towards any of the cornerstone 
scenarios. 
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Figure 4: The five background scenarios of the DYNAMIX project 
 
2.6 Organisation of the task: author teams 
Each policy mix is developed and described by a team of authors. Each author team has 
approximately five to eight members in total, spread across the different DYNAMIX partners 
according to expertise, capacity and interest (see Box 3).  
One of the factors influencing the choice of policy mix is what we can learn from assessing it, 
using the tools we have. For this reason, each author team has at least one member who is 
involved in the economic modelling in the expected ex-ante assessment of the policy mixes. 
This gives the author team direct access to knowledge on whether a policy idea can be 
modelled or not.  
In order to make best use of our findings on the current use of resources (WP2) and the 
current policies (WP3), we sought to involve in each author team researchers that were 
directly involved also in these WPs.  
Each author team presents the development of their policy mix in a separate chapter 
(Chapters 4-6). Draft policy mixes have been presented and discussed with the full DYNAMIX  
consortium. The complete chapters have also been read and reviewed by partners involved in 
other author teams; however no complete harmonisation between the chapters mixes have 
been conducted. As a consequence there are variations in the structure between Chapters 4-
6. in these chapter. There is also some overlap and might even remain inconsistencies 
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Box 2: The DYNAMIX background scenarios (Gustavsson et al. 2013) 
• Reference Scenario. This scenario describes a surprise-free future. It is not a likely future, 
however, because surprises are likely to occur. Improvements in technology continue at a 
good pace in the Reference Scenario, but the society is not transformed by any major 
technological break-through. The balance between materialistic and environmental values 
stays the same as today. The balance of power between Brussels and national governments 
also remains the same. Important current trends continue, however, towards, e.g., increased 
globalisation. The EU slowly expands to include and integrate more countries. For further 
details, see Section 4.1 in Gustavsson et al. (2013). 
• Scenario 1: Economic bonanza. This scenario includes technological breakthroughs in 
many areas and several new business models. Countries as well as most individuals focus 
on increased production and consumption. The economic efficiency and growth are the 
highest in this scenario. The difference between rich and poor individuals increases in the 
EU, however. The difference between rich and poor Member States also grows, but the 
balance of power between Brussels and national governments remains as today. Global 
competition over rare metals, phosphorus, etc. becomes fierce. The resource efficiency of 
existing processes and products increases even without the policy mix, due to technological 
innovations and high resource prices. However, new wasteful products are introduced at a 
rapid pace. For further details, see Section 4.2 in Gustavsson et al. (2013). 
• Scenario 2: Safe globe. This is a scenario with a high rate of technological and social 
innovation, including breakthroughs in several areas. Industrial and environmental disasters 
in different parts of the world make consumers and voters focus on the safety and well-being 
of all humanity, future generations, and nature. Most individuals strive for close social bonds 
and cultural achievements, rather than economic wealth. Social norms are strong and make 
it difficult for companies and politicians to take actions that risk significantly harming the 
environment. This background scenario does not have the highest resource efficiency but 
the most advanced technology for environmental protection. The increased focus on safety 
leads to an increased centralisation of decisions and power in the EU. This makes it easier 
for the EU to introduce and implement new policy instruments. The scenario includes global 
cooperation on environmental protection, workers protection, product safety, etc. For further 
details, see Section 4.3 in Gustavsson et al. (2013). 
• Scenario 3: Divided we trudge. In this scenario, lack of cooperation and increased 
nationalism in Europe lead to diminished knowledge transfer between stakeholders as well 
as countries, and to a low rate of innovation. Economic growth is sluggish despite a 
materialistic focus on production and consumption. Resource use is similar to the reference 
scenario due to low efficiency. The EU is politically weak and focuses mainly on resolving 
internal conflicts. For further details, see Section 4.4 in Gustavsson et al. (2013). 
• Scenario 4: Back to nature. This scenario combines a low rate of technological innovation 
and societal values that focus on the well-being of all humanity, future generations, and 
nature. In this scenario, repeated failures of experts and advanced technology cause 
distrust, and society becomes dominated by small-scale solutions, local production and 
trade. The economy to a large extent becomes informal. Both the EU and the national 
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Box 3: The DYNAMIX policy author teams 
Author team for overarching policy mix (Chapter 4): 
• Katharina Umpfenbach, Ecologic, previous coordinator of DYNAMIX and head of the author 
team 
• Leonardo Mazza, IEEP, representing WP3 
• Martin Hirschnitz-Garbers, Ecologic, current coordinator of DYNAMIX and representing WP2 
• Patrick ten Brink, IEEP, representing WP3 
• Martha Bicket, PSI 
• Francesco Bosello, FEEM, representing the economic modellers 
Author team for policy mix on land use (Chapter 5): 
• Daniela Russi, IEEP, head of the author team until maternal leave 
• Martin Nesbit, IEEP, head of the author team from halfway through the process  
• Mary Ann Kong, BIO, representing WP2 
• Maria Elander, IVL, representing WP3 
• Andrea Bigano, FEEM, representing the economic modellers and WP3 
• Clunie Keenleyside, IEEP 
• Graham Tucker, IEEP 
• Evelyn Underwood, IEEP 
• Robin Vanner, PSI 
• Stephanie Wunder, Ecologic 
Author team for policy mix on metals and other materials (Chapter 6): 
• Tomas Ekvall, IVL, leader of WP4 and head of the author team 
• Adrian Tan, BIO, representing WP2  
• Doreen Fedrigo, IEEP, representing WP3  
• Jan Gaska, WISE, representing the economic modellers and WP3  
• Fabio Eboli, FEEM, representing the economic modellers  
• Aleksander Sniegocki, WISE, representing the economic modellers  
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3 Paradigms and the development of DYNAMIX 
policy mixes 
This chapter summarises the analysis of paradigms as relevant to the development of policy 
mixes. It incorporates an analysis of paradigms from the ex-post analyses undertaken in WP2 
and 3.  It also incorporates some insights from the WP5 on how the public have previously 
responded to proposals such as these. This shows where thresholds of public acceptability 
were found1 in these proposed policies, and which of these represent a threshold which would 
promote a paradigm change if the policy was to be implemented. 
This section responds to the following questions: 
• What are paradigms and why are they important to DYNAMIX? We briefly 
introduce the concept of paradigm in the context of DYNAMIX, and explore why taking 
a paradigm perspective is important.  
• How do the DYNAMIX stakeholders view different paradigms? We asked the 
DYNAMIX stakeholders within a policy platform to explore how they see different 
paradigms. This was done by looking at preferences for, and the perceived feasibility 
of, a range of different systems concepts, such as the circular economy.   
• How can DYNAMIX promote paradigm change? We present our conceptual 
understanding of how DYNAMIX can look at policies that go beyond the limits of 
existing political paradigm by looking at how the policies themselves can promote 
paradigm change over time. 
• What kind of paradigm changes are desirable within DYANMIX? We illustrate this 
by developing a simple mapping for the cornerstone scenarios, and explore how these 
relate to the DYNAMIX objectives. This therefore provides the broad direction of 
paradigm movement required to move towards the DYNAMIX objectives.  
• What has the analysis of paradigms got to tell those developing resource 
efficiency policy? We present the high-level set of paradigm-relevant insights and 
recommendations provided to the policy author teams. We also provide the policy 
specific thresholds of acceptability from the public acceptability analysis in WP5.  
In addition to these elements aimed at briefing the policy author teams, researchers were 
appointed to two of the three policy author teams to ensure that the paradigms’ insights and 




                                               
1
 This information was not available to the author teams when they  developed the initial policies 
proposals for the first edition of this report; however, it was available when revisions of the policy 
mixes were being considered as this revised version of the report was produced. 
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3.1 What are paradigms and why are they important to 
DYNAMIX? 
3.1.1 What are paradigms? 
Paradigm is a term that has come to be applied loosely with a range of different meanings; it 
is synonymous and used interchangeably with belief, concept, theory, and even tradition, 
practice, or attitude. In broad terms, an individual or group of people’s paradigm is the 
worldview – the set of sometimes unconscious values, beliefs and ideologies – in which they 
are immersed and which they use to navigate any new evidence, challenges or choices with 
which they find themselves confronted. Paradigms manifest themselves externally via 
discourses and are reinforced within society via the creation of social technical systems.  
Paradigms exist across society in different shapes and forms. Typically, the literature 
classifies paradigms into two subcategories:  
1. Scientific paradigms encapsulate those paradigms held by scientists and 
professionals in both the natural and social sciences. Thomas Kuhn popularised 
the concept of paradigm in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 
1962). Kuhn described the development, progress and lifecycle of science in terms of 
the broad scientific community’s strength of conviction in a set of prevailing theories or 
methods: a dominant paradigm. Kuhn postulated that science goes through alternating 
periods of stability and changeability – in which a combination of factors, such as the 
emergence of new contradictory evidence and the availability of alternative plausible 
hypotheses, may coincide to provide more favourable conditions for the shift to a new 
paradigm.  
Social science paradigms represent a subset of scientific paradigms but with a 
greater tendency toward numerous competing paradigms, reflecting different world 
views and models of how society will respond to a given intervention. They in many 
respects reflect the complexity and diversity in human behaviour, with different models 
being relevant depending on the context. The important difference between social 
science paradigms and socio-cultural paradigms is that the judgements and models 
used by social scientists are subject to review and challenge about the degree to 
which they reflect how the world works, unlike the beliefs underlying socio-cultural 
paradigms which need not be. 
2. Socio-cultural paradigms which represent the remaining non-technical 
ideologies, beliefs, and values of society. The concept of socio-cultural paradigms 
as defined here represents a particular philosophy of life or a framework of ideas, 
beliefs and values through which a community or an individual interprets the world and 
interacts with it. The term often reflected in (and reflects) religion and political 
ideology. Unlike scientific paradigms, which tend to be clear-cut and incommensurable 
with one another, it is quite common for there to be a number of socio-cultural 
paradigms within society, apparently contradicting one another. Socio-cultural 
paradigms have the capacity to create their own stability when collectively held; with 
observable behaviour reinforcing the prevailing world view held by those around you. 
This therefore makes culture and cultural differences essential in permitting different 
world views to exist and paradigm shifts to occur when cultural exchange occurs. 
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3.1.2 Paradigms and sustainability 
Alongside the limits to growth discourse (see Meadows et al. 1972), the desire for resource 
efficiency and decoupling has increasingly become a socially co-constructed concept. 
Therefore, the definition of paradigm to be used within DYNAMIX requires an understanding 
of how socio-cultural and scientific paradigms interrelate and how they become tangible via 
the notion of discourses. A review of the literature reveals that while it is possible to define 
socio-cultural paradigm, scientific paradigm and discourse as separate concepts, many of the 
resource efficiency terms and paradigms can be placed in any of these three categories 
depending on the context in which the paradigm is used and to whom it relates (policy 
makers, individuals, institutions, etc.), and of course, from whose perspective the term or 
paradigm is reported from. For example, the concept of sustainability might be observed and 
theorised by both natural and social scientists but seen to be a socio-cultural paradigm within 
a social justice discourse. The new constraints required by sustainability have also led to 
scientific paradigm shifts within established fields such as economics. 
3.1.3 Why are paradigms important to DYNAMIX? 
One’s paradigm can bias the way one engages externally in collective discussion about 
phenomena, problems and solutions. This collective external manifestation of a given 
paradigm is known as the discourse. According to Driesch (2007), discourses establish 
meanings, identify agents, confirm relations between actors and other entities, set the 
boundaries for what is legitimate knowledge, and generate what is accepted as common 
sense. In essence, an individual’s discourse is the interface between his or her (inner) 
paradigm and the outside world. Importantly for DYNAMIX, discourses represent the main 
interface between scientific paradigms and socio-cultural paradigms, and therefore often 
highlight areas of significantly different perspectives and worldviews. 
When discourses are seen in context with scientific, socio-cultural paradigms, institutions 
(including governments and the tools and policies they develop in order to influence 
behaviour), a wider paradigm system forms as shown in Figure 5.  
The paradigm system presents the means that paradigms can be observed, co-created and 
re-validated. So for example, social science paradigms can become self-reinforcing when 
interacting with socio-cultural paradigms via policies. The scope for changes in socio-cultural 
paradigms perceived achievable by social scientists working for policy makers can become 
limited by existing worldviews of how people will respond, reinforced by observations. There 
is also the potential for people’s socio-cultural paradigms (and therefore behaviour) to be 
constrained by the worldview messages communicated within the way that policies are 
constructed and are communicated. This makes paradigm changes and shifts complex to 
implement. 
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Source: DYNAMIX deliverable D1.12  
Figure 5: Mapping of the paradigm system 
 
3.2 How do the DYNAMIX stakeholders view different 
paradigms? 
The DYNAMIX project team engages with policy makers and expert stakeholders on a regular 
basis through Policy Platform events held in Brussels. During the 2nd DYNAMIX Policy 
Platform, which took place on 24 and 25 October 2013, the DYNAMIX team explored the 
feasibility and potential impact of alternative paradigms, as viewed through concepts (such as 
‘green growth’) which are often not the dominant paradigm but reflect and reveal large parts 
                                               
2
 http://dynamix-project.eu/use-paradigms-dynamix  
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of a paradigm system as explored in Figure 5 by offering an alternative conceptual view of an 
alternative paradigm. This was done within an interactive working group session of 58 
participants from 16 European countries attending the Policy Platform, including policy 
makers, researchers, and representatives from civil society organisations, business, 
environmental protection agencies, and international organisations. 
The working group exercise sought to use participants’ experience and expertise to explore 
their current perspectives, identify barriers to, and comment on the potential of different 
paradigm conceptual terms. In small groups of 4-6, participants discussed a sub-section of 
three of the following paradigm concepts: green growth, circular economy, biomimicry, green 
economy, transition towns, reliance on markets, and beyond GDP. Participants assessed the 
concepts’ (i) potential to realise absolute decoupling, and (ii) the feasibility of and (iii) any 
specific barriers to their widespread adoption, drawing on their personal experience and 
perspectives. Groups were given a ‘concept sheet’ for each of the three concepts with a brief 
description of the concept, and questions on impact, barriers and feasibility to discuss and 
complete together. The outcome from the exercise is shown in Box 4 below. 
Stakeholders also offered comments on the apparent inverse relationship between the 
feasibility of a paradigm concept and its decoupling potential, remarking that concepts with 
high decoupling potential often focus on lifestyle and consumption changes, which are 
considered more difficult to achieve. Participants further discussed the paradox of scarcity 
and how since many resources are not scarce, policy should focus on the decoupling of 
economic growth from environmental impact rather than from resource use. The important 
issue of whether growth and decoupling of environmental impact can be complementary 
goals was also raised, with divided opinions. 
3.3 How can DYNAMIX promote paradigm change?  
Achieving certain targets of the proposed policy mixes requires the inclusion of policies that 
go beyond the perceived limits of political feasibility with respect to the existing paradigm. 
While paradigms may be deeply embedded and appear difficult to change, paradigms are not 
immovable, and can be influenced and reshaped over time in response to both new evidence 
and positive experiences of similar actions. Furthermore, depending on how things are 
presented, different groups and individuals have been shown to be adaptable to different 
perspectives and values. The analysis of public acceptability within DYNAMIX has sought to 
map-out how policy sequencing can be used within these pathways of interactions in a way 
that might lead to the required paradigm changes over time.  
‘Theoretical pathways for paradigm change’ are proposed to support policies presently 
outside the existing political paradigm to become acceptable and feasible to implement at a 
later date. A ‘theoretical pathway for paradigm change’ maps out the envisaged pathway of 
interactions between society and actors which would lead to the required paradigm change 
over time.  
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Box 4: DYNAMIX stakeholders’ views of different paradigm conceptual terms 
• Transition towns was seen to have some decoupling potential, but perceived 
feasibility of widespread implementation was generally low, with concerns raised 
over its scalability, the amount of time needed for broader implementation, and the 
degree of change from current lifestyles required. 
• Green growth was seen by the majority of participants as a concept with only 
modest decoupling potential, but also as a ‘first step towards more radical change’, 
with moderate to high feasibility, as participants felt that the paradigm was already 
widely in place. However, the lack of financial industry and business people 
promoting it, high shareholder pressure for short-term profit, measurement 
challenges, and the feeling that the concept is not concrete enough (‘same game, 
new name’) were all cited by participants as barriers to more successful adoption 
and application of the concept as a paradigm. Still, the concept was one of the most 
popular, with several stakeholders championing the concept as an ‘improvement on 
the current status’ and a ‘top policy priority’. 
• Reliance on markets and market-based instruments were felt to be good concepts, 
but nonetheless highly dependent on the state of the economy, strength of political 
will, and on the design, implementation and regulation of market mechanisms. 
Feasibility was considered to be generally high, depending to an extent on the 
Member State political context. Key criticisms of the concept included public and 
private acceptability (‘nobody likes taxes’), coordination issues between market 
actors, distributional issues, predictability of policy outcome, and competitiveness 
issues. 
• The circular economy was the most popular among stakeholders in the Policy 
Platform working group session, with moderately high scores for both the 
decoupling potential and feasibility of widespread application. Participants noted 
that policy designed around this concept needs to be supportive of both industry 
and consumers and the connection between them. Low current levels of producer 
responsibility; a disconnection between producers and consumers of waste 
throughout the different value chains; and a lack of collection infrastructure and 
innovation in recycling capabilities were all listed by participants as barriers to the 
more successful application of the circular economy concept. It was championed by 
many as having ‘strong potential’ and as a ‘good direction, but a lot to do.’ 
• Beyond GDP – a paradigm concept which focuses on developing indicators that 
are as clear and appealing as GDP, but more inclusive of environmental and social 
aspects of progress – was considered to have a high potential for achieving 
absolute decoupling, participants considered it to have a very poor chance of 
widespread adoption, due to the challenge of defining and reaching consensus on 
indicators that can be useful and meaningful. 
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This process makes reference to the ‘two circle’ model of paradigm change presented in case 
B of Figure 6 below, where positive outcomes from early sequenced policies lay the 
foundations for previously ‘out-of-paradigm’ policies to be implemented in subsequent steps. 
This is in contrast with the less problematic case A where the there is already at least one 
‘target’ policy or policy mix that leads to a safe operating space which fits within the 
acceptability limits defined by the current paradigm. In case B, the key is to design a policy 
pathway which, whilst challenging, is publically acceptable to present citizens but that moves 
the paradigm towards one compatible with a safe operating space in the longer-term, through 
a series of ‘stepping-stone’ sequencing policies.  
 
 
Figure 6: The two circle model for policy pathways towards a safe operating space 
 
This model calls for policies to be designed in a way that not only changes behaviours (via a 
tax for example), but additionally considers how the policy might support a change in people’s 
worldviews in a way that supports future policy measures that are even more ‘contentious’ 
and ‘highly contentious’ than is presently considered publicly acceptable. The policy therefore 
needs to be adjusted and extended in a way that creates a safe pathway of future policies.  
The factors that permit the extension of what policies are publicly acceptable include how the 
policy is developed in partnership with stakeholders, and the political capital available to do 
so. To support this process in the ex-ante assessment, the policy development process needs 
to make an initial, simplified attempt to describe this pathway by responding to a few 
questions for each proposed policy considered beyond the present paradigm. We therefore 
asked policy author teams to answer the following questions when a policy measure was 
perceived beyond the present paradigm: 
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1. Why might the proposed policy fail if implemented at present? 
a. Is there a top-down barrier within the existing relevant political authority to 
implementing this? If so, what/who/what form does this take3? 
b. Is there a corresponding bottom-up resistance within society to its successful 
implementation? What value or behaviour is being threatened? 
c. Is there an established channel of discourse between policy and society on this 
issue? If so, who initiated the discourse and what form did it take? 
2. Are there envisaged ‘natural’4 (or counter-factual) processes of change which would 
significantly change this situation?  
3. Using the responses to the questions above, what do the changes which would need 
to occur over time to make the policy implementable look like? 
It was envisaged that the responses to these questions both support policy author teams to 
develop ‘smarter’ and more ambitious policies, as well as support the analysis of paradigms 
within public discourse in WP5.  
3.4 What kind of paradigm changes are desirable within 
DYNAMIX? 
The cornerstone scenarios, as introduced in Section 2.5, propose the two variables 
considered to be most important in supporting or hindering the achievement of the DYNAMIX 
objectives. These two variables (materialism versus environmentalism; and the level of 
innovation, both social and technical), can therefore be mapped on and axes and used to 
illustrate different directions of paradigm change, and how these relate to the DYNAMIX 
objectives and cornerstone scenarios. Within this mapped space, there will be a theoretical 
‘safe paradigm space’ in which the population would need to inhabit to meet the DYNAMIX 
environmental objectives. In addition to this, there is also a theoretical (and unknown) growth 
space in this mapped area which divides the negative-GDP growth space from the positive-
GDP space. These two curves are conceptually plotted in Figure 7 below. 
Within DYNAMIX we are proposing to use resource efficiency policies to make the economy 
more efficient and expand the safe operating space closer to the reference scenario. In 
addition, we are also seeking to design the policy packages to move the underlying paradigm 
(the reference paradigm) closer towards the safe growth space as seen by the overlap 
between the growth space and the safe operating space. These changes are illustrated in  
Figure 8. 
  
                                               
3
 This includes any business lobbying interest. 
I.e. Are any of the contextual issues from question 1 likely to change within the foreseeable future (i.e. 
change of government) or are there long-term processes of social change which would change these 
circumstances, notably occurring in the absence of political intervention? 
Development of DYNAMIX Policy Mixes – Revised deliverable D4.2 














Note: The positions and lines on this figure are for illustrative purposes only 
Figure 7: Conceptual representation of existing paradigm context 
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Whilst theoretical, this mapping exercise is able to offer a few insights into the cornerstone 
scenarios: 
1. The safe growth space will be cantered within the safe globe quadrant of the 
mapped area. Under the safe globe scenario less paradigm intervention is 
required and policy can work within the high innovation and collaborative paradigm 
context. 
2. Under the back-to-nature scenario, we need not necessarily move towards safe 
growth, only safe operating space. This is because under this scenario the 
population has already expressed an acceptance for policy outcomes that do not 
necessarily deliver positive growth in GDP. There may be a need within this 
scenario for targeted ‘green-innovation’ to ensure the efficient use of resources. 
3. Under the economic bonanza scenario, high levels of innovation offer the apparent 
prospect for green growth but high levels of materialism-driven consumption 
means that it is less likely (than the safe globe scenario) that a safe operating 
space is realised. The policy choices under this scenario context are to either 
implement far-reaching policy measures intended to cap consumption but risk 
social-regressivity, or social engagement leading to paradigm shift. However, it 
seems unlikely that the political capital could be present within a materialist 
paradigm to implement policies which significantly cap consumption. 
4. Under the divided we trudge scenario, there would very unlikely be sufficient levels 
of innovation or cooperation necessary to be in safe operating space or safe 
growth space. Successful intervention under this scenario would have to involve 
attempts at paradigm change. In this context, prioritising moves towards a more 
environmentalism paradigm may also provide the cooperation needed to stimulate 
innovation.  
3.5 What has the paradigms analysis to tell those developing 
resource efficiency policy?  
3.5.1 Recommendations to those developing and implementing policy 
Detailed guidance has been provided to the policy author teams in the development of the 
policies. Further to this, for two of the policy packages, research staff were embedded into the 
policy author teams to provide guidance on the sequencing from a paradigm perspective. This 
was preceded by a general set of recommendations as formulated for a broad range of policy 
makers in this area. These were based on the findings of the paradigm analysis conducted on 
the WP3 case studies and input from the 1st and 2nd DYNAMIX Policy Platforms: 
 Become aware of the worldviews and paradigms of all those inputting into the 
policy formulation, including your own and those supporting you. Failure to do 
so risks disconnect and a reactionary discourse. There is the potential for people’s 
socio-cultural paradigms (and therefore behaviour) to be influenced by the worldview 
messages communicated within the way that policies are constructed and are 
communicated. Additionally, those developing policy also need to be aware that the 
scope for changes in socio-cultural paradigms perceived achievable can become 
limited by the worldviews held by policy makers (and their advisors) of how people will 
respond. This will likely be validated by ex-post observations and risks being 
reinforced ex-post via the policy once implemented. 
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 Be aware that the terminology used around paradigms is used interchangeably. 
A review of the literature in this area highlights a lack of consistency in the use of 
some of the terminology among authors and, in some cases, with important concepts 
being used interchangeably. Indeed, an exploration of these issues has revealed that 
a given concept can justifiably be categorised differently depending on the context. 
For example, the concept of sustainability might be seen to be a socio-cultural 
paradigm within a social justice discourse which is observed and theorised by social 
scientists. The new constraints required by sustainability have also led to natural 
scientific paradigm shifts within established fields such as economics. 
 Strong and credible government is a key point of commonality amongst 
successful policy mixes for decoupling. Political capital is especially important at 
the point of policy design and introduction; once the hurdle of introducing the policy is 
overcome, there is little evidence amongst the WP3 case studies at least of 
repercussions arising from political changeover. Furthermore, participants in the 1st 
Policy Platform working group on paradigms remarked that initial public support is not 
always a necessary ingredient for successful policy where the political capital exists to 
carry it through instead; indeed, participants identified a range of such cases of 
successful policy where public support rather grew with time. To this end, it may be 
worth considering supplementing the policy mix with policies to improve citizen 
engagement with politics, improve governance and public institution structure and 
efficiency, increase credibility and trust (e.g., through transparency) and encourage 
cross-party agreement on key policies. 
 Give prominence to public acceptability issues and be prepared to make 
adjustments to the policy to maintain it. Policies must be sensitive to the current 
paradigm; policies which out-step the boundary of current thinking, behaviour, values 
and beliefs are more likely to be met with significant or prohibitive resistance from 
target groups, policy makers themselves and/or the wider public in general, making 
them politically unfeasible. Measures which can serve to improve acceptability include: 
o Value and engage with all perspectives and groups through consultation 
and participation in the policy design process to explore mutually agreeable 
solutions to new barriers.  
o Choose words, concepts, discourses and rhetoric carefully. The 
understanding of terms and concepts such as ‘green growth’ or ‘sustainability’ 
may differ subtly between different groups and stakeholders in society; they 
are riddled with preconceptions, various associations and incite biases for or 
against.  
o Demonstrate that such changes are possible. Highlight where possible how 
equivalent paradigm shifts have occurred in the past in particular sectors (e.g., 
in transport, telecommunications). 
o Consider making concessions to target groups to ease the introduction of 
the suggested policies, and make a policy more palatable overall. For 
example: in the case of fisheries management in Iceland, resource permits 
were allocated via grandfathering rather than by auction. 
o Be prepared to support transitions in sectors most affected. The presence 
of laggard industries (especially the large or traditionally valued sectors) can 
discourage policy initiatives and prevent wider societal paradigm change if they 
are unable to adapt or transition without substantial (economic and/or social) 
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cost. Consider and tackle industry lock-in amongst laggards with policies to 
enable and support a sustainable transition to alternatives.  
o Frame the change in the context of a wider transition over the longer 
term and highlight where equivalent paradigm shifts have occurred. 
Although such transitions can often have short-term and very visible costs 
(e.g., job losses, factory closures), they typically have benefits which although 
are in the future and theoretical, will often outweigh these costs (e.g., cost 
reductions, jobs in new industries, efficient allocation and use of scarce 
resources). 
o Use policy sequencing of softer measures, such as voluntary schemes, 
to introduce the concept change required.  This is particular the case where 
the policy is proposing a paradigm level change which people are not familiar 
with and have concerns over. Sequencing of policies permits people to try and 
experience what a different system feels like and how it works in practice. 
o Recycle any revenues generated from implementing policies, aiming the 
benefits close to these most affected by the policy. As was done with the 
UK Aggregates Levy, where revenue was initially earmarked to enable a 
reduction in employers’ National Insurance contributions (NICs) and for a 
Sustainability Fund to provide funds to help address the environmental impacts 
of aggregate extraction (the Sustainability Fund closed in 2011, while the Levy 
continues). 
 Beware the trade-off with effectiveness. If the end-result of the policy mix is that the 
target resource is substituted in such a way where the environmental pressure is 
merely displaced, a paradigm shift towards consumption within limits cannot be said to 
have successfully occurred. Consider the alternative type (or manner of use) of 
resource being promoted, and the risk of the environmental pressure being displaced 
or exported without at the same time being reasonably reduced. Similarly, consider 
and address possible rebound effects of the policy or policy mix. 
 Avoid sidestepping difficult paradigms, and where necessary, be prepared to 
invest considerable political capital. Often the most challenging and needed 
paradigm changes will provide a return on the investment with ‘interest’. 
In summary, an understanding of paradigms and public acceptability issues is important. 
Designing policy to maximise public acceptability can be time-consuming and may require the 
policies to be sequenced or adjusted. However, the benefits include maintaining political 
capital for the future and permitting policy objectives to be achieved which would not have 
otherwise been possible. It is worth reiterating that resistance to a policy can be triggered by 
implicit paradigm messaging built into the policy itself, and that of preceding policies. This can 
occur via the worldviews held by those who design the policy.  
3.5.2  Where are the existing paradigm edges? 
The findings from the public acceptability analysis in WP5 identified the limits or thresholds 
in public acceptability. Some of these thresholds are more contextual in nature and 
represent transition type concerns that policy makers are tasked to respond to and consider 
making concessions and mitigations for. Other thresholds, whilst challenging to work with, 
identify the paradigm edge of the existing social-political system to  implement policy in this 
area (as exemplified by case B in Figure 6 of the ‘two-circles’ model). It is these thresholds 
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that are worth investing more political capital in overcoming as the return on this investment 
will likely make policy making in this area easier once the policy has met its objectives. These 
types of threshold are highlighted by underlying in the following: 
• Green fiscal reform: The threshold of the measure centres not only on individual’s 
loss, but also a sense that they are being imposed fairly and evenly, and not just 
where it is possible. 
• Stimulation of sharing systems: The threshold of acceptability is associated with 
those citizens who either don’t want to or can’t participate, and then focused on the 
level of public funding provided. 
• Product standards: Consumers in some more Eurosceptic Member States are 
presently liable to reject collective action for environmental purposes.  
• Food waste policies: Acceptability thresholds have been identified around policies 
that threaten to increase living costs or significantly reduce the consumer’s right to 
shop freely and throw unwanted food away. 
• Value added tax (VAT) on meat products: Acceptability thresholds have been 
identified associated with fairness concerns, border issues and competitiveness 
issues.  
• Step-by-step restriction of advertising and marketing: The threshold of 
acceptability is associated with restrictions on advertisement on luxury goods linked to 
conspicuous consumption. 
• Local currencies for labour-based services: It is likely that there would be 
objections to Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS) where they are perceived as 
being primarily motivated as a way of avoiding taxation, or where they become 
compulsory for buyers or sellers to participate in.  
3.6 Next steps for paradigms and policy mixes in DYNAMIX 
The theory of change and recommendations set out in Sections 3.3 to 3.5 above have served 
along with the other various detailed components of analysis in DYNAMIX so far to inform the 
conception and design of three policy mixes, set out here in the following chapters of this 
report. In terms of paradigms, this is an iterative process; in WP5 we assess the acceptability 
and effectiveness of policies and reflect on the scope for adjustment of existing instruments or 
introduction of sequencing policies as necessary. It is not necessary to eliminate from 
consideration those policies perceived to be politically unacceptable. The approach proposed 
here encourages the sequencing of policies to support transitions in acceptability. 
The following Chapters 4-6 present the initial DYNAMIX policy mixes together with the topic-
specific discussion and analysis, which formed the basis for the selection of instruments 
within each policy mix. The first policy mix is overarching (Chapter 4) while the other two 
focus on land use (Chapter 5) and materials (Chapter 6). 
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4 Developing the overarching policy mix  
4.1 The current problem situation, drivers and barriers 
4.1.1 Current trends in resource use in the policy mix target area  
The overall environmental impact related to consumption of goods, services by households 
and companies in the EU continues to grow, creating impacts within the EU and globally. In 
its Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe the European Commission (2011a, p. 2) 
suggested that “if we carry on using resources at the current rate, by 2050 we will need, on 
aggregate, the equivalent of more than two planets to sustain us”. EEA analysis of nine EU 
Member States (representing 268 million or 53.5 % of the EU’s total 501 million people) has 
found that the majority of key environmental pressures caused by total national consumption 
can be attributed to food and drink, housing and infrastructure, and mobility. These three 
broad consumption areas are estimated to have contributed approximately two-thirds of 
consumption-related material use, greenhouse gas emissions, acidifying emissions and 
ozone precursor emissions (EEA 2012a). 
The indirect pressures that are created along the production chains of the goods and services 
consumed result in environmental impacts, as for example global warming, biodiversity 
degradation, soil sealing and erosion and air and water pollution. Since an increasing share of 
the final and intermediate goods consumed in Europe is imported, a growing proportion of 
impacts caused by our consumption takes place in other parts of the world. The average 
environmental footprint (an indicator of pressures from consumption) per person in EEA 
member countries is about double the available biocapacity (an indicator of land which is 
biologically productive) of those countries (EEA 2012a). 
4.1.2 (Main) drivers of those trends? 
The trends towards increasing consumption of resource-intensive goods and services 
observed in the EU over the last decades have no single driver. Rather, a web of interrelated 
direct and indirect drivers results in the observed trends. Drivers include inter alia 
demography (e.g., population growth, higher life expectancy), rising affluence, decreasing 
production prices, increasing pace of product innovation, increasing consumer choices 
through the expansion of trade,infrastructure design and consumption patterns shaped by 
social norms, advertising and consumerist values (Tan et al. 2013, EEA 2012a).  
On the demand side, the integrated and widespread cultural, economic, institutional and 
political system that supports consumerism encourages individuals to establish their place in 
society through the purchase of material possessions (e.g., housing, vehicles, products) and 
the lifestyle choices they make (e.g., diet, holidays, transport mode choice). Widespread 
consumerism, which is promoted by advertising and peer-pressure leads to consumption of 
resource-intensive goods far beyond the satisfaction of basic needs, in order to cultivate an 
identity, an image and prestige vis-à-vis other individuals and groups. In these cases “wants” 
are often perceived as “needs”. Thus demand-side drivers are essentially about individual and 
societal choices. 
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Table 1: Overview of the identified past and current drivers 
Demography (e.g., population growth, higher life expectancy, smaller households) 
Rising affluence 
Inadequate resource pricing, i.e., a lack of internalisation of external costs of resource use 
Environmentally harmful subsidies 
Short product lifespans (e.g., because of built-in obsolescence, fashion, limited options for 
and high cost of repairing or up-dating)  
Limited whole-life costing assessments in investment decisions 
Limited liability rules 
Demand for high profits and short pay-back periods of investment linked to the institutional 
framework in which companies operate (rules for listed companies, banking system) 
Technological and social lock-in 
Decreasing production and retail prices 
Increasing pace of product innovation 
Increasing consumer choice through the expansion of trade 
Advertising and marketing reinforcing consumerist values 
Infrastructure design reinforcing unsustainable consumption patterns  
Social norms and habits 
Institutional bias of governments towards promoting growth  
The influence of vested interests on policy-making 
 
On the production side, drivers causing inefficient resource use include demand for high 
profits and short pay-back periods of investment, inadequate resource pricing (not reflecting 
the provision of the resource and its resource value) and a lack of internalisation of external 
costs of resource use (Withana et al. 2014). These drivers lead to short product lifespans, 
which in part is also due to built-in obsolescence (Slade 2006, Guiltinan 2009) and limited life-
cycle costing5 in investment decisions. This is exacerbated by limited liability rules and 
warranties for products for the private sector and the existence of environmentally harmful 
subsidies (Oosterhuis and ten Brink 2014).  
Together, production and consumption-side factors are leading to technological and social 
lock-in leading to unsustainable consumption patterns, i.e., systemic linkages between 
technology, existing infrastructure and behaviour patterns that appear hard to break. This is 
for example the case with transport infrastructure, where a wide range of factors mean that 
we are currently locked-in carbon intensive road transport. Here, the crisis has much 
constrained the financing of large-scale infrastructure, as banks are less willing to invest in 
                                               
5
 Life-cycle costs refer to the total cost of ownership over the life of an asset. 
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innovating and more sustainable long-term projects such as railways and underground 
networks. Institutional barriers like market failures, uncertainty, investors’ inexperience and 
the absence of dedicated tools in the public sector, as well as social factors like convenience, 
motorisation rate, customs or even esteem, continue to make investing in green transport 
infrastructure a really difficult choice for policy. 
Linked to the issue of externalities is the wider issue of a frequent conflict between public and 
private interests; which can in many cases be characterised as a conflict between short-term 
(particularly reflecting the interests of current population cohorts) and the long-term (reflecting 
a public responsibility for the interests of future generations, or other species). Market and 
governance failures mean that there are not enough obstacles to corporations increasing 
private profits while disregarding the wider social costs of their operations – a process that 
globalisation of the world economy has rather strengthened. Similarly, the provision of public 
goods by private endeavour (e.g., climate change mitigation through agricultural land use 
practice) is often not or not adequately rewarded in existing market and regulatory signals. 
Until long-term societal interests are more adequately reflected in decision making at all 
levels, the trend towards over-resource use and pollution will be difficult to address. 
The underlying drivers of resource overconsumption are strong; they are deeply embedded 
and often mutually reinforcing. Our economic model is fuelled by consumption spending, and 
GDP growth is generally seen by policy makers as a fundamental necessity to ensure jobs 
and prosperity. Institutions and their policies have more often than not encouraged 
consumption, and aligned with business. Even in a context of austerity as the current one, 
consumer spending is encouraged as it is seen as necessary to keep the economy going 
while public expenditure is cut back. In a world of infinite resources and infinite capacity to 
absorb pollution or innovate to avoid pollution, this model could work. However, both natural 
resources and the planet’s capacity to absorb pollution are limited. 
There is a growing agreement between scientists and analysts that a significant reduction of 
overconsumption challenges the premises on which our economies are built and would 
require important, structural changes (Jackson, 2009, Daly 1996, UNEP 2011b, OECD 2011). 
However, the academic community does disagree about the extent of the required changes. 
Particularly, they debate the future role of economic growth (understood as growth in GDP) in 
industrialised countries (Urhammer and Røpke 2013).  
Proponents of ‘green growth’ or ‘a green economy’, most prominently the OECD and UNEP, 
argue that economic growth per se does not pose a problem, but that material intensive 
growth that is associated with high environmental impacts does (OECD 2011, UNEP 2011b). 
They advocate that economic dynamism, market processes and technological innovation – if 
properly incentivised – can be harnessed for addressing environmental problems and 
increasing resource efficiency (EEA 2011a). Thus, the benefits of growth could be preserved 
while at the same time ensuring that (public and private) investments and policy frameworks 
spearhead the shift towards a less resource intensive and material wealth-driven economy.  
Towards the other end of the spectrum, authors arguing for a ‘steady state economy’ (Daly 
2008), ‘prosperity without growth’ (Jackson 2009, Schor 2010, NEF 2010) or ‘degrowth’ 
(Assadourian 2012, Schneider et al. 2010, Martínez-Alier et al. 2010) claim that – in rich 
countries – additional GDP growth and sustainable levels of material and energy use cannot 
be combined. The argument rests on the understanding that physical expansion of the 
economy (physical growth) is bound by limits, often referred to as ‘planetary boundaries’ 
building on Rockström et al. (2009). These authors stipulate that reducing the use of natural 
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resources and the environmental impacts to sustainable levels while the economy grows is 
unrealistic, particularly because rebound effects limit the absolute effect of efficiency 
improvements (Jackson 2009). 
The latter approaches also build on the recognition that there is a weak correlation between 
GDP growth and increases in well-being in high-income countries and pursuing growth per se 
might actually undermine the realisation of wellbeing benefits.6 Another argument is that, 
independently of environmental issues, high levels of economic growth in the rich world are 
highly uncertain or even improbable to achieve in the future. Reasons for slowing of growth 
include ageing, resource scarcity and the shift to services in the economy which have lower 
potential of productivity improvements than industrial production (Demailliy et al. 2013, Miegel 
2010). 
Both of the research streams depicted above, however, see a need for shifting consumption 
patterns towards more sustainable options. This is supported by empirical evidence: The key 
areas with the highest potential for contributing to decoupling are linked to lifestyle-based 
consumption choices in the three consumption areas food, housing and mobility, such as diet 
choice, number of people per household, living area per person, distance travelled and choice 
of transport mode. The areas of food, transport and buildings are indeed those that contribute 
the most to environmental pressures in the EU (UNEP 2011b, Tan et al. 2013, European 
Commission 2011a). 
Yet, what drives consumption patterns is subject to intense debate as well as leading over to 
the key question if and how policy could shift consumer behaviour. Judging from the 
popularity of information-based policy instruments (e.g., energy efficiency labelling, 
ecolabelling, organic food labelling, etc.) used to promote behavioural change, deficiency in 
consumer information and lack of awareness seem to have long been seen as the one of the 
main drivers of unsustainable consumption patterns. Evaluations of past policies, including 
within the ex-post analysis of DYNAMIX, have shown, however, that information-based 
instruments used in isolation are not effective (Southerton et al. 2011, Fazio-Fedrigo et al. 
2014). This points to other drivers shaping consumption patterns and hence calls for different 
(additional) policy instruments as part of a policy mix. 
Research in the multi-disciplinary field of behavioural economics has produced evidence on 
the role of framing, anchoring, mental shortcuts, information overload and emotions in 
decision-making (Kahnemann 2011). Recent sociological research in the field of practice 
theory emphasises the interplay of materials (for example infrastructure and technology), 
competences (mainly skills and knowledge) and meaning (referring to values, attitudes and 
emotions) in shaping everyday practices (Shove et al. 2012). Practice theory confirms earlier 
findings about the strong influence of habits in consumption choices (Defra 2011) and seeks 
to explore the social setting in which they evolve and change. Thereby, it puts the focus on 
groups of people who carry out the same practice (for example bike riding or car sharing) 
                                               
6
 Easterlin (1974) found that while within countries there was a noticeable positive association between 
income and happiness, there was little evidence of happinesss differences between rich and poor 
countries. For a more recent assessment, see  Kubiszewski et al. (2013), which notes that welfare as 
estimated by the Genuine Progress Indicator has declined since 1978, notwithstanding increases in 
GDP.  
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rather than putting the individual and his or her general attitude towards the environment at 
the centre as most conventional consumer policies do (Shove 2010, Umpfenbach 2014). 
Another explanation for escalating consumption patterns has been proposed by Schor (1998) 
who has introduced the concept of the work-and-spend-cycle. Longer work hours and fewer 
boundaries between work and free time, partly create a lifestyle that is driven by convenience 
and therefore more wasteful, but also characterised by higher stress levels and higher 
income, for both of which consumerism can be a compensation. 
Finally, lack of transparency in decision-making and strongly vested interests at various levels 
of governance across the EU are another persistent systemic problem when addressing 
resource use challenges through policy.  
4.1.3 Implications for the conception of policies 
The differences in problem analysis outlined above lead to different policy proposals 
(Urhammer and Ropke 2013). While proponents of green growth and a green economy 
mainly argue for internalising environmental bads in policies and prices, reforming 
environmental harmful subsidies, stimulating green technologies, innovation and improving 
education and governance, authors aiming for prosperity without growth or degrowth propose 
deeper changes to the socio-economic system – though with variation between authors (see 
Table 2). The proposals include stricter regulation of the financial sector, labour market 
changes and redistribution mechanisms to share wealth between social groups (Table 3). 








Ecological tax reform pro Pro pro pro 
Carbon tax pro Pro mentions pro 
Cap and trade pro Pro mentions pro 
Border tax adjustment not incl. Pro not incl. mentions 
Technology policies pro Pro pro mentions 
Stopping environmental harmful subsidies pro Pro not incl. pro 
Green subsidies pro Pro not incl. pro 
Green stimulus pro Pro mentions not incl. 
Education and re-education pro Pro mentions mentions 
Increasing demand for low-resource services not incl. not incl. pro mentions 
Pension fund investment in green infrastructure pro Pro not incl. not incl. 
Eco-tax revenues invested in green transition not incl. Pro mentions pro 
Financial transaction tax for green transition not incl. not incl. pro pro 
Advertisement tax revenues for green transition not incl. not incl. not incl. pro 
Source: Adapted from Urhammer and Ropke 2013, p. 65. 
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Local currencies not incl. not incl. not incl. pro 
Strengthening the informal economy not incl. not incl. not incl. pro 
Enhancing local production and services not incl. mentions pro pro 
Maximum and minimum income not incl. not incl. pro pro 
Citizen’s income not incl. not incl. pro not incl. pro 
Worksharing not incl. not incl. pro. pro 
Division btw. Investment and retail banking not incl. not incl. not incl. pro. 
Demerging of banks ‘to big to fail’  not incl. not incl. not incl. pro 
Financial transaction tax not incl. not incl. pro pro 
Capital control not incl. not incl. not incl. pro 
Co-operative ownership not incl. not incl. not incl. mentions 
New business models not incl. not incl. mentions mentions 
Regulation of international trade not incl. not incl. pro mentions 
New measures of economic progress pro Pro pro pro 
Source: Adapted from Urhammer and Ropke 2013, p. 65. 
This analysis shows that there is clear common ground between the different approaches, 
mainly with respect to price-based instruments, incentives for innovation, information for and 
education of consumers, improved governance (for example mainstreaming of resource 
efficiency concerns into all EU policies) all of which the EU has also recognised as policy 
priorities (European Commission 2011a).  
In addition to the measures mentioned above, regulations (bans, emissions or quality 
standards, targets) as well as wider governance tools (transparency, accounting, assessment 
tools, participation and an improved science-policy interface to provide for evidence based 
policies) are also important for increasing resource efficiency and reducing environmental 
impacts associated with resource consumption. The policy design within DYNAMIX will build 
on this common ground. 
With respect to the question of growth, DYNAMIX takes an a-growth position, i.e., the team is 
agnostic about the possibility or need of future economic growth in the EU. The environmental 
goal of staying within limits, of decoupling social well-being from resource use and its 
environmental impacts is assumed to take primacy over any other objective. This means that 
the policy mix will not include policies to change the fundamental institutional structure of the 
EU’s socio-economic system (which would also go beyond the project’s scope), although it 
will occasionally point to the existence of choices which could have this effect. 
At the same time an a-growth position also implies that GDP growth does not play the role of 
an overriding policy objective, and that it cannot therefore be put forward as a veto against 
ambitious environmental policy, a role that it often occupies in public discourse (whether this 
is directly, or indirectly through the reference to intermediate objectives whose ultimate 
purpose is GDP growth, for example the trade liberalisation and competitiveness agendas).  
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In the current dominant political discourse growth is viewed as necessary to sustain high 
employment levels. Economic performance plays a central role in shaping the revenues 
available to governments and, correspondingly, the resources available for public services 
such as education, health care, policing, transport, pensions and other forms of social 
security. Growth is thus perceived as fundamental to the functioning of many aspects of 
modern society7. Resistance to major changes to this system are linked to fear of financial 
collapse, social and political instability, and loss of influence of vested interests. In addition, 
the remaining discrepancies in standards of living in the EU – both within as well as more 
importantly between Member States – are also used to justify policies that further stimulate 
economic growth. Moreover, the EU is an open economy interacting and competing with other 
world regions and any policy mix has to take into account impacts on trade and 
competitiveness. 
It can thus be argued that to convincingly follow an a-growth position, we would at least 
assume that EU’s society could also function with a stable GDP under certain circumstances, 
even if we cannot demonstrate this in detail within DYNAMIX, let alone test the robustness of 
this assumption. 
4.2 Guiding vision for 2050 
The ambition is that by 2050 all European citizens meet their basic needs and enjoy high 
levels of quality of life and well-being. At the same time, significant shifts in production and 
consumption patterns mean that impacts associated with the average consumption of a 
European citizen have gone down significantly and Europe’s overall footprint is within the 
earth’s carrying capacity. Efficiency and recycling in the economy have been substantially 
improved, including through system innovation (rather than only through technical 
improvements of previously used processes and products). Energy and materials input are 
very effectively used in an almost perfect circular economy (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 
2012). 
Both because of increased levels of awareness and the incentive structures in place (i.e., 
prices), consumers demand low environmental, health and social impact products. In a range 
of key consumption categories, habits have changed – with change of diets, increased 
collection rates of waste and end of life products, and potentially increased use of leasing or 
sharing of products such as cars and other equipment to facilitate innovation and reduce 
overall impacts.  
Products that are adaptable to changing user demand, long-lived, and designed for 
remanufacture are easily available and affordable, thus it has become widely shared 
consumer practice to use these products and services. Also, a combined set of technological 
and social innovations has brought about new, resource-light ways of fulfilling consumer 
needs through, for example, enabling wide-spread sharing, custom-fit design and re-design. 
The principle of stewardship ensures that resources are shared according to need, rather 
than squandered in conspicuous consumption. Infrastructures and land planning have been 
                                               
7
 See for example the assessment in the EEA’s 2010 “Assessment of Global Megatrends”, p. 50 (EEA, 
2011a). 
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adapted in a way so as to make sustainable living, moving and consuming the obvious choice 
for all social groups. 
Attractive options exist and it is socially accepted practice to substitute income with leisure to 
a certain extent. Overall, resource intensity of leisure activities has gone down substantially 
while consumption of immaterial or resource-light goods and services has gone up.  
4.3 Objectives for 2030 and 2050 
By 2030: 
• Consumption in the EU has shifted towards more sustainable goods. Products are better 
designed, more durable and can be recycled easily.  
• Systematic use of green public procurement, more systemic use of whole-life costing in 
public decisions and EU’s as well as MS’s budgets are climate and biodiversity proofed to 
ensure net positive impacts and hence the public sector leads by example. 
• At MS level financial incentives make consumers choose products with reduced 
environmental impacts. 
• By 2030 today’s niche markets (organic food - with a low GHG emissions impact-, eco-
labelled products etc.) have become more mainstream and the quality of labelling is 
improved. 
• The curriculum in schools addresses head-on issues of systems thinking, environmental 
scarcity and helps to improve understanding of the benefits to individuals and society of 
healthy, low (environmental) impact lifestyles and become aware of the risks associated 
with pollution and the threat associated with going beyond planetary boundaries. 
• Europe’s ecosystems and associated biodiversity are recovering; stocks of renewable 
resources are more wisely managed and depletion of non-renewable is slowed/halted. 
• Decision-making is becoming more transparent with the science-policy interface 
strengthened; natural capital accounting and associated metrics of progress (beyond 




The resource demands and environmental impacts associated with the average per capita 
consumption of a European citizen has reached a level where Europe’s footprint would allow 
9 billion people benefitting from the same high living standards to live on earth while staying 
within planetary boundaries.  
In particular by 2050 the policy mixes will have helped to progress towards the following 
objectives (see also Umpfenbach 2013): 
• Circular economy is the norm (close to 100 percent collection and recycling rates) across 
materials (e.g., use of virgin metals is reduced by 80 % compared to a 2010 baseline) and 
thanks to the achievement of almost 100 % collection and recycling rate. 
• The economy has finally been almost completely decarbonised thanks in particular 
through a steep increase in the share of energy coming from renewable sources and 
energy efficiency measures (per capita GHG emissions are reduced by 90 % compared to 
1990 levels) (or 2t CO2-eq per capita per year). 
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• No net demand of non-EU arable land, or a significant reduction in the net demand (the 
EU aims to produce its fair share of nutrients to feed an increased global population).  
• Sound management of water resources means that no region experiences water stress 
linked to human overuse. 
• All fish stocks in European waters are viable and managed in a way that ensures their 
long-term health and sustainability. 
• All European ecosystems are in good ecological conditions (thanks to substantial 
restoration measures and effective conservation policies). 
• Climate impacts that have not been avoided have led to a fundamental shift in decision-
making frameworks and modes. In particular the role of the public sector and citizens has 
changed towards a longer-term perspective being taken into account, reflecting a greater 
appreciation of systems thinking. 
Table 4 (see below) defines intermediate objectives for the pathway on the road towards 
2050. Each of the objectives is paired with the driver of resource inefficiency it is meant to 
address.  
The table’s third column proposes policy instruments suited to reach the objectives. With the 
exception of instruments that were judged to be out of the scope of the research project or 
extensively covered in numerous previous studies, detailed instrument descriptions were 
developed for this first set of promising set of policy instruments. The descriptions are 
presented in section 6.4. Obviously, this selection of potential interventions is neither 
complete nor will it in itself suffice to fully and securely reach the vision and objectives 
outlined above. It does however aim at covering the most relevant drivers with at least one or 
several instruments. 
Given the project’s limited resources for in-depth qualitative and quantitative assessment, an 
additional selection process was required to determine the set of policy instruments to be 
subject to in-depth ex-ante impact assessment. The following criteria were used to guide the 
selection (see also fourth column of Table 4): 
• Potential for systemic impact.  
• Balanced mix addressing both supply-side demand-side drivers.  
• Policies may deliver important benefits in terms of improving quality of life. 
• Policy intervention is necessary, because markets won’t bring about the necessary 
changes. 
• Feedback on proposed instruments and additional instrument ideas from 
stakeholders.  
• Limited number of studies exist to date. 
In addition, to facilitate the quantitative assessment and modelling of the proposed policy 
instruments, precedence is given to tools and instruments which have effects on:   
• input prices, 
• consumer prices, 
• availability of and costs of supply, 
• demand (e.g., niches, growth), 
• innovation rates (e.g., autonomous energy efficiency improvements), 
• elasticity of demand (i.e., ability to go to substitutes). 
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Table 4: Drivers, intermediate objectives and corresponding policy instruments 
Drivers Objectives 2030 Instruments (see also section 6.4) Assessment? 
Demographic 
change 
Outside the scope of the 
policy mix 
  No, outside 
the scope. 
Rising affluence Enabling translation of 
higher income levels to 
more leisure instead of 
additional consumption. 
Labour market reform fostering a shift 
from consumption to leisure, including 








Smart pricing – full cost 
pricing for resource 
provision, internalisation 
of externalities to the 
extent this is feasible. 
Tax on material use and polluting 
activities for both producers and 
consumers. Revenues used to lower 
prices for resource-efficient products. 
Support for local currencies, 
incentivising use of services and 











harmful subsidies.  




Products have longer 
durability and 
operational lives. 
Extended producer responsibility, 
international collaboration for more 
ambitious product standards. 
Yes. 
Limited whole-




consumers are enabled 
to consider whole-life 
costs. 
Price incentives for resource-efficient 
products through VAT reductions and 
feebates; compulsory sustainability 






The polluter pays 
principle is fully 
implemented. 







Adapting incentives to 
reward long term 
investments. 
Improve sustainability accounting of 
companies to increase transparency; 







pace of product 
innovation 
Radical innovation have 
emerged and replaced 
some of the most 
inefficient and resource 
intensive systems. 
Skill enhancement programme; green 
public procurement and support to 
niche technologies; privileging 
sustainable behaviour in city, land use 











vis à vis 
overconsumption as well 
as waste and end of life 
products 
Step-wise approach to restricting 








focused on appropriate 
policies for public goods 
and wellbeing. 
Improve transparency, participation 
and accountability, mainstreaming and 
proofing tools.   
No, outside 
the scope. 
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Finally, the selection of instruments for the detailed assessment takes into account the 
instruments assessed in the two other DYNAMIX policy mixes on land and metals. The aim is 
to avoid duplication and overlaps as much as possible. 
4.4 The overarching policy mix: Promising policy instruments  
4.4.1 Circular economy tax trio 
Brief intro and summary of the measure 
Numerous countries already use environmental taxes and charges in order to put a price on 
resources and reduce environmentally harmful activities. Countries like Denmark, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom have combined taxes on raw materials (Sweden’s gravel tax, UK’s 
aggregates levy and Denmark’s tax on certain raw materials), on landfilling (UK) and on 
waste in general, either through taxes on landfilling or incineration (Sweden, Denmark).  
The “circular economy tax trio” (taxes on virgin materials, landfills and waste incineration) 
described in more detail in this policy fiche is an attempt to produce a mix of tax instruments 
which would be an “upwards harmonisation” of the use of such instruments across the EU 
(i.e., taking the best practice in the implementation of each one of these taxes and trying to 
combine them into one EU-wide mix of tax instruments). The combination of a virgin materials 
tax (based on UK’s aggregates tax, the Swedish gravel tax and the Danish tax on raw 
materials), a landfill tax (UK) as well a waste incineration and landfill tax (Sweden and 
Denmark) would pursue three objectives simultaneously: 
a) reducing raw virgin resources extraction; 
b) encouraging recycling/making recycling more profitable; 
c) internalising externalities linked to (1) the extraction/transportation of raw materials (2) 
landfilling and incineration. 
Assessments came to the conclusion that the instruments used in the UK, DK and SE have 
been effective in achieving their objective at a reasonable cost (in the UK, administrative 
costs represented 0.5% of total tax revenues, while enforcement costs represented 0.3%, 
while in Sweden the proportions were 2% and 3-5.5% respectively (Ecorys 2011)). We 
assume here that this would also be the case if these were applied more widely, across the 
EU. The aim is to set up a hypothetical instrument in order to investigate the effects it would 
have and whether, overall, it would be a useful measure that would contribute to meeting 
some of the objectives and targets the overarching policy-mix pursues. The materials that 
could be covered by the virgin materials tax would in particular include: marble, chalk and 
dolomite, slate, limestone and gypsum, sand and gravel, as well as metals (Eunomia and 
Aarhus University, 2014).  
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
The tax instruments would be introduced in all EU MS around 2025.  
b. What is its aim?  
The combination of virgin materials, landfills and incineration tax would pursue primarily three 
objectives: 
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1) reduce the extraction of virgin raw materials both inside and outside the EU; 
2) encourage recycling/make recycling more profitable; 
3) internalise externalities linked to the extraction/transportation of these materials and 
the landfilling an incineration of waste. 
 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted at? 
The tax-mix will target both the early stages of the lifecycle, by making use of raw materials 
more expensive through a resource extraction tax on aggregates of €2.40 per tonne by 2020 
(approximately 38 % of the average price of materials in Europe, which was €6.7 per ton in 
2012 according to UEPG, 2013), and the final stages (disposal) - landfilling and waste 
incineration becoming more expensive too (€90 per tonne of landfilled waste and €15 per 
tonne of incinerated waste by 2020).  
The virgin materials tax will target virgin raw materials’ suppliers and importers. The landfilling 
tax will have to be paid by all waste producers who choose to discard their waste using landfill 
sites, with the primary aim to incentivise them to produce less waste or if that is not possible, 
to recycle it. Therefore the landfill tax acts as an incentive to consume more efficiently and will 
contribute to the waste pyramid in the EU, which fixes the following priorities in the EU: 
prevention, re-use, recycling recovery and disposal (in order of priority) (Waste Framework 
Directive: Directive 2008/98/EC on waste).  
The incineration tax will be paid by the incineration plants and will lead to increasing 
incineration gate fees. That will eventually determine higher recycling rates. In Denmark, the 
incineration tax rate was initially set the same as the one for landfilling at €5.37 per tonne, 
though landfill taxes increased substantially more since 1993, to reach €50 (Söderholm, 
2011). Since 2001, the incineration tax was raised to €44.4 by the Danish government. In 
Sweden, the incineration tax is composed by an energy tax (€16.5 per tonne) and fossil coal 
and CO2 tax (€371 per tonne of fossil fuel used), while deductions exist for energy generating 
plants or due to their energy efficiency (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2006).  
Raw materials that are exported will not be exempt from the virgin materials tax; and the tax 
will not be levied on imports, given (i) the difficulty, potential trade complexities, and likely 
displacement impacts of setting up systems to identify virgin from recycled materials and (ii) 
the policy objective of preserving European resources for future generations.  
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
The tax on virgin materials will be paid by those extracting them. Higher taxes on virgin raw 
materials will require the industries/sectors that so far have relied heavily on their use to use 
these more efficiently and /or identify alternatives to virgin raw materials as inputs into their 
production processes (e.g., with a preference to recycled materials). While there is an 
argument for applying the tax also to imports of virgin materials, initial implementation should 
avoid this, on the grounds of (i) the complexity, possible conflict with trade obligations, and 
risk of displacement effects associated with setting up a mechanism to distinguish virgin from 
recycled materials at import, and (ii) the policy objective of preserving EU resources for future 
generations. 
The taxes on landfilling/incineration will increase price on waste incineration and landfilling, 
and therefore they are expected to conduct the shift from disposal and incineration to 
recycling.  
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e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments within policy-mix 
There should be particular synergies with the extended Bonus-Malus scheme and the 
reduced VAT for environmentally friendly products which should further stimulate the market 
for products with a high share of recycled material. In addition there are synergies with the 
measures foreseen in the context of the extension of the Ecodesign directive meant to 
increase the recyclability of goods as this will increase the extent to which alternatives to 
using virgin raw materials can be found. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax or subsidy? 
For the sake of this exercise uniform tax rates applying across Europe are specified below. In 
reality there would still be some level of discretion to account for existing discrepancies in 
prices across different countries. 
The rates of the virgin materials tax would initially be low but would increase every year (cf 
UK aggregates tax escalator for raw materials, from €1.8 in 2002 to €2.28 in 2009 (IEEP 
2012) which reflects the average costs of extraction, and the Swedish gravel tax from €0.567 
per tonne in 1996 to €1.44 per tonne in 2006, corresponding to 20-30% of the price of a 
tonne). Therefore for aggregates the UK level of €2.40 per tonne, indexed to inflation 
(Eunomia and Aarhus University, 2014), could be a good starting point. By 2050 it could 
reach 50% of the average value of the prices of materials extracted. 
Regarding landfill taxes, the UK landfill tax also provides a good example (from €54.6 per 
tonne of active waste in 2010 to €90 in 2014, while inactive waste is charged at €2.8 per 
tonne)(Ecorys, 2011). In Sweden, the tax has progressively increased as well, from €27.53 in 
2000 to €40.74 in 2003 (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2005), and to a further 
€63 in 2010 (ETC/SCP, 2012).. 
When it comes to incineration taxes, they should encourage higher recycling rates and 
provide additional revenues, and rates should evolve in a consistent manner with other 
residual waste treatments. By 2020, an incineration tax of €15 per tonne is considered to be 
an effective incentive, given the results attended in best-performing countries – this would be 
in line with the actual Swedish incineration rate, which is considered to be consistent with 
rates applied to other waste management treatments (Eunomia and Aarhus University, 2014). 
Consideration could be given, for both the landfill and incineration taxes, to have rates that 
are variable depending on the type of waste. The French “tax on polluting activities (TGAP)”, 
mainly aimed to discourage polluting activities through the polluter-pays principle is a good 
example. The TGAP is due by enterprises (natural or legal persons) whose activity is 
considered a pollutant one: waste, pollutant emissions, oils, detergents, extractive materials, 
pesticides, chemical products, while its rates depend on the activity they carry and on the type 
of product they produce (Ministère de l'économie, des finances et de l'industrie, France, 
2014), with possible deduction for materials for which landfill stands for the best 
environmental solution, or materials that could be biologically treated for biogas production or 
incinerated.  
 For tax: Who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
As far as the virgin or raw materials tax is concerned, those extracting them would be 
subject to the tax. For low tax rates and considering the low price elasticity of these materials 
(-0.22 in the UK between 2002 and 2003, revenues from the tax could eventually be passed 
on to users of these products, whereas in some cases, local and national authorities will also 
have to contribute as they represent one of the biggest consumers of construction materials 
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(ECOTEC, 2001). It may make sense to initially earmark some of the virgin tax revenues to 
the restoration of former quarries and extraction sites that will close as a result of the reduced 
consumption rate, while the biggest share of tax revenues would serve lowering the fiscal 
pressure on labour. The restoration would contribute to EU’s objective of restoring 15 % of 
degraded habitats and avoiding net loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services. For the 
purposes of the assessment, it should be assumed that 80 % of the tax revenues are used to 
reduce labour taxes and charges, and 20 % is used for restoration. 
As regards the landfill tax, this would be paid by waste producers in order to encourage them 
to produce less waste or to recycle it. The tax should apply to all kinds of waste. Part of this 
tax could be earmarked for R&D to increase recycling of waste and the use of waste materials 
for the production of new goods. Besides, the tax could support treating and recycling waste 
in a more sustainable and resource-efficient way (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 
2005). 
As regards the incineration tax, this would be paid by waste incinerators, increasing the 
incinerator gate fee. In Denmark, its rate increased to €44.4 in 2001, while the landfill tax has 
also substantially increased, which is in line with waste priorities in the EU (Söderholm, 2011). 
An initial rate of €15 per ton, in line with the Swedish rate for incineration waste, would be a 
good starting point for this tax. 
A small share of the tax revenues generated by these instruments should be used for the 
setting up of an institution like the WRAP in all EU MS. Tax revenues beyond this may be 
used by MS as they see fit. 
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
Not applicable 
g. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
The materials that could be covered by the virgin materials tax would in particular include: 
marble, chalk and dolomite, slate, limestone and gypsum, sand and gravel, as well as metals 
(Eunomia and Aarhus University, 2014). The virgin metals tax would also incorporate the 
proposal for a virgin metals tax from the metals policy-mix. Thus, the flows of metals are also 
expected to be targeted by the virgin materials tax.  
Governance 
a. At what governance level should the instrument be deployed? 
In order not to distort competition on the Single market and to avoid that waste be traded 
across countries this should be a Europe-wide tax trio, to be levied/collected by authorities in 
each EU MS (as seen in the UK, DK and SE examples). The level of discretion for the exact 
rate needs to be specified. While we assume average tax rates as mentioned above, there 
may still be discrepancies across different countries to account for the difference in price 
levels and PPP. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
For the virgin materials tax: Resource extraction and waste recycling industries, but also 
public authorities that sometimes prove to be an influential customer, as it was the case in 
Sweden (ECOTEC, 2001). 
For the waste landfill and incineration tax: waste collection companies, landfill operators and 
waste incineration plants. 
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c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Public authorities will be responsible for the collection of the tax, generally through their 
taxation ministry or authority (as it is the case in DK, SE and UK, see ECOTEC, 2001). 
Failure to pay the tax would result in prosecution and a fine. Late payments, misdeclaration, 
non-compliance or evasion should also be prosecuted. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Expert groups with individuals from national Ministries who would need to introduce the tax in 
their national system would be set up in order to prepare the European Framework 
(legislation) for the introduction of this instrument. Comitology may therefore play an important 
role in designing and implementing the policy instruments.  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Implementation will determine transaction costs in Member States. Up-front involvement of 
MS and relevant sectors in the development of the instruments is expected to increase 
feasibility and acceptability.  
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
The introduction of a virgin materials tax is supposed to have limited direct effects on the 
environment, as the aggregates levy in the UK has shown (IEEP 2011, Söderholm 2011). On 
the contrary most of the impacts would come from the reduced amount of materials extracted 
(potentially leading to the closing of some mines and sites) or from substitutions through other 
kind of (usually recycled) materials; although it seems likely that global supplies of recycled 
materials may not respond immediately or in full, leading to some displacement effects. Later 
using the tax to finance research for reducing the demand for polluting materials, fighting 
pollution, and encouraging recycling, through a national WRAP (Waste and Resources Action 
Programme) may also result in longer term indirect positive impacts on the environment 
(IEEP 2011). The main environmental benefits include the reduction of noise and vibrations, 
air and soil pollution, waste management, and biodiversity. The Swedish example also 
showed that there may be some limits to substitutability. Substitution was difficult for some 
applications (for example playgrounds, mortar, etc.). It is rather consumers’ interest for high 
quality materials that made them turn towards crushed rocks and therefore increase 
substitutability rates (Söderholm 2011). 
As far as the taxes on landfills and on waste incineration are concerned, it would have the 
advantage of encouraging materials’ recycling (in Denmark this has been the main 
contribution of the combined tax mechanism, since the raw materials tax itself was not very 
incentivising (IEEP 2011, Söderholm 2011, ECOTEC 2001) and lead to a recycling rate of 
95% for construction and demolition waste in 2008 (ETC/SCP 2012). In Sweden, waste 
entering a waste facility and being taxed halved between 2000 and 2004 (Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency 2005). An indirect target would be those industries and 
individuals that directly or indirectly are affected by the environmental impacts of extraction 
and transportation of virgin materials, as well as alternative materials’ suppliers, as it 
happened in Sweden through price equalisation (ECOTEC 2001).  
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Key expected economic impacts  
For some materials the UK aggregates tax can account on up to 20% of the average raw 
material price, €2.33 per tonne of materials being collected in 2011 (Ecorys 2011). The 
revenues therefore collected can potentially increase the total tax revenue although the 
primary goal of the environmental tax is not fiscal (0.1% of the total tax revenue in the UK 
comes from the aggregates levy (IEEP 2011)). 
A material tax will generally change the production structure and will influence consumption. A 
tax on virgin materials’ use is also expected to solve some market failures, such as of 
incorporating environmental externalities in raw materials’ prices. In addition, taxes represent 
a more cost-effective solution towards packaging and waste issues than regulatory legislation, 
by imposing costs which reflect the external environmental costs and allowing operators to 
find innovative solutions. 
With regards to competitiveness, the impact of such a tax would be strongly influenced by the 
extent to which the materials which are to be covered by the tax can be imported. Transport 
and other logistic costs may make some materials unsuitable for long distance trading, and 
therefore the tax should not procure major disadvantages to the national extractive industries, 
as assessments of the aggregate levy in the UK and of the materials’ tax in Sweden provided 
(ECOTEC 2001). For the processing, resource-intensive industries however, the measure is 
expected to lead to loses in their processing capacity and therefore in their investment 
potential. Despite the disinvestment incentive, introduced system changes would require for 
new infrastructures to be built. Lock-in risks can therefore rise, which would further limit the 
potential for developing eco-innovations in the EU (European Parliament 2009).   
A tax on landfill or waste incineration would have the benefit to create a playing field for the 
recycling sector, as it will generally become more attractive to recycle than to dispose of these 
materials. Thus, landfill and waste incineration taxes could create opportunities for 
businesses in the recycling and secondary materials sector, whereas overall waste and waste 
charges are expected to decrease for waste producers (IEEP 2011). 
The tax-mix is expected however to have a negative impact on the construction sector since it 
will make the use of virgin raw materials more expensive. On the other hand, positive effects 
are expected for the recycling sector because of the incentives to recycling.  
Key expected social impacts 
Extracting sectors are likely to lose revenues, as previously discussed, which can be 
compensated by an efficient recycling of the virgin materials tax (as the IEEP study on the UK 
shows), through back to business transfers. Increases in prices determined by such a tax 
however, are likely to be passed on to the consumer if tax rates are set too low to 
compensate for the low price elasticity of demand, and therefore the tax impact on the 
extractive industry is arguable (IEEP, 2011). 
Previous experiences with some virgin materials’ taxes (gravel tax in Sweden and aggregate 
levy in the UK) have shown that the overall labour involved in the industry either remained 
unchanged given the limited labour market in the extracting sector in Sweden (ECOTEC, 
2001), or it was overall positively affected, as funds collected through the tax were generally 
used for more employment intensive public expenditures or recycled back into the industry in 
the UK (Ecorys, 2011). On the other hand, it would also contribute to more high quality jobs in 
the field of recycling (the Tellus Institute estimates that two jobs are created for the recycling 
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of 1,000 tons of construction and demolition waste), but also in the field of organic farming, 
retail sales, timber production and tourism, as Friends of the Earth pointed out in Northern 
Ireland (Friends of the Earth, no date). These less-resource intensive sectors would 
necessitate the development of new skills. Other social benefits would include public health 
improvement, especially of population living close to mines (Office of Mine Safety and Health 
Research, 2010; Vrijheid, 2010), and local economic diversification through the restoration of 
abandoned mines. There is no evidence however on the impact for industry or households’ 
equity of such a tax, although reduced environmental cost through mines’ shutdown would be 
beneficial for poor populations situated downstream. 
4.4.2 EU-wide introduction of feebate schemes for selected products 
categories 
Brief summary of the measure 
This measure would be to develop at EU level a common framework for the introduction of 
bonus-malus schemes across the EU, identifying the specific products for which such 
schemes should be introduced in the Member States and providing a methodology for setting 
both bonus and malus at the right level for the schemes to be cost neutral (in particular for 
accounting for differences in prices across different countries and different price elasticities). 
The enhanced Bonus-Malus Scheme proposed here would  
(i) imply applying an improved version of the French Bonus Malus scheme on cars 
across Europe (i.e., rewarding the purchase of smaller, fuel-efficient as well as hybrid 
and electric cars, and penalising the purchase of large and fuel-inefficient cars; but 
also applying to a wider range of environmental impacts, beyond GHG emissions - 
such as emission of other harmful substances and small particles, noise);  
(ii) and (ii) be applied to other relevant product categories potentially including products 
such as batteries and accumulators, paints, detergents, refrigerators etc., based on 
their different environmental and social impact. 
The ‘Bonus-Malus’ system introduced in France offered a financial incentive for the purchase 
of low-emitting cars and charged a fee for the purchase of high-emission vehicles and thus 
entails a system of price reductions and fees depending on the level of emissions of each 
new vehicle. It pursued a twofold objective. First, it is designed to change consumers’ 
behaviour and encourage the purchase of low-emitting cars and discourage the purchase of 
the high-emitting vehicles. Secondly, it was created to stimulate technological innovation in 
new vehicles (Mission Ministérielle 2013). 
The enhanced Bonus-Malus Scheme proposed here would be applied to other relevant 
product categories potentially including products such as batteries and accumulators, paints, 
detergents, refrigerators etc., based on their different environmental and social impact 
(ADEME, 2009). The two basic principles remain the same as the French Bonus-Malus 
scheme, namely to: 
• Provide financial incentives for the purchase of low-emitting, environmental friendly 
products 
• Charge a fee for high-emissions and highly resource use appliances (Ecologic 
institute, 2013). 
Apart from the car market, feebates (a combination of fees and rebates) were previously used 
in Europe and North America to influence consumption towards favouring fuel efficiency, 
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some food groups, fair trade, nitrogen oxide emissions, and energy efficiency in buildings 
(Basque Centre for Climate Change, 2014). Recent research was carried out to study the 
possibility of the extension of these schemes to household appliances in Spain and Canada 
(Basque Centre for Climate Change, 2014; David Suzuki Foundation, 2007). Encouraging 
predictions call for an extended scheme to be applied to major household appliances based 
on their energy consumption, as well as batteries and accumulators, paints or detergents, for 
which feebates can positively influence offer and demand and therefore change bad 
behaviours.  
The price reductions are to be financed through a dedicated fund covered by the fees 
charged on the products which have the worst environmental performance. The cost 
neutrality of the scheme will require carefully taking into account the elasticity of offer and 
demand when setting the rates of these incentives and fees. Indeed, while the French model 
was intended to be neutral on public finances, its success has contributed according to some 
sources to a deficit of €1.46 billion between 2008 and 2011 (WPS 2013).  
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
This instrument has already proved to be applicable. If developed over the next few years the 
system could be introduced progressively for different product categories around 2025.  
b. What is its aim?  
The two basic principles are to: 
• Provide financial incentives for the purchase of low-emitting, environmental friendly 
products 
• Charge a fee for high-emissions and highly resource-inefficient appliances and 
products. (Ecologic institute 2013) 
This is expected to: 
• Shift consumer demand towards low emissions and highly environmental products 
• Encourage producers to develop and supply more environmentally friendly products 
(CREST 2013). 
 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would the be targeted at? 
Different sectors manufacturing products that would be subject to such a scheme would be 
impacted by the measure and would have a stronger incentive to innovate in order to ensure 
that their products perform better from an environmental point of view and may benefit from a 
bonus or at least avoid the malus. A whole range of studies suggest that the household 
appliances producing industry could be a prime target for such schemes. Other products for 
which fees and rebates could positively influence their offer and demand and succeed in more 
environmentally friendly production and consumption patterns could then follow. The measure 
may well also have impacts over the product’s whole lifecycle in the case of, for example, 
energy-using products, given the incentives provided by energy-savings. 
As regards the practical implementation, the point-of-sale of these products could be the one 
where the bonus on a given product is granted and the malus is collected (which is the case 
in a whole range of Bonus-Malus schemes in use) (National Energy Policy Institute, 2013). 
This would ensure that domestic production and imports were treated equally; and that EU 
exports did not face a price disadvantage. 
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d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Generally, the scheme won’t place strict requirements on anyone although consumers 
purchasing the least performing product within a given category subject to the Bonus-Malus 
scheme will be expected to pay the “malus”. 
The requirements that manufacturers will have to meet for their products to be granted the 
bonus will depend on the specific product and the specific criteria that will be determined for 
being granted a bonus or being subjected to a malus. Manufacturers will not be requested to 
strictly adhere to these criteria but will have to take these into account when deciding about 
the environmental performance they wish their products to achieve. 
For the schemes to be set up and managed relevant authorities in the MS might have to be 
prepared to invest resources, at least in the short run, if the schemes are initially unbalanced 
and don’t achieve cost neutrality. Such costs could however, at least in principle, still be 
recovered via the schemes in the long run; for example, through the mechanism of a 
dedicated fund suggested above, Member States might face only a one-off cost of providing 
working capital. In the event of the scheme proving more – or less – successful than expected 
in influencing behaviour, the fund could also produce a deficit (or a surplus).  
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix 
A wider application of Bonus-Malus schemes to relevant product categories and a tax on a 
range of key raw materials may complement each other. The Bonus-Malus system may be 
easier to implement as it is meant to be revenue neutral and may therefore face less 
resistance than ordinary fiscal measures such as taxes. Together with the extended producer 
responsibility schemes, the virgin materials, landfill and incineration taxes can however 
ensure that other stages of the product lifecycle are more effectively targeted as well, in 
particular disposal. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax or subsidy? 
There would not be a single level of bonus or malus for a specific category of products across 
all the EU. This common EU level framework for the introduction of bonus-malus schemes, 
which would also identifying the specific products for which such schemes should be 
introduced in the Member States (at MS level), would provide a methodology for setting both 
bonus and malus at the right level for the schemes to be cost neutral (in particular for 
accounting for differences in prices across different countries and different price elasticities). 
The Bonus-Malus scheme is in fact a double mechanism; on the one hand a tax on less 
environmental products in a category, and on the other a rebate or subsidy for more efficient 
products. It seems clear that the tax element will need to be treated as a fiscal measure, since 
it is not related to administrative or other costs faced by public authorities, and is clearly 
based on the objective of reflecting external impacts. The revenues from the tax are intended 
to finance the subsidy or rebate that is paid. Thus, when setting the level of the tax and the 
level of the subsidy, attention will need to be given to the elasticity of demand/price elasticity 
for a given product category, as these will need to be carefully determined and adjustments to 
the scheme foreseen in order to balance out revenues and subsidies. The National Energy 
Policy Institute estimated that fees’ and rebates’ levels that would produce the biggest 
benefits and would be the most effecting in achieving financial neutrality would be the ones 
that equal the economy done, for example of average fuel consumption or electricity. This 
economy is dependent on the technological advances and therefore these levels will fluctuate 
over time (National Energy Policy Institute, 2013). That level has been estimated to be around 
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10% of household appliances’ value by 2020, and it should progressively diminish (David 
Suzuki Foundation, 2007). 
In France, the Bonus-Malus scheme for cars targeted less polluting cars, benefitting from a 
price reduction of up to €1000. For the most polluting ones, the fee their owners had to pay 
amounted to €2600 (CREST, 2013). Although very incentivising, and with some positive 
environmental impacts (ADEME, 2009), this level didn’t prove to be sustainable in terms of 
public finances (WPS, 2013). 
 For tax: Who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
See above 
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
See above 
g. What physical/ resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
A concrete example would come from the energy using products, especially major household 
appliances (refrigeration equipment such as freezers, refrigerators and water coolers, stoves 
such as cookers and microwave ovens, washing equipment such as washing machines, 
clothes dryers, drying cabinets, dishwashers, and others such as air conditioners and water 
heaters), commonly referred to as white goods. The assessment should therefore be based 
on this initial list of products. 
As most of the literature suggests these schemes are particularly relevant for energy using 
household appliances, the main resource flow (indirectly) targeted would be fossil fuels and, 
in the case of cars, maybe some metals as there would be an incentive to using lighter metals 
when manufacturing cars (heavier cars use more petrol). 
A Bonus-Malus scheme on imported and domestically-produced appliances can be designed 
to reduce their energy consumption, as well as other environmental impacts (use of 
hasardous or rare virgin materials, etc.) (National Energy Policy Institute, 2013). The other 
physical flows will depend on the other product categories to which this product would apply, 
which in turn depends on the criteria applied.  
It must be noted, however, that in practice physical flows are primarily potentially affected in 
the instances where there is no or only a limited rebound effects (i.e the products aren’t used 
more intensively because they have become more efficient). 
Governance 
a. At what governance level should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
In order not to undermine the common market this measure would be a common framework 
for the introduction of bonus-malus schemes across the EU at EU level, which would identify 
the specific products for which such schemes should be introduced in the Member States and 
providing a methodology for setting both bonus and malus at the right level for the schemes to 
be cost neutral (in particular for accounting for differences in prices across different countries 
and different price elasticities). The specific rates would have to be fixed depending on the 
national market for each one of these products given differences in prices across countries 
and probably differences in price elasticity of demand; although the product coverage should 
be the same in all MS, and common rules governing the calculation of the tax and the rebate 
will need to be established.  
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b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Member States, consumer organisations, manufacturers and retailers (of the products that 
may be targeted by the measures) will need to be involved. Scientific expertise and studies 
will also most probably be required for the design of the schemes at MS level.  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Retailers and consumers have some obligations under such schemes, which they need to 
comply with if the scheme is to work effectively. In addition, Member States’ authorities need 
to make the necessary resources available for such schemes to function. Close monitoring 
may be necessary to ensure that the revenues can pay for the rebates and the schemes are 
adjusted over time. Monitoring may also be useful in case prosecution and fines are needed 
to ensure compliance. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
The system acts as a subsidy and as a tax at the same time, therefore coordination is 
required, be it only to avoid distortions in the common market. It is assumed (see above) that 
the measure would be treated as a taxation instrument, and therefore subject to unanimity in 
Council. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Consultation of involved stakeholders is a prerequisite for an effective implementation. The 
propensity for consumers to buy environmental-friendly products depends on their ability to 
make financial savings. For producers, their willingness to innovate and enhance products’ 
characteristics depends on the difference between the marginal costs and the marginal 
benefits their products procure on a market with feebates (National Energy Policy Institute, 
2013). A study on the French Bonus-Malus system showed that costumers made a 
substantial shift towards environmentally friendly classes of vehicles and therefore benefited 
from a rebate. Consumer may have acted in their own interest, but at least some suppliers 
were also pleased as the introduction of the bonus-malus scheme also seems to have 
contributed to boosting car sales (which increased by 13 % (CREST, 2013) but probably also 
because of a scar scrapping scheme which ran in parallel). 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
An extended Bonus-Malus is best suited to address environmental issues such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption and other pollutant emissions but could 
probably also account for the toxicity of a product’s components or the resource intensity in its 
production. It could potentially account also for other environmental externalities and impacts. 
If the right incentives are to be used in order to divert people’s behaviour from 
environmentally damaging activities or products, such a scheme could be effective in 
reducing overall environmental degradation and resources’ consumption. The French model 
of Bonus-Malus for cars proved to be efficient in reducing emissions’ of the car fleet and 
therefore contributing to fighting climate change (the CO2 emissions of new cars have 
decreased by 6 % between 2007 and 2008 according to ADEME). Rebounds effects in the 
form of increased use of these products that would offset the gains in emissions and 
resources will have to be avoided through adopting the right financial incentives and correctly 
setting the level of the discounts but may be difficult to fully avoid, depending on the product 
category. In the car Bonus-Malus system in France for example, newly registered passenger 
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cars were targeted by the measure (IEEP et al. 2014), but attractive rebates had rebound 
effects in the form of increased sales of new cars and therefore of an increasing number of 
drivers and overall increases in environmental impacts (IEEP at al, 2014). It must be noted, 
however, that a car scrapping scheme offering financial incentives to scrapping your old car 
ran in parallel in France and, given it was limited in time, may have contributed to temporarily 
boost car sales. 
Key expected economic impacts  
If the rates are not carefully set, the measure can contribute to changes in the consumption 
and production patterns that are not optimal. The Bonus-Malus system in France for example 
resulted in increased sales of new cars (CREST, 2013; Callonnec and Sannie, 2009; ICCT, 
2011), which should not be the purpose of such schemes as they should be primarily 
environmentally motivated. 
Eco-innovation and competitiveness can also be stimulated if the criteria according to which a 
bonus or a malus is applied to a good is transparent and manufacturers know which product 
characteristics they need to improve if they want consumers purchasing their product to 
benefit from the bonus or at least avoid having to pay the malus. The introduction of the 
Bonus-Malus for cars in France for example resulted in an increase in the number of patents 
linked to innovations related to the improvement of the environmental performance of the 
vehicles (CREST, 2013).  
Key expected social impacts  
Overall social well-being is expected to increase, as consumption of environmentally friendly 
products that result in less harm would increase at the expense of products that have adverse 
effects on human well-being and health. Low-income households should in principle also 
benefit, as the up-front cost of energy-efficient products will be reduced, making it easier to 
purchase products with a short payback in terms of energy savings (IEEP et al. 2014): 
however, in product categories where less energy-efficient products tend to be cheaper, lower 
income households may face additional up-front costs, and not be able or willing to choose 
the more efficient products.  
4.4.3 Reduced VAT for the most environmentally advantageous products 
and services 
Brief summary of the measure 
This measure involves a reduced VAT rate (therefore applying at point of sale, with no impact 
on exports) of 6 % for the most environmentally advantageous or least resource intensive 
products and services across a wider range of products and activities, which may include 
environmentally beneficial works done in the housing sector (renovation, maintenance), some 
local, labour intensive services and products, and additionally virtual books (European 
Commission, 2008a), organic products, etc., for which policy instruments in the form of EU 
environmental standards (Ecolabel, EU energy label) already exist or could be easily 
introduced. In the long run, this is expected to: 
• Increase resource efficiency in the production of these products and the delivery of 
these services (incl. the use of recycled materials where possible); 
• Lead to products that have been designed to allow for an easier recycling;  
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• Provide energy savings throughout their lifecycle for energy using products; 
• Result in a virtuous cycle that will speed up the process of withdrawal from the market 
of less efficient products and services. 
 
In order to make this measure practicable it will have to build on existing practices and 
instruments. It is proposed to link the reduced VAT to the European Ecolabel8 (IVM et al. 
2008) (which itself may be subject to further changes to (1) better account for product’s 
environmental impacts throughout the lifecycle (2) eligibility rules should regularly become 
more and more tightened and (3) apply to a broader range of consumer goods), and the EU 
energy label (reduced VAT could therefore apply to A+++ rated electronic equipment). For 
consumer electrical goods, this instrument would work alongside the feebate mechanism also 
proposed, and should provide additional incentives to manufacturers to continuously improve 
energy-efficiency (or other relevant environmental parameters) in order to benefit from the 
reduced tax rate. Products (and services) having been awarded the European Ecolabel or the 
highest A+++ grade in the EU energy label would benefit from the reduced VAT rate of 6% in 
all MS. This reduced VAT rate would also apply to electricity from renewable energies, 
installation of energy saving materials and equipment/retro-fitting of people’s homes 
(including insulation materials), and a selected number of services such as retrofitting of 
household appliances in order to make them more energy efficient, hotels/tourist attractions 
(which can already be ecolabelled), or environmentally beneficial locally labour intensive 
services such as local transport, repair, refurbishing, etc.  
Reduced VAT rates are already regularly used in MS all across Europe to pursue a wider 
range of objectives and this new environmental measure would be approved following the 
same procedures9. In the area of environment, some EU MS actually already apply reduced 
VAT rates linked to the energy consumption of households’ appliances (i.e., to particularly 
energy efficient appliances), and most importantly, to public transport. 21 out of the 28 EU MS 
currently apply a rate which is lower than the recommended 15% standard VAT rate, for 
public transport (European Commission, 2014b). In those countries, amenities from using 
more public transport are obvious, and include environmental and economic efficiency, 
reduced congestion, less GHG emissions and lower local air pollution (Green Budget Europe, 
2011). Studies proved that such a reform of the VAT system does not compromise revenues 
raised, but would rather shift the tax base towards more environmentally damaging products, 
according to the polluter pays principle (European Commission 2013a, Oosterhuis and ten 
Brink 2014). 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
A consensus between Member states would not be easy to achieve, especially at a time 
when most EU Member States are desperately looking for new sources of income. We do, 
                                               
8
 The EU Ecolabel helps you identify products and services that have a reduced environmental impact 
throughout their life cycle, from the extraction of raw material through to production, use and disposal. 
More info here: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/index_en.htm  
9
 Reduced VAT for restaurants in France, reduced VAT on fuels for heating in the UK, reduced VAT on 
renovation of old buildings in Belgium, reduced VAT on public transport in some MS…  
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however, assume here that this problem can be overcome and that, in the context of a 
broader tax reform, new sources of income would be identified (e.g., financial transaction tax, 
harmonisation of company taxation across EU allowing taxing the benefits like large groups 
such as Amazon or Google, etc.). Thus, the instrument could be introduced around 2025. If 
the unanimity requirement is thought to be a barrier it may be an option to use the open 
method of coordination (OMC) up to 2030 (in the context of which countries which would 
engage in this open coordination would be allowed to introduce the lower VAT rates even if 
this would result in some trade distortion across EU MS). 
b. What is its aim?  
The aim of this instrument would be to stimulate consumption of environmentally 
advantageous products and services, or of least resource intensive ones through lower VAT 
rates on products and services which meet higher environmental standards.  
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted at? 
All suppliers of goods to the EU market that are targeted at the end-consumer (and that 
therefore would be eligible for the European Ecolabel) would be targeted by the measure in 
the sense that they would be encouraged to change their production processes and products 
in order to be awarded the Ecolabel, or for electronic equipment, the highest ranking of the 
EU energy label, in order to benefit from the reduced VAT rate. The measure could also 
target some locally-supplied environmental-friendly services (such as public transportation, 
provision of locally source catering) which require a larger amount of labour for their delivery. 
The points in the product lifecycle which are targeted by this measure are closely linked to the 
criteria for the award of the Ecolabel: the idea is that the European Ecolabel would over time 
fully account for all impacts across the lifecycle, while some services will focus on one 
particular point in the lifecycle (such as the use of public transport).  
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
The requirements would broadly in principle be the same as those required to be awarded the 
European Ecolabel (which themselves may be subject to change in order for the requirement 
to become more stringent over time). Improving products’ and services’ footprints would 
generally require their creators to innovate in order to foster resource efficiency. However, 
compliance costs are expected for businesses and tax authorities, especially for borderline 
cases, which will induce additional costs and resources’ consumption (European 
Commission, 2007).   
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix 
The links to other taxes need to be further elaborated. For the time being, we assume that for 
some product categories (e.g., cars, white goods), Bonus-Malus schemes (and normal VAT 
rates) are better than the reduced VAT rates as the Bonus-Malus scheme is thought to be 
even better suited for shifting consumers’ behaviours towards purchasing more environmental 
friendly products for particularly expensive goods. As this is however thought to be more 
onerous administratively, this will be limited to the product categories where environmental 
impacts over the lifecycle are particularly important and the Ecolabel typically has not been 
used. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax or subsidy? 
Although strictly speaking it is the end consumer which will pay the reduced VAT, the direct 
costs to the measure will have to be borne by public authorities who would see the revenues 
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from VAT somewhat reduced and would need to seek compensation for the revenue forgone. 
One option for compensating would be to increase the normal VAT rate at the same time as 
the reduced VAT rates are introduced. However, given that imposing constraints on funding 
the measure could make it more complicated to secure unanimous agreement in Council, for 
the purposes of the assessment it should be assumed that Member States will face a free 
choice on how to fund the shortfall, and will raise general tax levels by a small amount to 
compensate. 
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
This measure can be considered a subsidy. As mentioned above, one option to compensate 
for the revenue forgone, is to raise the normal VAT rate by 0.5 percentage points (or any 
amount thought to potentially compensate for the revenue forgone); although we assume that 
it will be for individual Member State finance ministers to make these choices. 
g. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
In principle this may affect a wide range of material flows which are linked to the production of 
products, as they will determine its final environmental impact. Reduced VAT rates will also 
concern goods imported from outside the EU, but they will not concern exported goods. The 
European Ecolabel tends to require a reduction in the use of the most harmful substances as 
product components. Hence, this measure may reduce the flow (extraction, use) of these 
types of product inputs in particular, whether they are imported or supplied domestically. 
Imported or domestically used flows of goods beneficiating from reduced VAT could be 
expected to have reduced impacts on air, land and water compared to the standard product in 
the same product category. In terms of outputs, reduced VAT for environmentally-sound 
products and services (e.g., having been awarded the European Ecolabel or the highest 
A+++ grade in the EU energy label) are expected to reduce GHG emissions and, to some 
extent, also contribute to reducing the quantity of waste generated in an economy as a whole 
range of ecolabelled products are made out of recycled materials or can be more easily 
recycled. 
Governance 
a. At what governance level should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
The measure would be introduced (i.e., adopted) at European level but implemented 
concretely at MS level (where responsibility for collecting taxes such as VAT lies). The 
reduced VAT rate should be the same across all MS to prevent trade distortion across the 
common market, especially for cross border sales and distance sales. A coherent application 
of the measure across Europe is also expected to increase incentives to invest in innovation 
in order to bring about products that may qualify for the European Ecolabel or for the highest 
grade under the EU energy label (Copenhagen Economics, 2008).  
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b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
It will of course be key to bring Member States on board given the impacts that the measure 
may have on their finances and more specifically tax authorities. Actors involved in the 
implementation of the European Ecolabel will also need to be involved in the preparation and 
design of the measure in order to clarify how the two measures could be made 
complementary and how the Ecolabel could meet the necessary requirements to become one 
of the decisive factors for the application of the reduced VAT rates. 
Building on existing procedures for the award of the Ecolabel but reflecting the new 
(economic) implications behind the award of the Ecolabel, an independent body may have to 
be set up in order to ensure the relevance of the criteria for the award of the Ecolabel and 
their strict application. 
Finally, negotiations would also require the participation of those actors involved in the 
delivery of environmental-friendly services that would be targeted by the measure. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
The reduced VAT rates would have to be implemented by Member States’ authorities. Failure 
to implement the measure once it has been adopted at EU level would lead to the 
Commission initiating infringement procedures against MS not implementing the reduced VAT 
rates on the ecolabelled products and other environmentally-friendly services and products. 
Producers wishing to be awarded the Ecolabel will also be responsible for complying with the 
criteria. If the criteria are revised, they will have to remain compliant with the new criteria if 
they want to continue to be awarded the Ecolabel and benefit from the associated VAT 
reduction. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Tax distortions risk undermining the level playing field in the single market. As a 
consequence, activities that are subject to VAT would risk not being treated equally across 
different MS. Within a single market, better relative prices which do not reflect production 
costs anymore, may induce a consumer to buy one product instead of another, even if it is not 
its first choice in terms of perceived satisfaction (Copenhagen Economics, 2007). To avoid 
these distortions, coordination would therefore be necessary in two ways: first, at the policy 
design and implementation level, using the comitology procedure, and later following the 
same principle decided for the VAT Information Exchange System10, a system allowing 
customers to check which businesses and products beneficiate from such VAT rates in the 
EU. Distortions would not exist however in the case of locally-supplied services. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
The European Commission tends to push for a reduction of goods that benefit from a reduced 
VAT as the measure can sometimes be used as a protectionist instrument for labour intensive 
activities. Given the Commission’s traditional reluctance in using reduced VAT rates as an 
                                               
10
 A VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) designs a computerised information system allowing 
companies to easily and rapidly obtain information about their trading partners in the EU and 
administrations to monitor intra-Community trade flows. More information about the VIES is available 
here: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/traders/vat_number/index_en.htm 
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instrument this proposal would therefore have to be pushed hard by a critical mass of 
Member States if it was to go through. In addition, depending on the decision-making 
procedure applying to these changes, a broader support for this measure would be needed 
within the European Parliament. However, in its recent communications, the Commission 
gave guidelines on products and services that could beneficiate from a reduced VAT rate in 
the EU. Some of those have clear environmental benefits, such as the housing sector 
(maintenance, renovation), local labour-intensive services (renovation, repair, transport), and 
virtual books (European Commission, 2008a). 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
A reduced VAT for environmentally advantageous products and services could be useful to 
reduce a range of adverse environmental impacts including in particular a reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, water use and quality and use of other specific resources which 
go into the production process. The reduced VAT rates would also mean that the full VAT 
rates applying to the non-eco-labelled products or services would, to a certain extent, reflect 
the adverse environmental externalities associated with the consumption of goods which have 
a higher environmental impact.  
The instrument’s effectiveness depends on: 
(1) the extent to which consumers will respond to marginal changes in prices and hence 
the instrument’s capacity to change people’s purchasing decisions; 
(2) The extent to which there may be a rebound effect - either direct (i.e., consumers 
buying more of the same product) or indirect (i.e., the money saved through the 
reduced VAT rates will be spent on other goods). This raises the question of the price 
elasticity of the products that may benefit from such a reduced VAT; 
(3) The extent to which this new measure will create additional incentives for companies 
to invest in R&D to bring about products that meet the criteria of the European 
Ecolabel or that qualify for the products with the hightest grade in the EU energy label.  
In addition, to assess the impacts of this measure, it will be important to look into ex-post 
assessment of the environmental impacts of the implementation of the European Ecolabel 
which would constitute a basis for extrapolation. It can be expected that this measure would 
not only accelerate the rate at which environmental impacts are reduced but also result in a 
higher diffusion of low environmental impact products and thus in a significant reduction on a 
wider range of environmental impacts. 
Key expected economic impacts  
The costs of this measure to the governments, in terms of forgone revenues, will depend on 
the overall value of the goods benefitting from reduced VAT being purchased. According to 
Copenhagen Economics, the average tax loss from lower VAT rates than the standard rates 
accounts for an average of 0.9 % of GDP, with cross-country variations. On the contrary, 
advantages in terms of welfare, productivity and GDP related to extending reduced VAT rates 
to sectors whose services can normally easily be substituted by do-it-yourself or underground 
work and therefore distracting high skills professionals from productive labour supply are seen 
in all Member states (Copenhagen Economics, 2007).  
The economic benefits would mostly come from a higher rate of innovation in Europe 
generating products that are more competitive on the global market. This could therefore, in 
the long-run, increase Europe’s exports to the rest of the world, especially as resources 
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become scarcer and their prices increase and the cost of labour across the world converges. 
This could reflect in positive trends as regards GDP growth and employment in Europe in the 
long run. 
Thus, reduced VAT rates will also provide incentives for eco-innovation and knowledge-based 
resource efficient growth (Seely, 2013).  
Administrative costs: Linking the introducing of reduced VAT rates to the already existing 
European Ecolabel as well as the EU Energy label (only for highest grade A+++) is thought to 
limit additional administrative-burden and create fewer inconveniences to both consumer and 
retailers than other direct subsidies or similar incentives. 
Experience with reduced VAT for environmentally friendly products in EU MS proved that the 
changes in relative prices of such products would change consumer behaviour and 
encourage environmentally sound purchasing decisions. Price signals would be given for 
energy and resource efficient products if they are properly communicated, while pay-back 
times for more expensive energy-efficient products could be reduced (IVM et al. 2008).  
Key expected social impacts  
Energy-related spending constitute a big part of low income households’ budgets (4.8% of 
lowest income quintile’s budget is spent on energy in the EU-27 compared to 3.0% for the 
highest income quintile in 2005, according to Eurostat) that is why their incomes will be 
positively influenced through reduced prices of certain essential goods and services or 
through purchases of ‘good’ products that can actually increase their welfare level (Seely, 
2013). 
Income distribution may in particular benefit if a lower VAT rate would make goods that are 
mostly used by low-income groups more affordable. The consumption share of this group 
should also be stable and different from that of high-income groups, otherwise distributional 
effects will be minimal. This is the case for food, electricity and heating, for which low income 
groups generally spend twice as much of their total income than high-income groups 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2008). This is not the case however for the designed policy 
instrument, as the tightening Ecolabel standards will contribute to scaling up innovative 
solutions, and high-income households will tend to benefit, as they tend to be early adopters. 
In the longer run however, the promotion of eco-efficient goods and services will conduct to 
lower operational costs and therefore they will become more affordable to lower-income 
households.  
Additional social benefits would come, with the introduction for example of a reduced VAT 
rate for local transport, from reduced congestions and lower levels of pollution. 
4.4.4 Boosting extended producer responsibility 
Brief summary of the measure 
Following the recommendations of the European Resource Efficiency Platform (EREP), the 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment directive (WEEE) (renewed Directive 2012/19/EU), 
the End-of-Life Vehicle (ELV) directive (Directive 2000/53/EC), the Packaging and Packaging 
Waste Directive (Directive 2005/20/EC amending Directive 94/62/EC) and the Battery and 
accumulators Directive (Directive 2006/66/EC) would be revised in an effort to further 
optimise enhanced producer responsibility. 
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The Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) provides incentives to manufacturer for better 
product design and for setting up more resource efficient business models. The EPR 
schemes also encourage waste management solutions through the internalisation of the 
negative effects of waste resulting from end-of-life products.  
The producers’ responsibility proposed here would be extended to the entire lifecycle of a 
selected range of products (therefore including their take-back, recycling or disposal) to 
decrease total environmental impact of those products (EREP 2014, Hislop and Hill 2011). In 
2013, such schemes were already in use in several Member States (Bio by Deloitte and al. 
2014). For a few products categories EPR schemes are in place in all MS (e.g., batteries, 
electronic and electric appliances) while for other products only a handful of MS have put 
EPR in place. Although for long lifespan products, assigning responsibilities is more 
challenging, children’s toys and construction materials could also be considered potential 
candidates (IIIEE 2006). Products which are not covered by EU Directives but for which such 
schemes have effectively been introduced in selected MS will be considered priority products 
to which such EU-wide schemes should be applied. 
Under the new Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) programmes, industry would have 
the full responsibility (including costs) for the disposal of packaging and other materials 
associated with the product it puts on the market. As for the other schemes already in place, 
this is expected to lead to the integration of the environmental costs associated with the 
goods throughout their lifecycle into the final market price of the products. They would 
therefore provide incentives to the producer for designing more sustainable, less toxic and 
more recyclable products (Aldersgate Group, 2011, p. 10).  
Brief description of the design and scope 
This new policy instrument would introduce an enhanced producer responsibility scheme (i.e., 
building on lessons learnt from existing schemes) which would apply to a selected number of 
products. In the EU, EPR schemes have been implemented at EU-wide level for sectors such 
as Batteries, WEEE, Packaging and Vehicles (as shown in the Table 5 below). These EPR 
schemes have been introduced to all the MS of the EU.11 
                                               
11
 Data on the EPR implemented for End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) in Malta was not available. 
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Table 5: Products for which EPR schemes are already in place in all EU MS 
  
 
Products for which EPR schemes have been put in place in a handful of MS would be 
considered for the introduction of a Europe-wide requirement for EPR and where analysis 
suggests a Europe-wide scheme would be relevant and practicable it would be introduced. An 
important aspect to take into consideration is the extent to which a product can be 
economically re-used at its end-of-life. The products/sectors that are likely candidates for the 
introduction of new EPR schemes are likely to include: Tyres, Graphic paper, Medical 
waste, Oils and Agricultural films, for which EPR has already been introduced in at least 
eight MS of the EU (Table 6). EPRs for particular waste streams (waste containing asbestos, 
pesticides and furniture and office equipment) have only been implemented in single MS (as 
indicated in Table 7). For the purposes of the assessment, it should be assumed that tyres, 
graphics paper, medical waste, oils, and agricultural films will be covered by an initial 
expansion of the scope of EU EPR legislation. The question of whether further products 
should be brought into the scope will be answered following evaluation of the impact of this 
initial expansion. 
Sectors
EU Member states 































AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, 
GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, 
















(economically critical and highly toxic)
High 
(economically critical, CO2 intensive and potentially toxic)
High 
(economically critical and CO2 intensive)
High 
(economically critical and CO2 intensive)
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, 
GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SE, SK, SI, ES, UK, HR (total 28 
MS)
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, 
GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SE, SK, SI, ES, UK, HR (total 28 
MS)
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE (only 
takeback obligation), FI, FR, DE (only 
takeback obligation), GR, HU, IE, IT, 
LV, LT, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO (only 
takeback obligation), SE, SK, SI, ES, 
UK, HR (total 27 MS)
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Table 6: EPR schemes implemented for specific waste streams in at least 8 EU MS  
 
 
The implementation of EPR schemes would be boosted thanks to the introduction of 
appropriate Standards. An example could be Canada, which has introduced a common 
standard bottle12 for beer and soft drinks. As the majority of the brewers have adopted the 
standard, nowadays almost two-third of sold beers are distributed through reusable bottles. 
The introduction of the standard has helped the industry to reduce costs and has also paved 
the way for the Canadian government to implement an EPR (Ellen Macarthur Foundation 
2013).  
Table 7: EPR schemes implemented for particular products in single MS  
 
While collective responsibility schemes may initially be allowed for a transition period, 
producers’ individual responsibility schemes would be preferred over collective responsibility 
                                               
12
 the Standard Mould Bottle (SMB) 
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AT, BE, EE (only take-back 
obbligations), FI, FR, PT, RO, SE, SK, SI, 
ES, HR (total 11 MS)
Medicines High N/A
Oils 
AT, BE, CY, DE, LV, PL, PT, SI, ES, HR 
(total 10 MS)
Mineral-based Industrial oils 
(Lubrificants, gearbox oils, 
Synthetic and waste oils) 





(related to oil prices)
Sources: BIO by Deloitte et al (2014), PSI et al. (2014), Ellen Macarthur Foundation (2013), Skole and Brent (2009)
High
(economically critical and strong environmental impact)
High
(economically critical and strong environmental impact)
Moderate
(land consumption and pressure from emerging market)
Tyres
Graphic paper
AT, BE, CY, DK, FI, FR, LV, LT, NL, SE, SK 
( total 11 MS)
AT, BE, BG, CY, DK, EE, FI, FR, IE, IT, LV, 
LT, NL, PL, PT, SE, SK, SI, ES, HR, HU 
(product fee legislation only) (total 22 
MS)
Product/Sector EU Member States 













(related to oil prices)
Metals 







(related to oil prices)
Pesticides SL
Chemicals 









(economically critical, CO2 intensive and potentially toxic)
High
(economically critical and CO2 intensive)
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schemes, as these have proven to be more effective in delivering design change. Collective 
responsibility sometimes has not sufficiently stimulated investments in product design. The 
most likely explanation for this is that collective schemes mutualise costs, producers of goods 
paying an average cost for waste management. In this way eco-design is not incentivised 
anymore as it cannot be effectively internalised in the cost of each product. Moreover, the 
concentrated market structure of Producer Responsibility Organizations (PROs) tends to 
make them overly strong players in the waste management market, ultimately acting at the 
expense of fair competition and dialogue (Bio by Deloitte et al. 2014). 
The proposed programmes would draw on lessons learned from existing schemes such as 
those outlined in OECD’s publication “Extended Producer Responsibility: A guidance manual 
for Governments” (OECD 2001), which has identified several guiding principles for an 
effective enhanced producer responsibility program including the creation of incentives for 
producers to incorporate innovation since the design phase, a lifecycle approach with clear 
product specific responsibilities, clear communication and consultation strategies, a 
comprehensive evaluation of the programme, compliance mechanisms and full transparency 
(Brady 2003). 
The extended producers’ responsibility would act in support of the implementation of the 
European Waste Hierarchy, for increases in prevention, reuse and recycling (Bio by Deloitte 
et al. 2014). 
Successful elements of the WEEE would be reproduced and its limitations addressed. The 
WEEE directive tries to facilitate dismantling and recovery, reuse and recycling of electrical 
and electronic equipment waste through innovations in design and development and therefore 
reduce end-of-life management costs. It details the implementation of recovery and treatment 
processes through allocating responsibilities for the final stage of the lifecycle of a product; it 
imposes designing and manufacturing that minimise environmental impacts, along with limits 
to the undue use of resources, energy and induced pollution (WEEE, 2008). Risks associated 
with the WEEE directive which the proposed programmes would include: high level of 
uncertainty, lack of awareness, misinterpretations of current take back schemes when 
manufactures use take-back requirements to impede valuable second-hand products to reach 
the reuse market, and the fact that it can only be a long run proposal. 
As is the case with existing EPR schemes nowadays the newly introduced schemes would 
not only apply to EU-produced goods, but also imported goods would be targeted by these 
schemes. Exported goods would not be affected. 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
The Commission's work programme for 2013 indicated for the following years a review of 
EU’s waste policy and legislation. In June 2014, the European Commission (2014c) published 
a communication on the circular economy (COM(2014)398), accompanied by a legislative 
proposal to review waste-related targets in the European Union, which emphasised the 
importance of setting minimum operating conditions for implementing effective EPR schemes 
across the different MS of the EU.  
The work to include additional products in the scope of the ecodesign could be carried out 
over the next few years and found its way in EU legislation by 2020 given the announced 
review. By 2025 the schemes for the additional product categories could be in place in the 
MS. 
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b. What is its aim?  
This policy instrument tries to develop an enhanced and expanded producer responsibility 
scheme for a various range of products for which such schemes appear to be most suited to 
effectively enhance the environmental performance of the products, namely for products for 
which EPR schemes exist in some Member states, as well as for children toys and 
construction materials.  
Therefore the overall aim of these new extended producers’ responsibility schemes would be 
to provide incentive for producers to take into account environmental considerations along the 
products’ life, from the design stage until end-of-life in view of internalising environmental 
externalities and producing products which can be more easily recycled.  
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted at? 
Product manufacturers as well as distributors and importers would be the main target of the 
instrument. Additionally, the measure would affect waste treatment facilities and consumers. 
Indeed, an extended producer responsibility scheme would affect product management, from 
the manufacturing phase and up to end-of-life. Special attention should also be given to the 
use phase of the products, through consumer information and incentives towards separate 
collection coming both from the business sector and administration. The Belgian and 
Portuguese experiences with recycling systems have shown that raising consumer 
awareness towards separating packaging waste was a determinant factor in implementing 
these schemes (Marques et al. 2013). 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
An EPR scheme gives producers responsibilities during the entire lifecycle of a product, and 
especially in the stages of take-back, recycling and/or final disposal of the product. In some 
cases, producers decide to implement obligations from EPR schemes collectively, through 
Producer Responsibility Organisations, which in exchange of a fee, will take responsibility for 
dealing with discarded products. Under current EPR schemes, this is compulsory in Germany, 
while in France this method is optional (Da Cruz et al. 2014). Given the drawbacks of this 
method (lack of incentives for eco-design for example), individual responsibility would be 
preferred within an extended EPR scheme. Differences in types of responsibility, cost 
coverage, technical and economic reporting requirements and procedures would however 
need transparency on economic indicators and technical performance requirements (Bio by 
Deloitte et al. 2014). 
Authorities, for their part, need to develop goal-orientated informative, administrative and 
economic instruments (Okopol, 2007). This includes clearly identified definitions of EPR 
schemes and objectives along the whole lifecycle, following a true costs principle, as well as 
surveillance over the economic and technical data, in collaboration with industries (Bio by 
Deloitte et al. 2014).  
Generally, EPR would normally encourage a change in behaviour of all actors involved in the 
product value chain: manufacturers, retailers, consumers, citizens, public authorities, public 
and private waste management operators, recyclers, social economy actors (Bio by Deloitte 
et al. 2014). 
To illustrate allocation of responsibilities in the context of producer take back schemes: in the 
context of the WEEE directive Member States, producers and third parties acting on their 
behalf and that are responsible for the collection, treatment, recovery and environmental 
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disposal of products are given a responsibility to finance, label, organise, collect and provide 
information (Ecologic and IEEP 2009).  
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments within the policy-mix 
Enhanced Producer Responsibility and a developed Eco-design directive with more Lifecycle 
assessment requirements are mutually reinforcing, as both instruments work to protect the 
environment through better design. Their complementarity comes from the fact that while the 
minimum requirements on the life-cycle performance integrates recyclability, durability and 
sourcing requirements, from an early stage of the life-cycle to its end, the WEEE directive and 
implicitly the Extended Producer Responsibility should pursue concentrates on innovations in 
design and development that will later facilitate end-of-life management. 
According to research done by the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, when it 
comes to incentives to eco-design, the Eco-design Directive may actually be preferred by 
some companies over an enhanced producer responsibility as it is stated by the WEEE 
directive.  
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
Not applicable. 
 For tax: Who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
Not applicable. 
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
Not applicable. 
g. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
A manufacturer should adopt a system-wide view in order to understand the full implications 
of its products (Brady Kevin, 2003). This includes looking beyond the manufacturing 
processes and also account for the impact on the environment and resource use implied by 
the input materials, the suppliers, energy options, transportation, distribution, and end of life of 
the products. Environmental issues therefore become a way to reduce costs, maintain market 
access, gain competitive advantage, and finally increase revenues.  
The precise flows would be determined by the specific categories of products that are to be 
included into the scope of new producer responsibility schemes.  
For the time being, given the nature of the products to which producer take back already 
applies at the European level, this has large implications for metals used in cars and 
batteries, for which resources are limited and non-renewable in a lifetime. Expensive metals 
such as cobalt and nickel could be found in substantial amounts from Lithium–ion and Nickel–
cadmium batteries. Reintroducing these materials back into the circle at the end-of-life of 
products instead of landfilling or incinerating them, would also allow manufacturers to catch 
the recycling potential (Espinosa and Mansur, 2012).  
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
Effective EPR schemes would need comparable information between operators on the 
market, which supposes transparency on which economic indicators and technical 
performance companies have to comply with. As great discrepancies in performance 
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indicators at MS level would be ineffective a common EU framework setting at least minimal 
requirements would appear more effective (Bio by Deloitte, 2014).  
As regards the implementation at MS level a slightly different approach better reflecting 
lessons learnt from past schemes (i.e., other EU Directives introducing producer 
responsibility) would be adopted. For example, consideration would be given to transfer their 
obligations for product take-back to Producer Responsibility Organisations would only be 
possible for a transition period but not in the long run, given this approach has proven to be 
less effective in meeting the objectives. 
At the same time, EU final users and retailers could both play an important role for boosting 
the implementation of EPRs schemes. The establishment of a compliance scheme (based on 
a similar scheme used in Germany for packaging waste) could be enacted, by paying 
consumers whom return their WEEE to a collection point (Wiesmeth and Häckl, 2011). This 
would establish an economic incentive for final users to increase collecting rates and 
implementing a refund scheme based on the degree of “recyclability” of the product would 
also stimulate producers to improve the design of their products (Wiesmeth, 2012). 
Mandatory take-back arrangements could also be established to incentivise both suppliers 
and final retailers, in case certain products (e.g., magazines, bread) remain unsold (European 
Commission 2014d).  
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Stakeholders that should be involved in the design of an enhanced producers’ responsibility 
scheme would be national authorities responsible for implementing the Directive in Member 
states, as well as individual producers, producer compliance schemes (or organisations), 
trade associations, consumer organisations and recycling and waste management companies 
(Okopol, 2007). 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Through specific design features or processes, producers could actually prevent that 
materials and products are taken back, reused, refurbished or recycled. Member states would 
be responsible for taking the appropriate measures in order to ensure this doesn’t happen, 
unless such particular features prove to be on the contrary beneficial for the environment or 
necessary for safety requirements (Okopol, 2007). 
In addition, awareness raising campaigns and public willingness to participate should be a 
priority in order to reach the overall long term objectives, as Bio by Deloitte identified on their 
study on actual EPR schemes. These should indeed help consumers recast social norms and 
behaviour as far as necessary for well-functioning EPR schemes. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
There are many requirements for an effective coordination of the instrument and the EU can 
create a framework for those requirements to be in place across all the MS: 
• Share of responsibility and dialogue: definition and objectives of EPR should be 
clearly identified along the whole product’s lifecycle 
• Cost average and true cost principle: costs should cover at least the cost of the waste 
that has been separated, as well as administrative, reporting and communication costs 
related to the treatment of end-of-life products. Eco-design costs could also be 
internalised, so it would offer incentives for good environmental practices. 
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• Transparency and surveillance over the economic and technical data that needs to be 
harmonised at European level. Surveillance is necessary for ensuring traceability and 
reducing environmental impacts related to the treatment of waste. Authorities and 
industry alike would be involved in the monitoring and surveillance of EPR schemes 
(Bio by Deloitte 2014).  
 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Participatory democracy is needed in order to give high legitimacy to decision-making. 
Member States would be left with some scope to decide the details of the implementation. For 
example, as compliance imposes different and sometimes substantial costs to the business 
sectors, for a transition period, producers may be allowed to transfer their obligations for 
product take-back to Producer Responsibility Organisations but this would be limited in time 
given this system performs less well. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness 
Extended producers responsibility would have positive impacts on the environment, as it 
would reduce waste and raw material consumption. The full implementation of the WEEE 
directive is estimated to result in a 131-340 kilotons of lead (Pb) reduction per year in the EU 
(Arcadis et al. 2008), while in 2007, 28 tons of platinum and 31 tonnes of palladium were 
recovered worldwide from automotive catalysts, which represents almost 15% of the global 
mining production (UNEP 2009). Implementation of the ELV directive also led to a reduction 
of over 50.000 tonnes of waste oils and other fluids in the EU per year (GHK 2006). Better 
designed products could also consume fewer resources and energy. As the scheme foster 
reuse and recycling, the overall pressure on natural resources such as water, biodiversity and 
soil might diminish. Greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) are also reduced by means of 
innovation and eco-design during the entire lifecycle of a product. Environmental sound 
design to facilitate dismantling, reductions in the level of hazardous substances used and the 
amount of recycled materials used are side effects of the measure (Ecologic & IEEP, 2009). 
In particular, the WEEE directive reduced negative externalities on the market originated from 
the discarded electrical and electronic equipment, while at the same time improved the overall 
social well-being through reduced greenhouse gas emissions and recycling. The directive 
also imposed to the EU member states a collecting target of 4 kilograms of electronic waste 
for recycling per capita per year by 2020. The WEEE also includes compulsory requirements 
regarding aspects of innovation and competition (e. g. the removal of certain substances from 
the manufacturing process) and a Producer Responsibility Principle which connects 
producers to the end-of-life phase of their products (Arcadis et al. 2008, p. 230). It must be 
pointed out, however, that the scope of the directive means that many products are not 
covered and that these benefits are somewhat limited: the directive is currently limited to the 
private households’ goods and business goods are currently excluded from its scope (Hislop 
and Hill, 2011, p. 19).  
The European Commission (2014a), in its latest communication on the circular economy, also 
indicated that financial support schemes implemented within the framework of the EPR, could 
be important drivers to be used for mitigating the environmental impact the littering of plastics. 
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Key expected economic impacts  
Enhanced producers’ responsibility should lead to growth, eco-innovation and increased 
competitiveness, as over the next decades more actions will be needed to reduce pressure 
on resources and to increase in resource efficiency. (Ecologic and IEEP, 2009). Several 
companies (e.g., Siemens) have registered lower production costs for their eco-products 
(Arcadis and RPA, 2008, p. 231).  
According to data provided by a report published by TNO (TNO, 2013) there are substantial 
economic opportunities to be captured within the circular economy. A study carried on by 
TNO in 2013 has highlighted that in the Dutch economy alone, extensive reuse and recycle of 
metal and electrical products (e.g., home computers, televisions, mobile telephones and 
measuring equipment) would provide an additional annual added value equivalent to €2,9 
billion (TNO, 2013).  
Key expected social impacts  
Efficient resource use through the entire lifecycle of a product would normally lead to 
increased environmental and health benefits. Innovation and the treatment of waste can also 
foster employment and local jobs opportunities, as a 2009 Ecologic and IEEP report pointed 
out for Belgium (Ecologic and IEEP, 2009). In terms of equity (income distribution and 
inequalities), an EPR scheme would have a minor role though providing enhancements in 
products’ durability, which is an important purchase decision factor for low-income 
households. The development of the necessary skills and expertise to enable this expansion 
of employment opportunities to be realised would be facilitated by the skills enhancement 
programme also proposed in this policy mix. 
The implementation of enhanced EPR schemes could also have an effect in terms of waste 
shipments and recycling. If refunds and the fees are set properly, illegal shipments of waste 
should diminish, as the companies might have more incentives in reusing and recycling 
better-designed products (Wiesmeth 2012).  
4.4.5 Skill enhancement programme 
Brief summary of the measure 
The EU develops (a) a strategy for mainstreaming resource efficiency aspects into relevant 
academic and vocational curricula (economics, engineering, marketing, architecture, design, 
business accounting, land management, craftsmen, etc.) and (b) conceptual frameworks for 
training for professionals to develop skill and techniques relevant for implementing resource 
efficiency measures in existing firms or developing new business models. The Strategic 
Energy Technology (SET) Plan Roadmap on Education and Training could provide a useful 
blueprint (European Commission / Joint Research Centre 2014). 
It is important to address both white collar and blue collar jobs. Therefore, the skill 
enhancement programme will have to have targeted programmes, contents and design for (i) 
professionals and leaders responsible for strategic decisions, implementation of innovations, 
etc, and (ii) broader programmes which provide workers with “green” skills suitable for the 
new business models. Thus, both the necessary changes on managerial and leadership level 
can be initiated as well as the swift reallocation of workers can be organised which is a 
necessary part of the decoupling. 
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The skill enhancement programme could (partly) be financed by revenue from the circular 
economy tax trio.  
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
In order to unfold its effects as soon as possible given the time needed to educate the next 
generation of academics, professionals and blue-collar workers, as well as to reach out to 
established professionals, the instrument would be introduced at the earliest possible date 
(realistically by 2020).  
b. What is its aim?  
The aim of the instrument is to embed systems thinking on resource use and efficiency as 
well as environmental impacts into relevant academic and vocational training in order to equip 
the next generation of academics and professionals with the ability to recognise resource 
efficiency potentials as well as options for exploiting them. In addition to knowledge transfer, 
the second aim is awareness raising about the need to think more long-term. 
Similarly, training professionals that are already on the job has the same aim, but a shorter 
time-frame as it may take more immediate effect among already established professionals. 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted at? 
With economics, engineering, architecture, design, craftsmanship, etc. as focus areas of 
mainstreamed resource efficiency curricula, all sectors and also all stages of the life-cycle 
(engineering, design and economics for extraction, processing, manufacturing, marketing, 
recycling) are targeted. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Relevant business and sectoral associations need to be engaged into discussions on their 
skill needs in light of resource scarcities and planetary boundaries. Universities, chambers of 
commerce, vocational training institutions, companies should be encouraged to consider 
systems thinking in their curricula and trainings and to be more open towards changes to 
long-standing, traditional curricula development processes.  
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix 
Compulsory reporting on resource efficiency issues at company level could benefit from 
implementing mainstreamed resource efficiency thinking into academic and vocational 
training as such training will foster sustainability oriented mindsets and thinking and hence 
foster acceptance of and increase need for such reporting from company employees and top-
management. However, assuming that the next generation of trained academics and 
professionals will be more inclined towards sustainability issues due to skill enhancement, the 
initially compulsory reporting may no longer be needed to be compulsory after some years. 
f. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
The instrument is a supporting instrument. It does not directly target physical flows. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
EU standard setting as regards the scope of the skill enhancement would be beneficial in 
order to achieve harmonised training contents. In addition, the EU can provide funding and a 
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platform for best practice exchange. Given the large diversity in education systems and 
industrial structure, the implementation should nonetheless rest with the Member States. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Industry associations, universities, chambers of commerce, vocational training institutes, 
resource efficiency agencies, professional trainers. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Not applicable.  
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Coordination at EU-level would be beneficial to ensure harmonisation of education and 
training standards, but implementation and detailed design could be left to Member State 
level. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
In principle, skill enhancement should both be politically feasible and accepted among 
addressed stakeholders as it is a future-oriented measure helping increase future-proofing 
and competitiveness. However, in order to get significant planetary boundary and systems 
thinking issues embedded into curricula which previously had not integrated that at all needs 
longer-term exchange and commitment from those setting up the training content. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Reduction of environmental impacts, increase of resource productivity and also likelihood of 
fostering alternative business models will increase through skill enhancement. The actual 
effect on impacts and resource use are difficult to quantify, but the measure can serve as a 
support to ease the implementation of the circular economy policy cluster. 
Key expected economic impacts  
Skill enhancement will increase resilience of the economy and increase likelihood of 
adaptation to emerging opportunities, as new business models, technologies, pay-back and 
investment cycles come into existence. The skill enhancement programme could partly be 
financed by revenue from the material input tax (Metals Policy Mix) and the circular economy 
tax trio (overarching policy mix). 
Key expected social impacts  
Additional skills relevant for improved resource efficiency can increase companies’ 
competitiveness as well as the workers’ individual career opportunities resulting in higher 
employment levels and increased wages. 
This requires, however, in-depth assessment of the existing skill gap towards decoupling 
technologies, processes and services and a close, continuous monitoring of the labour market 
development in order to minimise (i) the mismatch between prevailing and needed skills as 
well as (ii) the time-lag between skill needs and skill enhancement programme impacts. 
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4.4.6 Local currencies for labour-based services 
Brief summary of the measure 
The instrument entails the expansion of the use of alternative local currencies within 
communities for labour-based services. The alternative currency is initially distributed within 
the community, and then traded for local services negotiated in prices based on the currency. 
These services can include, for example, haircuts, cleaning, gardening, hosting, cake-baking, 
vegetable growing, chicken and egg rearing, child-care, care for the elderly, chauffeuring, 
public space improvements, equipment and auto repairs. As these trades are untaxed, this 
serves to make the local services more affordable, compared to products. The parts of the 
services that require material goods would be paid for in the usual currency. 
Accumulation of the alternative currency would be made public - and so provide an alternative 
status metric to consumption. A person's balance of alternative currency could stand as a 
measure of social contribution - because it shows that they are working for the community. 
This provides an additional alternative to earning in the formal economy as a route to deliver 
status and well-being, and so gives people options to achieve well-being through reducing 
paid working-hours. The currency would be electronic (cf. bitcoin) to allow for an automatic 
update of each person’s balance of the currency.  
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
Start supporting local currencies from 2020 onwards to establish service markets and prepare 
the ground for citizens to get used to options for building their own service-oriented capacities 
and skills.  
b. What is its aim?  
This instrument aims to reduce the demand for products and services that require metals and 
other materials. Its objective is to shift the focus a) of people's time from traditional production 
to alternative routes to well-being, and b) from consumption of products to consumption of 
services, which, in general, require less material input. 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted at? 
The measure targets the purchase and delivery of services to final, primarily to final 
consumers.  
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Each person would be obliged to keep track of his own accumulation of the currency, and to 
report errors found in the transactions. 
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix 
No evident link or synergy. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
Public support would be required to get the system up and running. This support includes 
both investments in the necessary technology and the management of a central system for 
control and administration. In addition, public finances will suffer from having no tax revenues 
for any of the transaction with the local currency. We assume that 0.5 % of GDP is dedicated 
for covering the costs and tax-revenue losses of this system. 
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 For tax: Who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
The costs of the system will be covered by an increase in the local and national income tax on 
households. The distribution of the tax increase will be the same as the already existing local 
tax.  
However, as the local currency is a voluntary system, it should be decided on the local 
community level (incl. the municipality) whether or not the entire municipality or only a specific 
part of it will be using local currencies. As the latter is the more complicated system in relation 
to administering a fair and just income tax increase, the local currency could be offered to 
entire municipalities and be decided by local councils/citizens debate and representation 
based on knowledge of the associated income tax increase (and what it means in numbers to 
all households wanting to take part) whether or not to vote for having the offer to all.  
g. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
All products that are used for final consumption in the areas where the local currencies are 
established. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
Municipal and/or Member State level 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
National and local authorities.  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Not applicable. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary is it to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Coordination at EU level is not important.  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Public acceptance is likely to be good. However, as the local currency is a voluntary system, it 
should be decided on the local community level (incl. the municipality) whether or not the 
entire municipality or only a specific part of it will be using local currencies. As the latter is the 
more complicated system in relation to administering a fair and just income tax increase, the 
local currency could be offered to entire municipalities and be decided by local 
councils/citizens debate and representation based on knowledge of the associated income 
tax increase (and what it means in numbers to all households wanting to take part) whether or 
not to vote for having the offer to all.  
When this is implemented, likely no heterogeneous municipality would be ending up voting in 
favour of an offer for local currencies in order to prevent the income tax increases. Therefore, 
administering it on a much more confined scale, such as a sub-urb or district of a municipality, 
would be necessary for acceptance. But then, the income tax increase would have to apply 
only to those taking part in the system – requiring some form of administrative solution to the 
income tax levying and therefore putting a likely additional burden on public administration 
and raising administrative costs. Here, it could be evaluated whether linking participation in 
the local currency system to some sort of income tax notification so that the administration 
has a clear list of participants whose income tax to increase. While this would make the 
Development of DYNAMIX Policy Mixes – Revised deliverable D4.2 
|  Page 86 
burden sharing fair and just and hence increase public acceptance, it might undermine 
institutional and political acceptance. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
The shift in consumption from material goods to labour-based services is likely to reduce the 
energy-intensive production of materials and the associated environmental impacts. The shift 
in focus from traditional production to alternative routes to well-being is likely to increase 
these environmental benefits.  
Key expected economic impacts 
The formal economic growth, as measured in the traditional currency, is likely to be reduced 
by this instrument. On the other hand the labour-based services funded by the alternative 
currency will add a half-informal component to the total economic activity. The volume of 
labour-based services is likely to increase. The production of material goods is likely to 
decrease due to reduced competitiveness in two ways: 
 Sales of material goods in the area with local currency will be less competitive 
compared to labour-based services, because the latter are untaxed. 
 Production of material goods in the area will be less competitive compared to 
production elsewhere in the world because labour taxes will be increased to cover the 
costs and revenue-losses associated with the local currency.  
Key expected social impacts 
The social impacts are difficult to predict.  
4.4.7 Enabling shift from consumption to leisure 
Brief summary of the measure 
This strategy measure aims at exploring policies to encourage reduced working hours (either 
in form of part - time or as sabbaticals). Among other measures it could include examination 
of longer statutory vacation times, dismantling of discrimination of part-time workers, the 
introduction of flexible wage records and reductions of the fixed cost of labour that currently 
disfavour part-time posts (e.g., in employee taxation and administration). 
Policies enabling part time work exist in various forms in many EU Member States, 
particularly in France, Germany and the Netherlands. The EU could initiate a debate by 
comparing effectiveness and economic impacts of these policies and setting out options in a 
communication. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
The measure is likely to be met with strong opposition. A first step can only be a public debate 
before 2020 laying the ground for voluntary labour market reform activities in Member States 
around 2025 (deciding on whether or not to introduce mandatory changes in the coming 
decades). In the 2030ies an EU framework could follow.  
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b. What is its aim?  
One of the strongest drivers for environmentally-harmful consumption is the availability and 
affordability of consumption. Induced behavioural changes are unlikely to compensate for the 
increasing possibilities of consumption afforded by increases in productivity that reduce prices 
relative to average incomes (see, e.g., Jackson 2009). Another driver appears to be the 
sticking to unsustainable habits due to perceived lack of time to consider alternatives or 
acquire the skills necessary for a new, more sustainable practice and increased consumption 
because it is convenient or quick due to lack of time (see, e.g., Shor 2010). 
Opting for increases in leisure instead of increases in income could address both drivers 
mentioned above. Evidence shows that on average leisure time pursuits tend to be 
associated with lower GHG emissions than work or consumption activities (Druckman et al. 
2012). A shift from income to leisure thus holds the potential to decrease consumption levels 
compared to a business-as-usual scenario with continually rising incomes. 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted? 
The measure would potentially affect all companies with employees in all economic sectors. 
In practice, reducing work time might be easier put in practice in some sectors than in others. 
As described above, resistance is likely across sectors and stakeholders which underlines the 
need of encouraging voluntary work time reductions rather than using mandatory regulation. 
The public sector is likely to be more affected (as the evidence from Scandinavia shows). 
Similarly, workers and positions lower in the hierarchy are likely to be more suited for part-
time work than management positions. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Given that the measure has an exploratory character, no direct requirements would ensue 
before 2030. After intense debate, measures such as longer statutory vacations, longer 
parental leave, job protection for employees opting for sabbaticals or part-time work, schemes 
that allow workers to save parts of their income for later career breaks or part-time work, 
standards avoiding the discrimination of part-time workers or more sophisticated approaches 
of time rights over a work life (Pullinger 2014, 16f.) would oblige employers to comply starting 
in 2030. The instrument would therefore be primarily regulatory, in most cases changing 
existing labour legislation, preferably by harmonising it EU-wide. It could be combined with 
additional financial incentives, for example state support in times of parental leave or while 
caring for elderly relatives or tax credits. 
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix 
The measure has synergies with the attempts to restrict advertisement and marketing 
because both aim at addressing social norms and mindsets leading to continually growing 
levels of consumption. It would also work best in combination with economic instruments 
aiming at internalising environmental costs such as a resource tax, since price levels that 
correctly reflect environmental impacts would provide an incentive to spend the additional free 
time gained in activities with low environmental footprints. 
f. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
The instrument is a supporting instrument. It does not directly target physical flows. If coming 
to full fruition, it has however the potential to significantly reduce resource flows associated 
with the purchase, use and disposal of consumer goods and services. 
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A small body of research using household expenditure and time use survey has provided 
empirical evidence that on average shorter working hours correlate with lower carbon 
footprints (Devetter and Rousseau 2011, Nässen and Larsson 2010, Pullinger 2011, 
Druckman et al. 2012) and lower ecological footprints (Hayden and Shandra 2009, Knight et 
al. 2013). The correlation also holds when comparing total hours worked in an economy with 
overall energy consumption as Rosnick and Weisbrot (2006) have shown in a comparison of 
Europe, Australia, the U.S. and Canada. The effect is mainly due to lower affluence which 
correlates with lower footprints.  
The environmental benefits is likely to be at least partly offset by indirect or rebound effects: 
• Shorter working hours can make the labour force more productive per hour at work. 
This means the production, salary, consumption and emissions will all decrease less 
than the working hours – at least down to a certain amount of working time, beyond 
which productivity and hence income will reduce more significantly. 
• The additional leisure time could be spent on production at home: baking, sewing 
clothes, carpentry etc. Since the raw materials for such activities are cheaper than the 
finished products, the total use of raw materials might not decrease even if affluence 
does. 
• As the reform makes labour less abundant, producers might increase the use of 
machinery, electricity and fossil fuel as a substitute for labour. This could potentially 
offset the environmental benefits completely and even result in an increase in carbon 
emissions, depending on the technology used, etc.  
Based on the empirical findings and the discussion on rebound effects, one could thus 
assume that total resource consumption by households decreases in a determined 
proportion, which is less than 1 to 1, to work time reduction. Based on the most conservative 
scenario used by Rosnick and Weisbrot (2006) for energy consumption, one could for 
example use the assumption that every 1 % of working time reduction per worker results in a 
0.32 % reduction of resource consumption.  
In addition to potentially affecting the total volume of goods and services consumed in a 
household, changes in working time might also alter the composition of consumption. This 
effect is more difficult to track and evidence is not conclusive so far (Pullinger 2014, 12). The 
composition of consumption could, as an approximation, be assumed to remain unchanged. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
The EU can initiate a debate, but policies are most appropriate on MS level given the 
singularities of national work time regimes. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Business associations, worker unions, NGOs, social movements. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Not applicable.  
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
See above.  
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e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
The measure is likely to get strong opposition out of fear that the Commission or national 
governments might limit working time via strict regulation. Also, in many Member States that 
still are severely affected by the economic crisis, increasing employment is the prime aim. 
Enabling part-time work might be perceived as being at odds with this agenda. Initially, the 
measure should therefore focus on public debate and exploration. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Initially no direct environmental impacts are to be expected. In the longer term, a substitution 
of additional income by leisure could reduce the consumption of consumer goods and 
services and reduce the associated resource flows. It has the potential to effectively address 
the rebound effects since it limits rises to affluences counteracting gains in available income 
due to efficiency improvements. 
The level of effectiveness depends on many factors, such as the wage arrangements that go 
with the reduction in work-time and the average environmental impacts associated with the 
leisure activities chosen. The latter can also be affected by the policy itself insofar as it could 
give particular incentives to reduce working time for caring activities (for children or the 
elderly) or voluntary work – both of which tend to be linked to lower ecological footprints than 
other leisure or work activities. 
Key expected economic impacts  
The expected economic impacts are reduced total working hours compared to the reference 
case. The impact on productivity needs to be examined.  
Key expected social impacts  
Overall, work time reduction has the potential to positively impact wellbeing since it can be 
shown that the activities related to high levels of subjective wellbeing such as strong social 
relations, creative and meaningful activities are time-intensive (Pullinger 2014). This being 
said, a number of conditions need to be met. Working time reductions should not endanger 
appropriate living standards for any social groups. Any working time reduction accompanied 
with decreases in total wages should be voluntary. Historically, working time reductions have 
been achieved without overall wage reductions, since productivity gains (and to some extent 
also capital gains) have been translated into an increase in leisure time rather than higher 
incomes (Shor 2008, 165f.). Potentially, work time reductions could also help to distribute paid 
work more evenly across society, thereby reducing the negative health effects of both 
unemployment and overwork (Coote et al. 2010, p. 18) 
Also, accompanying policies might need to enable people to use additional free time in a way 
that increases rather than decreases their wellbeing.  
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4.4.8 Step-by-step restriction of advertising and marketing 
Brief summary of the measure 
A rough estimate of total marketing spent in the EU is 360 billion Euro per year. By 
comparison, EU governments spend an estimated 0.03 billion Euro per year on campaigns for 
sustainable behaviour.13 Given marketing’s and advertisement’s significant role in stimulating 
consumption levels and fostering values and norms of consumerism, it appears more 
promising to use regulation to introduce step-by-step restrictions on advertisement than 
employing limited public funds to run sustainable behaviour campaigns.  
However, political opposition against marketing restrictions is likely to be strong. Therefore, 
DYNAMIX proposes the following step-by-step approach: 
 Increasing compliance with and further developing voluntary codes of conduct, 
including inter alia with respect to non-declared advertisement (e.g., product 
placement in films and television content), advertisement strategies portraying goods 
as leading to status and popularity increase (for more detail see Alexander et al. 
2011); 
 Building on and extending existing regulation with respect to alcohol and cigarettes, 
marketing targeting children14, and visual pollution in city centres15; 
 Using synergies with other societal goals, particularly the improvement of public health 
or the preservation of historic monuments (which can be an additional arguments 
against billboards in city centres) by building partnerships with policy-makers and 
stakeholders in these fields; 
 Using existing EU law on misrepresentative claims to strengthen the commercial and 
environmental value associated with developing an environmentally beneficial product 
or service; 
 Funding consumer or citizen organisations to bring legal action against misleading 
marketing that wrongly suggests a pro-environmental association16; 
 Moving towards restrictions of advertisement on luxury goods linked to conspicuous 
consumption; 
                                               
13
 The second figure is based on an extrapolation of UK expenditure. 
14
 Currently, five EU countries have strong restrictions on advertisement of high-sugar, salt and fat 
foods and drinks to children, and others have codes of conduct (e.g. EU Pledge not advertise 
products to children under 12 years by 15 companies, including Coca-Cola, Burger King, Ferrero, 
General Mills, Kellogg’s, Mars, McDonald’s Europe, Nestlé, and PepsiCo) with varying degrees of 
effectiveness. 
15
 Examples include bans in Sao Paulo (Worldwatch Institute 2013) and Hawaii (Institute for Local Self-
Reliance 2009), as well as restrictions and initiatives to introduce them e.g. in Los Angeles (Raza 
2011) and Paris (Varela 2011). 
16
 Article 6, Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 2005/29/EC: “A commercial practice shall be 
regarded as misleading if it […] in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to 
deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct, and … is likely to cause 
him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise”. 
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 In order to catalyse action on the municipal and national level, the EU could issue a 
communication analysing the state-of-play and suggesting measures, while at the 
same time providing forums or using existing institutions such as the Covenant of 
Mayors to diffuse best practices. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
Since the measure foresees a step-by-step approach building on bottom-up action from the 
municipal level, national legislation and EU support, its introduction would span several years. 
Provided that bottom-up diffusion combined with national action is fruitful, an EU regulation 
with minimum standards could follow starting with restricting unfair advertisement, advertising 
targeted a children and advertisements in city centres by 2020. Then, the focus could be 
expanded step-wise to sugar/fats in 2025 and to selected luxury goods linked to global social 
responsibility (e.g., blood diamonds) by mid 2030. 
b. What is its aim?  
Restricting advertisement can help to dampen the prevalence and strengths of consumerist 
values in society which often counteract efforts aimed at spreading sustainable consumption 
practices. Restrictions on marketing and advertisement targeting children would be 
particularly effective given the lasting impact of commercialisation of childhood on consumer 
choices throughout an individual’s lifetime (Linn 2010). 
In addition, legal action against misleading environmental associations in advertising could 
increase the credibility and exclusivity of green claims, which in turn my lead to a stronger 
association between pro-environmental attributes and positive, underlying motivational factors 
of social contribution, justice, social acceptance, exclusivity and status. The widespread 
association of these factors repeatedly portrayed by pervasive marketing could play a role in 
re-enforcing both pro-environmental purchasing and the underlying social norms which 
promote other pro-environmental behaviours.  
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted? 
The measure could have indirect effects on all consumer goods and a limited number of 
services (e.g., tourist industry). In a first phase, the sectors where advertisement restrictions 
might be the least controversial are sweets and sugary drinks for children, fast food, and 
luxury goods such as jewellery, sport cars or high end fashion. From a pure environmental 
perspective, it would be advisable to focus on the most resource-intensive products and 
services.  
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
The food and drink industry as well as producers of luxury goods will face restrictions on 
where and how they can market their products.  
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments within the policy-mix 
The measure has a synergy with the working time reduction measures insofar as both 
instruments aim to reduce interlinked pressures to consume, often describe as the work-and-
spend cycle (Schor 1998). A correlation between rising per-capita spending on advertisement 
and working hours supply has also been shown empirically even though more detailed 
research is needed on the underlying causality (Alexander et al. 2011, 21f.).  
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f. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
The instrument is a supporting instrument. It does not directly target physical flows. Through 
decreased incentives to consume, it does however aim to reduce production levels 
particularly of highly processed food and luxury goods and thereby reduce the resource flow 
associated with the production, use and disposal of these goods. 
Governance 
a. At what governance level should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
National- and local-level regulation appears to a promising first step which – if successful – 
could build the momentum for EU-level minimum standards after 2020.  
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Affected industries, advertisement and marketing industry, consumer protection agencies, 
academics, particularly psychologists, sociologists, nutrition experts, city planners, health 
insurance companies. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Fines are needed to ensure compliance. The level needs to be defined in the respective 
municipal or national regulation.  
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
EU action can serve as catalyst and provide the platform for best practice exchange, for 
example in forums like the Covenant of Mayors.  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
The measures will face stiff opposition from the affected industries as previous debates about 
consumer information have demonstrated. The advertisement and marketing industry is also 
certain to oppose the measure since it threatens to decrease turnover. Municipalities and 
cities aiming for billboard-free public space will face revenue losses due to foregone lease 
payments.  
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
The concrete environmental impacts are difficult to quantify because many factors include 
purchase decisions of which marketing and advertisement is only one. However, we could 
attempt to compare consumption levels in countries with restriction on advertisement 
compared to countries with liberal rules as a gauge for future impacts.  
The paradigm shift away from a focus on conspicuous and ever spiralling consumption 
(“Keeping up with the Joneses”) can be a crucial means for enabling sustainable consumption 
practices to spread more widely to all societal groups. 
Key expected economic impacts  
The affected industries are likely to face reductions in sales. Depending on the stringency of 
the regulation in place, the advertisement industry’s turn-over may decrease. However, if 
regulation would be targeted only to the most resource-intensive goods, a mere shift in turn-
over composition is more likely. 
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Key expected social impacts  
Less pressure to consume is likely to result in better health and increased social well-being, 
particularly for poor people that suffer most from status competition and vulnerable 
consumers such as children (with respect to children see Ipsos-MORI and Nairn 2011). 
Moreover, higher quality of public spaces through reduced visual pollution also benefits low-
income groups disproportionally since they are more dependent on public spaces for 
recreation than richer people. 
Negative impacts for the advertisement industry, including loss of well-paid jobs, may lead to 
negative social consequences for employees in the field. However, this would only apply if 
advertisement budgets go down in absolute terms. The measures proposed are more likely to 
result in a shift of advertisement spending on different products or different target groups or 
media. 
4.4.9 Minimum requirements for life-cycle performance 
Brief summary of the measure 
This measure would entail expanding the scope of products covered by the Ecodesign 
Directive and addressing a wider range of environmental impacts throughout a product’s life-
cycle by adding design requirements relating to material efficiency. These could be 
incorporated through additional criteria related to durability, recyclability, sustainable sourcing 
of materials and packaging requirements, etc. This measure could be achieved in the context 
of a revision of the Ecodesign Directive (2009/125/EC) on energy, water, and other resources’ 
use, which is considered an important part of the EU strategy on Integrated Product Policy 
(European Commission 2003). As suggested in the Ecodesign Working Plan 2012-2014 
proposed by the European Commission (European Commission 2012b) additional 
requirements will only be included in the scope as far as they are “feasible and add value”. 
 
 
Figure 9: Steps of a Life cycle analysis. Source: The European Platform of Life Cycle 
Assessment 
 
The Eco-design Directive is already meant to cover the entire life cycle of a product, but just 
for energy related products. In addition, the life cycle assessment carried out only partially 
accounts for the impacts that arise at the beginning and at the end of the life stage (extraction 
of materials, depletion of resources, effects on land and biodiversity, air pollution, health 
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related diseases, etc.). An enhancement of the requirements for life-cycle performance would 
require all these aspects to be assessed rather than only the use phase of a product 
(European Commission 2014d). 
Brief description of the design and scope 
As stated above, the Eco-design Directive currently primarily covers energy-related products 
and their energy consumption once in use (Rohn et al. 2011), but the scope of the ecodesign 
could be expanded so as to: 
a) Fully account for energy use throughout a product’s entire lifecycle. 
b) Cover a wider range of products beyond domestic energy using equipment. 
c) address environmental impacts beyond energy use through the introduction of new 
performance criteria would be introduced in order to account more fully for the different 
types of environmental impacts of products across their lifecycle and ensure that they 
be addressed through better product design. This may include the ban on adding 
certain substances (e.g., phthalates and PVC in Denmark) which undermine the 
recyclability of products or represent a health risk (Mazza et al. 2013). 
As regards b), the scope of the Eco-design directive would be expanded so as to include in 
particular more non-domestic equipment (which are currently excluded from the list of the 
Ecodesign directive) (European Commission 2014d). As the Eco-design directive has 
particularly focused on domestic product groups (e.g., dishwashers), a lot of potential still 
remains untapped for a significant range of non-domestic or Business-to-Business products 
such as: commercial refrigeration, motor systems (e.g., lifts or elevators) and heavy duty 
vehicles (Global View Sustainability Services, 2011). Table 8 below indicates commercial 
equipment which would be covered under the scope for the Ecodesign directive, while Table 
9 indicates the potentials for additional household products which would be covered under the 
Ecodesign directive.  
In particular, other groups of products such as heavy-duty vehicles (e.g., trucks) could yield 
potential improvement through labels and eco-design (European Commission 2014d). A 
report released in 2012 by the European Commission (2012b), highlighted an indicative list of 
“priority products” groups: Thermal insulation products for buildings, commercial refrigeration 
and heating and lighting controls systems (e.g., Smart Appliances/meters). A continuously 
expanding list of products should be carefully assessed, because if environmental impacts 
are already covered by “horizontal” rules (e.g., REACH and RoHS) the ecodesign directive 
should not overlap with previous directives and regulations.  
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Table 8: Potential commercial equipment and products which could be covered by the 
Ecodesign directive  
 
Table 9: Potential additional household equipment and products which could be 
covered by the Ecodesign directive 
 
Products used for commerical 
purposes to be covered 
by the Ecodesign Directive
Expected Savings
Included in the First Eco-Design Working 
Plan
(2009-2011)
Included in the Second Eco-
Design Working Plan
(2011-2014)
Adopted to date Comments
Auxiliary equipment for Vehicles 
(e.g air conditioning and ventilators)
Electric Bycicles Low***









(e.g. 43 TWh/year by 2020)**
Partially
Energy requirements for 
Televisions were approved 
before
 the implementation of the 
LED Technology. Expected 





(e.g. 1500 PJ/year by 2030)**
Saving caluclated for both 
Households and Commercial 
users. Possible cross-linkages 
with the Energy Performance 
of Building Directive 
(2002/91/EC )
Window products for building
High
(e.g. 785 PJ/year by 2030)**
Taps and Showerheads
High
(e.g. 885 PJ/year by 2030)**
Complex and simple set-top box 
Moderate
(e.g. 9 Twh/year by 2020)*** NO NO
Industry VA
 in place
Enterprise Servers and Data centers
Moderate




(e.g. 20 Twh/year by 2030)**
YES NO Partially 
Preparatory studies are 
currently ongoing. Expected 
savings for Commercial and 
Household users 
*Wuppertal Institute (2010), **VHK (2011),***Ecofys (2014)




(e.g. trucks and buses)
Moderate
(e.g. 12-16 TWh/year by 2020)*
NO
Addressed only for 
Householdsbut not for 
Commercial users through 




Preparatory studies are 
currently ongoing. Expected 
savings for Commercial and 
Household users 
NO
Products used for household
purposes to be covered 
by the Ecodesign Directive
Expected Savings
Included in the First Eco-Design Working 
Plan
(2009-2011)
Included in the First Eco-Design 
Working Plan
(2011-2014)
Adopted to date Comments
Game Consolles Low† NO YES NO
Industry VA
 in place. However, If no 
action is taken,  the electricity 
consumed by game consoles 
in the EU could grow as much  
50% by 2020*
Imaging Equipment Low* YES NO NO
Industry VA
 in place
Professional Dishwashers, dryers and 
washing machines
n\a NO NO NO




(e.g. 12,8 PJ\year by 2030)**
NO YES NO
Difficult to calculate savings  
due to the changing 
performance of products.
Expected savings for 
Commercial and Household 
users 
*Wuppertal InsHtute (2010), **VHK (2011), †Coolproducts (2010) 
Sources:  PSI et al. (2014), Ecofys (2012), Ecofys (2014), European Commission (2012), European Commission (2014), Coolproducts (2010), Ecofys (2014b),BIO et. al (2014)
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a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
Article 21 of the Eco-design Directive gives the possibility to extend the scope of the directive 
also to “non-energy-related” products, in order to reduce the pressure on the environment (EU 
2009). In the context of the EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy (COM(2015) 614 final), 
the Commission outlines plans to “emphasise circular economy aspects in future product 
design requirements under the Ecodesign Directive” (p. 4 of the Action plan). The 
Commission intends to systematically examine “issues such as reparability, durability, 
upgradability, recyclability, or the identification of certain materials or substances […] on a 
product by product basis in new working plans and reviews […] (ibid.). An Ecodesign working 
plan, foreseen for publication in 2016, will then detail further how this will be implemented. 
Against this background, minmum requirements for life-cycle performance should be 
introduced by 2020.  
b. What is its aim?  
The aim is to extend the scope of the Ecodesign directive in order to: 
1) Expand the list of products covered by the Ecodesign Directive, in particular by 
including appliances beyond domestic equipment (see above) and additional product 
categories (also products that are not energy using). 
2) Include other criteria (beyond energy use of energy using products) (Global View 
Sustainability Services, 2011), especially relating to banning toxic substances and to 
increasing material efficiency (linked to product durability, recyclability, sustainable 
sourcing of materials and packaging requirements, etc.). 
Additional criteria better accounting for the overall lifecycle impacts could for example aim to 
extend the average lifetime of products by 50% by 2025 (more durable and have increased 
operational lives) and environmental impacts over the lifecycle (including production and 
discard) divided by at least two. 
However, care will be given to ensuring that the criteria do not lead to inefficiencies such as 
disproportionate administrative burdens, unnecessarily misleading information, and policy 
misappropriation when other existing instruments proved to be better prepared to challenge 
environmental impacts (e.g., REACH, regulation on pesticides residues, IED directive, etc.). 
This measure will ultimately lead to improvements to goods and services through: 
• Lower environmental impacts 
• Reduced resources consumption across the entire life cycle (EPLCA 2014) 
 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted? 
The instrument applies to the entire lifecycle of a product. Therefore, it will target virgin 
materials extraction and transformation, manufacturing and distribution sectors, consumption 
and end of life through recycling, re-use, recovery and disposal (EPLCA, 2014). This 
suggests that, while the primary target would continue to be the manufacturing sector, the 
new criteria relating to earlier stages in the lifecycle (e.g., only certified/recycled/sustainably 
harvested materials to be used for the production of a given good) would result in possible 
implications across the supply chain and call for cooperation across the supply chains of 
targeted products in order to achieve the required increase in environmental performance 
(ECOFYS 2014). 
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d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Producers of a larger range of products may be requested to collect and report a larger 
amount of information on the environmental performance of their products across their 
lifecycle (linked to the new/additional performance standards set). Suppliers may be required 
to provide information certifying their product’s conformity with material efficiency 
requirements as laid out in the (revised) Ecodesign Directive. When an existing legislation 
already envisages some of these requirements however, it may be appropriate to keep them 
under the previous framework legislation, unless an added value can be obtained (ECOFYS, 
2014a).  
Finally, public authorities may have to proactively push for the development of new/additional 
certification programmes and monitoring schemes in some areas order to ensure that 
manufacturers are provided with the necessary information allowing them to find materials in 
the supply chains which make it possible for their products to meet the new standards. 
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments  
Setting minimum performance requirements for an increasing number of products is closely 
linked to boosting extended producer responsibility. Satisfying those minimum requirements 
on materials would require better waste management solutions, better designed products and 
services, recyclability and remanufacturing business models, whose emergence is also 
expected to be driven from the development of extended producer responsibility schemes. 
f. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
The measure would target raw and intermediate materials’ flows, as well as waste flows 
generated, as the new requirements will cover the entire life-cycle of a product, from early 
stages until the end of life of a product.  
Governance 
a. At what governance level should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
The requirements on life-cycle performance follow a similar rationale as the development of 
the EU-wide Ecodesign directive, and the new requirements would be implemented in the 
same scales. The requirements this instrument introduces should be equally applicable to all 
imported products, in order to not create a competitiveness disadvantage for products 
manufacturers in the EU. Concerns about such requirements have risen in the WTO from 
developing countries; which claims that might be contrary to WTO’s agreements. However, 
eco-labels proved to be consistent with WTO regulation in the past, as far as they are 
necessary for the protection of the environment or of human health. In this case requirements 
are considered to affect non-product related processes or production methods. Only one 
GATT dispute was registered in the past for eco-labelling and so far not a single WTO dispute 
involved the ecodesign issue (Center for International Environmental Law, 2005). 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
In principle the same categories of actors that have been involved in the development of the 
current requirements under the Ecodesign directive, most notably product manufacturers but 
also environmental groups. However, the extended scope of the revised directive would 
require the involvement of manufacturers from new sectors that so far were not involved. 
Depending on the criteria it may also make sense to involve the extractive industry as well as 
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producers of intermediate products, to investigate to which extent their environmental impacts 
associated with their activities could be reduced and certified. 
In the case of global supply chains voluntary agreements might have to be negotiated 
between manufacturers and their suppliers, especially since in a global context information 
exchanges between producers and suppliers may not be easy to regulate.  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Depending on the requirements, manufacturers may have to disclose information linked to the 
environmental performance of their products in order to demonstrate that their products 
comply with all requirements. Requirements throughout the entire life-cycle makes suppliers 
and potentially even organisations responsible for the end-of-life of a product responsible for 
ensuring the reduction in the environmental impacts of their products throughout the entire 
cycle. Their non-compliance could eventually lead to a ban for certain energy-consuming 
products in the Member States (ECOFYS, 2014a).  
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Given the common market harmonised standards for products across all EU MS is necessary. 
In order to avoid discrepancies across Member States it is important that standards are 
developed based on EU-wide collection of information on the current performance of products 
and the extent to which it could be improved. Higher requirements in one country are possible 
if the manufacturer takes voluntary steps and if this does not lead to import restrictions for 
products coming from other countries (Center for International Environmental Law, 2005). 
Following the model adopted by the Ecodesign directive, the creation of a new EU-level 
organism (e.g., the European Committee for Standardisation or the European Committee for 
Electro-technical Standardisation) would facilitate the implementation of new requirements. 
Market surveillance on non-compliant products and fines for producers is also an important 
aspect that need to be taken into account for a successful implementation of the Eco-design 
directive (ECOFYS, 2014b).  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Expanding the scope of the Ecodesign directive needs an appropriate consultation between 
Member states, businesses, consumers, environmental NGOs and scientists in order to 
determine the most critical products that need to be addressed through the extension of the 
scope. Some sectors (e.g., motorised road transport) may be impacted particularly heavily by 
standardisation efforts aiming at reducing the environmental impacts throughout the lifecycle 
(ECOFYS, 2014a). Thorough consultation procedures will increase the enforcement capacity 
of the new regulations, create a momentum for investments in innovation, and increase 
acceptability among the business sector. Moreover, the measure will also increase 
consumers’ choice among different types of products. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Environmental impacts of this policy instrument should include less greenhouse gas 
emissions, reduced use of natural resources and improved waste management. In addition, 
adding some environmentally harmful substances (e.g., phthalates and PVC in Denmark) that 
may undermine the recyclability of the product may be considered (Mazza et al. 2013). An 
fuller implementation of the Ecodesign directive to all energy using products, whether used for 
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domestic purposes or business to business (with requirements on energy-related products), 
has been estimated to potentially save up to 400 Mega-tonnes of CO2 emissions annually-
saved in 2020 (ECOFYS, 2012).  
Key expected economic impacts 
Life-cycle requirements should foster competition and eco-innovation on the market, as 
constantly improving life-cycle performances will be an ultimate goal for companies in their 
quest of a better position on the market through labelling pressure (Kramer, 2012). 
Knowledge that is built through these measures can also constitute an important capital with 
associated economic advantages. Besides, companies’ image is improved, as they 
demonstrate their commitment in reducing the environmental impacts of their products 
(EPLCA, 2014).  
According to a study released by the consultancy ECOFYS, a correct implementation of the 
Eco-design directive would lead to yearly savings equivalent to 600 TWh of heat and 600 
TWh of electricity in 202017 (with the majority of the savings achieved by electric motors, 
tertiary sector lighting and televisions). The economic impact would also be relevant. Total 
gross monetary savings (in terms of saved energy bills) would be equal to €120 billion a year 
in 2020 for European businesses and consumers (ECOFYS, 2012).  
The security of supplies of the EU would also be reinforced, with a reduction of dependency 
on third-country energy suppliers. By 2020 the EU would experience a total import reduction 
equivalent at least to 10%. In particular, imports of natural gas and coal would be reduced 
respectively by 17% and 28%. If we take into consideration the energy imports from Russia, 
the Ecodesign could (ECOFYS, 2012). 
Consumers and businesses are also supposed to benefit, with savings equivalent by 2020 to 
€ 280 per household per year and for businesses of €90 billion per year. Future jobs are 
expected to be created through new requirements in innovation and life-cycle management. 
For energy-related savings alone, the Ecodesign directive has the potential to add 1 million 
jobs to the EU Economy by 2020 (ECOFYS, 2012). 
Key expected social impacts 
A possible reinvestment of these savings could be spent in other parts of the EU economy 
and lead to the creation of 1 million additional jobs in 2020 (ECOFYS, 2012). The Eco-design 
directive on energy-related products is expected to also produce energy savings equivalent to 
the annual residential electricity consumption of Sweden in the period 2010-2020 (European 
Commission, 2008b). Further estimates show that these savings could reduce consumers’ 
final energy bills and lead to substantial resources savings (e.g., raw materials and plastics). 
Moreover, a rebound effect could come from the fact that better performing products are 
usually associated with high premiums, and are therefore less affordable to low income 
households. 
                                               
17
 This would be equivalent respectively to 17 % of the total electricity and 10 % of the overall heat consumption.  
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4.4.10 Compulsory business reporting on sustainability 
Brief summary of the measure 
Obliging listed companies to provide sustainability reporting alongside financial reporting 
enables clients, investors and suppliers to take a company’s environmental and social 
performance into account when deciding on purchases, investments or co-operation. Well-
performing companies may gain competitive advantages and have easier access to capital. 
In addition, the internal management process established through the sustainability reporting 
will increase the company’s knowledge about resource flows and efficiency potentials along 
its supply chain. Thus, compulsory sustainability reporting (including goal setting procedures) 
can exert a push effect from clients, suppliers and investors and a pull effect from within the 
company to identify and exploit savings potential and increase eco-innovation. Finally, the 
measure creates the basis for mainstreaming of ethical investments in the financial industry. 
To avoid duplication of previous work and increase acceptability reporting requirements 
should build as much as possible on established frameworks developed, for example, by the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI 2013), the former Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP 2014) or 
UN Global Compact as well as standardised procedures of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) reporting and environmental management (such as ISO 14001). As opposed to 
voluntary implementation, compulsory implementation should, however, involve third-party 
verification to avoid lax implementation occurring in cases of voluntary reporting (Clapp 2005). 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced (2020 or 2030)? 
A compulsory reporting scheme on sustainability issues can be important for increasing the 
availability of reliable data and information. This allows further policy-maing to be more firmly 
based on evidence. A well-established system for sustainability reporting can also help 
shifting paradigms. For these reasons, we suggest that the obligation to report on 
sustainability issues would be introduced as early as 2020. Although some initial resistance 
can be expected, we assume this can be overcome by then. 
b. What is its aim?  
Provide solid and comparable data on companies’ sustainability performance to provide 
clients, suppliers, investors and other stakeholders with a more complete information basis for 
purchasing and investment decisions. Reporting can increase transparency on external costs 
that result from negative environmental impacts or depreciation of natural capital and allow 
the financial industry to take these external costs into consideration. 
At the same time, the reporting requirements prompt executives and employees to 
incorporate the broader and longer-term social and environmental consequences of corporate 
decision-making. A management system with performance goals and benchmarks enables 
companies to identify and tackle resource efficiency and savings potentials and the 
accompanying cost savings. Moreover, a corporate sustainability vision can help 
strengthening identity of employees and hence identification with and dedication to the 
company. 
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c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would be targeted? 
To maximise environmental impact, the focus should be initially on energy and material 
intensive industry sectors, such as automotive, chemicals, steel, aluminium, paper production, 
cement production, raw materials extraction. All life cycle stages from extraction via 
processing to manufacturing shall be targeted. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Listed companies would be required to deliver regular sustainability reporting on relevant 
environmental and social impacts based on one recognised standard in parallel to financial 
reporting and subject to similar certification procedures to guarantee quality of reporting. 
Depending on the company’s activity indicators might include material intensity measured, 
waste generation, freshwater use, GHG and air pollutant emissions, eco- and human toxicity, 
impacts on land use, soil sealing, energy use (fossil vs. renewables), planned remediation 
procedures, local and regional value added generation, social impacts. 
e. Links, synergies and interlinkages with other instruments in the policy mix  
Sustainability reporting in companies has synergies with all instruments of the circular 
economy cluster since they all aim at improving the environmental performance of products, 
services and production processes. Additional synergies exist with skill enhancement which 
will increase employees’ openness to and capacity of implementing the desirable changes 
identified through the reporting process.  
f. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
All physical flows of materials, energy, waste, biotic resources as well as impacts on land, air 
and ecosystems. 
Governance 
a. At what governance level should the instrument be deployed (EU? MS?)? 
To ensure a level playing field on the common market, the requirement should be 
implemented by an EU regulation applying in all Member States. In addition, the EU should 
strive for international standardisation of standards. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Industry and business associations, workers unions, civil society organisation, academia and 
existing reporting initiatives. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Company’s top level management (CEOs) will be required to establish sustainability 
departments and nominate a Chief Sustainability Officer, equipping him/her with sufficient 
power to get data and support from different company departments as well as with sufficient 
staff and top-management backing. If companies do not deliver (at a certain time of the year) 
according to agreed standards, a fine of 1% of the annual turnover, or in case of negative 
balances of at least 1% of the last positive turnover or, if lower than 1,000,000 EUR one 
million EUR will be levied. Fines will have to be scaled according to company size and 
turnover. 
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d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
To avoid market distortion EU-level regulation is desirable, even if challenging politically 
(particularly the UK is likely to oppose it).  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Acceptance may be initially low out of fear of increased administrative burden. It is therefore 
essential to build on existing standards and guidelines that many companies already use. 
Furthermore, linking the provision of high-quality reporting to market opportunities and 
potentially to green public procurement criteria can gain this instrument greater acceptance 
due to economic benefits. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Indirect environmental impacts can arise from increased transparency and effective internal 
management allowing identifying and exploiting existing resource efficiency potentials. The 
reporting may also encourage companies to pursue alternative and more sustainable 
business models through client pull, investor push and level playing field.  
Key expected economic impacts  
Low increase in company costs upfront to implement monitoring system, employ reporting 
staff, establish monitoring routines and producing reports. On the flipside, however, 
companies with good sustainability reporting could benefit from easier access to capital (given 
the increase of ethical investment standards), higher attractiveness for clients and potential 
employees, and increased chances to win government procurement tenders (given the 
expansion of green public procurement). The internal management process can also allow 
companies to detect supply or resource price risks early on and address them proactively. 
Key expected social impacts  
Compulsory sustainability reporting will also address social impacts of production processes 
such as health aspects of environmentally harmful activities (in extraction, processing, 
manufacturing). This has the potential to reduce the impacts of such activities and hence to 
improve human health aspects.  
4.5 Revisions after ex-ante assessment 
4.5.1 Policy mix narrative 
Based on the lessons learnt in the qualitative (Nesbit et al. 2015a, Bigano et al. 2015, 
Bukowski et al. 2015, Lucha and Roberts 2015, Vanner et al. 2015) and quantitative ex-ante 
assessments (Ekvall et al. 2016b, Bosello et al. 2016), the overarching policy mix would 
benefit from adapting some of the instruments proposed as part of the mix. 
The overall narrative of the overarching policy mix seems to be robust according to the ex-
ante assessment results – supporting resource and impact decoupling through fostering 
reduction in resource use and environmental impacts associated with resource use. 
According to Nesbit et al. (2015a) the eight policy instruments proposed for and assessed 
under the overarching policy mix likely have positive environmental effects because in 
combination the eight policy instruments will 
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I. Increase prices for use of materials and material-intensive products as well as for 
waste incineration and landfilling; 
II. Increase the availability and affordability of less material-intense and more climate-
friendly products and services; 
III. Help integrate resource efficiency into product design through expanding EPR 
systems to additional waste streams (e.g., waste tyres, waste oils); and 
IV. Provide enabling frameworks for reducing material consumption in businesses through 
skill enhancement programmes, and among households via encouraging the reduction 
of working hours, restricting consumption-fuelling advertising and supporting local 
service exchange through local currencies. 
 
However, despite a great likelihood of the policy mix to contribute to achieving the DYNAMIX 
key environmental targets, the assessments by Nesbit et al. (2015a) and Ekvall et al. (2016b) 
show that: 
a) no quantification of any exact level of contribution to the targets can be given 
b) the overarching policy mix has greatest potential contributions to the two targets (I) 
Reducing consumption of virgin metals by 80%, compared to 2010; and (II) Limiting 
annual per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 2 tons of CO2 equivalent.  
Furthermore, potentially negative side-effects of the policy instruments – such as increasing 
compliance costs for businesses and enforcement effort for administrations or potential job 
losses in the advertising sector – might prevent this policy mix from being implemented or 
might reduce its effectiveness. Hence, the potential environmental effects may not occur or be 
different.  
Despite an overall largely consistent and coherent design of the policy mix, the ex-ante 
assessment results indicate that  
1. Some of the instruments will likely face significant challenges as regards political 
feasibility (in particular the labour market reform fostering a shift from consumption to 
leisure; Step-by-step restriction of advertisement and marketing; and the Circular 
Economy Tax trio); and 
2. The policy mix will not be able to achieve the DYNAMIX environmental key targets, 
even if all instruments were politically feasible. 
4.5.2 Revision of instruments 
The ex-ante assessments did not call for any additional instruments to be added to the policy 
mix. However, they provided several intervention points for how to revise or adapt the 
instruments that were already in the mix in order to mitigate their potential side-effects and 
hence to improve their potential environmental impact. A selection of such pointers for 
revision per instrument is given below.  
(1) Labour market reform fostering a shift from consumption to leisure 
In order to enable positive employment effects of the labour market reform voluntary flexible 
labour market regulations should be introduced and part-time working arrangements 
empowered so that they can be applied even for a highly qualified workforce. Under such 
conditions, reform likely will facilitate labour market entry for:  
• Students who have enough time for a part-time job, but not for a full-time job; 
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• Parents, who will be able to return to the labour market earlier; and 
• Younger pensioners, who are still able to work part-time, but may no longer have the 
vitality to take a full-time job.  
As part of a voluntary increase in working hour reductions, part-time working arrangements 
should be popularised so that they are not discriminated against in terms of taxation and that 
they are not associated with lower per-hour wages and easy jobs for less qualified workers.  
Such popularisation could benefit from refocusing the policy instrument around a specific 
cause for extra time associated with a good and growing level of public acceptability and 
momentum, for example for parental leave or career’s leave or for alleviating the effects of on-
call time on key workers. 
(2) Step-by-step restriction of advertising and marketing 
It seems important to ensure the sequenced implementation approach starting with widely 
acceptable restrictions (unfair marketing and marketing targeted at children) and then 
successively making efforts to win public support for later, more contentious measures. This 
could be aided by framing the dialogue on restricting advertising around protection of social 
space and targeting misleading or unfair advertising, which receives strong public support 
across many Member States, particularly Spain, Germany, UK, France, Netherlands, and 
Portugal. 
(3) Boosting EPR  
Returning of end-of-life products should be incentivised (as with bottle deposits) by offering 
money-back and easy availability of returning options (a good example includes the return of 
mobile phones to recycling schemes). 
(4) Circular Economy Tax Trio 
The taxes should be: 
• Announced as and made part of a larger-scale tax reform process;  
• Agreed on a cross-party consensus and consulted on extensively with the affected 
sectors to recycle revenues in the way that mitigates potential losses and fears of 
leakage.  
• Coordinated to include options for border tax adjustments (tax imports and exempt 
exports from taxation) to ease pressure on competitiveness and thus increase public 
support. 
(5) EU-wide introduction of feebate schemes 
The schemes should encourage that within each targeted product category (in terms of car 
size, inter alia small, large, luxury, mini vans, SUVs) several options with varying efficiency 
and hence differing costs are available to choose from. Thus, it would avoid that needed 
product categories (e.g., a larger car for a larger family) become on average more expensive, 
hence minimising discriminatory effects.  
While thus a potential discriminatory effect could be reduced, the feebate design should still 
ensure that environmental benefits can be generated – for instance through increasing the 
fees and rebates according to magnitude of sustainability effect of a product or service. In the 
above case of cars, rebates for hybrid and electric cars should provide an incentive to shift 
from internal combustion engine cars to alternative engine and not just to slightly more 
efficient internal combustion engine cars. 
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(6) VAT reductions 
In order to limit potential rebound effects triggered by VAT reductions, the instrument should 
be complemented by a tax on least efficient products, thus minimising the risk that saved 
household money from the purchase (and use) of more efficient products and services is 
employed to consume other, less efficient products and services. Including the VAT 
reductions and taxation on least efficient products and services into a wider VAT reform could 
avoid such a potential income effect. However, this would not limit rebounds in terms of using 
more of the same products and services (direct rebound effect) having received VAT 
reductions.  
A wider VAT reform would address the same drivers as a feebate scheme and should be 
coordinated with it. The feebate schemes would be implemented for selected product 
categories, for example consumer electrical goods. The VAT reform would work alongside it, 
potentially fostering incentives to manufacturers to continuously improve energy-efficiency (or 
other relevant environmental parameters) in order to benefit from the reduced VAT rate in 
addition to the rebate at point of sale from the feebate scheme.  
In addition, the instrument should be accompanied by an adequate information campaign 
because if properly communicated, this instrument could have an impact on consumer 
demand beyond the financial advantage it confers – the so-called signalling effect.  
Furthermore, the taxation rate should not be uniform, but could be tailored to the different 
products and services targeted to differentiate according to national context. Given Member 
States’ discretion in the area of indirect taxation, implementing VAT reductions at Member 
State level appears more promising. A Member State introducing such reduced tax rates 
would have to meet certain minimum requirements stemming from the VAT Directive 
(2006/112/EC), which sets the standard rate at no less than 15 % and reduced tax rates at no 
less than 5 %. This would significantly reduce concerns regarding compatibility with EU law. 
(7) Skill enhancement 
State actors will face difficulties in identifying future qualification needs in a Circular Economy. 
This will complicate the setting up of appropriate skilling programmes to align supply and 
demand on the future labour market, and potentially cause inequalities. Therefore, private 
enterprises should be actively involved in the development (and also encouraged to par-
ticipate in the provision) of skill enhancement programmes as they are in a better position to 
gauge which sort of skills are needed. 
(8) Support for local currencies 
In the design and implementation of the local currency scheme(s) issues of tax avoidance 
should be transparently communicated and tackled by increasing the income taxation for 
those taking part in the local currency scheme in order to cover costs for the state of income 
taxation revenue foregone. Therefore, participation to the scheme should not be made 
mandatory, but decided democratically on the level of municipalities or parts of municipalities.  
4.5.3 Implementation of the policy mix 
By adjusting the potentially contentious policy instruments so that the potential negative side-
effects are minimised, the political feasibility of the overarching policy mix could be fostered.  
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Furthermore, strengthening a smart and effective time-sequencing (roadmapping) of the 
policy instruments can further help to improve political feasibility. A sequenced 
implementation approach for the overarching policy mix could look like the following: 
1. Introduce the Circular Economy Tax Trio, the feebate schemes, the VAT reductions 
and the boosted EPR schemes around 2025; 
2. Introduce the skill enhancement programmes around 2020 (prepared by a 
transdisciplinary advisory body comprising business sectors that are going to be 
affected by the above four measures) to develop the capacities to provide the skills 
necessary when the above four instruments take effect; 
3. Start supporting local currencies from 2020 onwards to establish service markets and 
prepare the ground for citizens to get used to options for building their own service-
oriented capacities and skills;  
4. Introduce voluntary labour market reform aspects around 2025 (deciding on whether 
or not to introduce mandatory changes in the coming decades later on); and 
5. Restrict unfair advertisement, advertising targeted a children and adver-tisements in 
city centres by 2020; step-wise expanding the focus to sugar/fats in 2025 and to 
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5 Developing a policy mix for land-use 
This policy mix aims to reduce the EU agricultural land footprint and its related environmental 
impacts, whilst assuming that EU agricultural production will remain stable or continue to 
increase slightly to 2050. It focuses on both the consumption and the production side, in order 
to be able to address the main drivers related with the use of land and the environmental 
impact of agricultural activities. 
As regards consumption, this policy mix’s objective is to reduce the global agricultural land 
use due to EU consumption by addressing three key drivers: 
1) Consumption habits, and in particular overconsumption of meat, dairy products and 
eggs, which have a much higher land consumption per calorie than any other kind of 
food 
2) Food waste 
3) Bioenergy, and in particular first-generation biodiesel 
As regards production, the policy mix aims to decrease the environmental impacts of 
agricultural activities in the EU and globally, which can be influenced by the EU and Member 
State policies. In particular, it focuses on three key categories of environmental impacts:  
1) Biodiversity loss 
2) Deteriorating water quality and overconsumption of water for irrigation 
3) Reduced carbon storage in soil 
In order to select a set of policies that have an impact on the consumption and the production 
side, first of all the authors defined the current situation and foreseeable future trends in land 
use and environmental impacts of agricultural activities. Also, they aimed to identify the main 
drivers that are at the root of the current situation and trends 
As a second step, the authors established targets and objectives for this policy mix . When 
possible, quantitative targets have been indicated, but when the issues were too complex and 
the uncertainty too high to allow quantifying targets, qualitative statements have been used. 
This policy mix has a double objective. It aims to decrease the land footprint at the global 
level due to European consumption of food and bioenergy; and it aims to reduce the 
environmental impacts related to agricultural land use in the EU, and to reduce the wider 
global impacts that can be influenced by the EU and Member State policies. The second 
objective is important because the agricultural sector is responsible for many environmental 
impacts at the global and European level, in terms of soil erosion, pollution, eutrophication 
and loss of biodiversity (IAASTD, 2009; PBL, 2010). Focusing on consumption alone would 
miss significant opportunities to reduce those impacts. 
As with other areas of resource use in the EU economy, EU consumption drives 
environmental impacts at a global rather than a European level; there is no neat symmetry 
between EU consumption changes and the impacts of production in the EU. At a global level, 
we could conceptualise the respective contributions of consumption and production as 
follows: increased efficiency of production leads to a reduced requirement for additional 
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land18; reduced consumption (or, more accurately, greater efficiency of consumption in 
meeting nutritional needs) leads to a reduced requirement for production, and again leads to 
reduced requirement for land. However, this assumes that there are mechanisms available 
which would allow EU policy-makers, acting with counterparts in other economies, to direct 
production to the optimal land use. In practice, this option is not available; and would in any 
case be prohibitively complex to exercise. A shift in EU consumption patterns, while it would 
reduce the EU’s overall global footprint, might not be accompanied by reductions in 
environmental impacts from EU agriculture. Conversely, an approach to the delivery of 
improved environmental outcomes from the EU which relied on reduced production, would, if 
it were not accompanied by an equivalent reduction in consumption, simply displace the 
environmental impact of EU food consumption to other economies, with long-term impacts on 
the provisioning of ecosystem services on which the EU relies. A reduction in EU production, 
even if there were an equivalent reduction in consumption, is not unequivocally beneficial in 
environmental terms; given the increased global demand for agricultural products linked to a 
growing global population, and the potential for significant impacts on ecosystem services of 
meeting that additional demand, the environmental opportunity cost of reduced production in 
the EU (compared to marginal environmental impacts elsewhere) needs to be considered. 
The overall impact of the EU’s consumption and production in relation to agricultural land can, 
in principle, be assessed, even if policies are developed separately; and we recommend 
below the development of an indicator showing the EU’s net land use impact (that is, the land 
use impact of EU agricultural consumption minus the land use impact of EU agricultural 
production); however, we lack the data to set precise targets at this stage. There is also 
scope for some policy measures on the consumption side – particularly on information and 
labelling of agricultural products - to begin to have an impact on production, both within the 
EU and beyond. 
One further point distinguishes agricultural production from many other fields of resource 
efficiency: dematerialisation of food production has clear biological limits. While food waste, 
over-consumption leading to obesity, and high levels of consumption of livestock products 
(which tend to have significantly higher environmental impacts per calorie, or per gramme of 
protein), can be reduced, we take as given the importance of meeting the nutritional needs of 
the EU and global populations. 
5.1  Production 
The production elements of the policy mix focus on EU agricultural land; there is limited scope 
for an impact of EU policies on agricultural land in other economies (although it should be 
noted that some EU member states have taken steps to encourage more sustainable 
agriculture in developing countries, as part of their overseas development aid). The 
consumption policies described can be expected to have impacts in the EU and beyond; and 
some mechanisms, particularly on labelling or improved information for final consumers, will 
                                               
18
 However, at a more local scale, or if we assume that consumption increases in response to 
increased production, there is evidence that the Jevons paradox (resource efficiency increases 
leading to increased consumption of a resource) can apply to agricultural land. See, for example, the 
amalysis in Rudel et al. (2009). 
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in principle have an effect beyond the EU (although that effect is partly linked to the accuracy 
of information supplied by exporters to the EU).  
This policy mix therefore focuses on agricultural land use and its related environmental 
impacts, particularly on biodiversity, soil and water. In line with the EU Thematic Strategy on 
the sustainable use of natural resources and the Roadmap for a Resource-Efficient Europe, 
agriculture-related resources are defined as encompassing:  
• abiotic resources, including minerals, metals, and fossil fuels, including their use for 
fertilisers, pesticides, plastics, machinery, and buildings (inputs), 
• biotic resources, including timber, agricultural products and all other types of biomass 
as well as land, water and soil (inputs),  
• environmental media and the ecosystem services linked to them: land, water, air, soil, 
biodiversity (impacted by outputs such as waste or emissions).  
The key biotic and environmental resources on which agricultural production depends are: 
land, water, soil, and agricultural biodiversity (including crops and animals, pollinators, and 
soil biodiversity). The key abiotic resources on which agricultural production depends are: 
fossil fuel energy, fertilisers, pesticides, and materials both for production and for 
infrastructure. 
This policy mix focuses only on the agriculture-related resources whose use plays a role as 
principal, direct contributors to environmental impacts on biodiversity, soil and water. It does 
not therefore directly consider reductions in the use of some abiotic resources or of direct 
greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture (as distinct from net carbon sequestration from 
land use). This could be revised at a later stage of the project if required.  
Land taken out of agriculture for built development, energy and transport infrastructure and 
recreation is also important, and in some cases this has implications for agricultural use (for 
example, there is an element of competition between land use for renewable energy sources 
such as onshore wind, and land use for agricultural production). However, this is outside the 
scope of this policy mix. While they are outside the scope of this policy mix, broader land use 
choices of this kind need to be considered carefully as part of the overall EU approach to 
sustainable resource use. 
The next three sections will summarise the current situation as regards both agricultural land 
use and the related environmental impacts, and the most important drivers. 
5.1.1 Current situation, trends and drivers 
Agricultural land use 
According to Bringezu et al. (2012), in 2007 the EU-27 used about 0.31 ha per capita of 
cropland at the global level, which represents one third more than the cropland that is globally 
available in per capita terms. Von Witzke and Noleppa (2010) found that the EU’s virtual land 
exports (i.e., the land used to produce exported agricultural commodities) have declined by 
17% between 1999 and 2008, whereas virtual land imports (i.e., the land used to produce 
imported commodities) have increased by 15%. The authors found that in 2007-8 the EU-27’s 
virtual land export and imports were respectively 14 and 49 million ha (about 0.03 and 0.1 ha 
per capita), and the land footprint (i.e., imports minus exports, including virtual flows) 
amounted to about one third of the EU-27’s utilised arable area. 
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Cropland accounts for 25% of the rural land in the EU, grassland for 20%, and forest and 
scrubland for 43%. In contrast to global trends of agricultural expansion and forest loss, the 
area of agricultural land in the EU has declined by around 2 Mha over the period 1990-2006, 
including 1.1 Mha converted to urban land and 0.2 Mha converted to forest . In addition, 
agricultural surveys show that around 7% of agricultural land is not currently being used (Hart 
et al. 2013). Within the agricultural area, the proportion of permanent grassland continues to 
fall in relation to the arable area, but at a much slower rate than two decades ago (EEA 
2010a).  
As regards the future use of agricultural land at the EU level, even with stable demand levels 
within Europe, significant changes in trade as a result of rising global demand for agricultural 
products create uncertainty in any forecasting of EU land use. The future balance of 
agricultural land use and environmental services provided will depend on individual decisions 
taken by millions of farmers across the EU. They will be heavily influenced by the future 
trajectories of supply side drivers, such as market prices and production costs for crops and 
livestock products and timber as well as by public policies, including the deployment of 
subsidies and incentives under the Common Agricultural Policy.  
A recent review of land use modelling studies (Tucker et al. 2014) drew the following key 
conclusions on the future land use in the EU. Agricultural land is likely to decrease in area at 
a rate of between 0.2% and 0.7% per year up to 2020. This land is largely taken up by urban 
development which is expanding by around 0.6% – 0.7% per year. Differences are observed 
within agricultural land use categories, with greater losses of rain fed agricultural land and 
natural grasslands (both to urban expansion and natural succession). Forest areas are 
expected to increase by 0.25% - 0.4% per year with significant fluctuations between 
transitional woodland scrub communities and high forest. Intra land use and management 
variations are expected to match existing trends to 2020 but with greater uncertainty to 2050. 
However, agricultural specialisation and intensification is expected in some areas, with 
pressures for conversion of grassland to cropland on the more productive soils, whereas a 
trend of extensification, marginalisation and abandonment is expected in those areas 
operating at the margins of profitability.. Forest management is also likely to intensify in some 
areas, particularly regarding the removal of forest residues. Although the recent economic 
crisis in the EU may mean that some model projections are no longer completely valid, such 
effects are not expected to have substantial impacts on agriculture and forestry as they are 
more influenced by global market forces (Hart et al. 2013). 
At the EU level, increases in farming’s productivity have, in principle, and for a given level of 
consumption, at least ensured that the EU’s net land footprint is smaller than it would 
otherwise have been. However, farming is overusing finite resources (for example water for 
irrigation), and does not perform to the standard demanded by targets at EU level for 
biodiversity and clean water, or achieve levels of soil protection which would ensure 
sustainable future provision of ecosystem services from farmland. These public goods are 
generally undersupplied because neither society nor markets provide sufficient incentive for 
land managers to provide environmental goods and services, leading to failure to meet key 
public policy objectives.  
The adverse environmental impacts of EU agricultural land use are in part linked to processes 
of change in farm structures and farming systems that began in the mid-twentieth century and 
continue in parts of the EU. The drivers of these processes of change in EU agriculture are 
complex, inter-related and changing over time. They include technological advances in plant 
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and animal breeding, crop cultivation, pesticides and herbicides, mechanisation of agricultural 
management (and hence reduced labour requirements), availability of capital (until recently a 
major constraint in some EU Member States) and access to global markets. Further increases 
in productivity associated with some of these changes could contribute to meeting increased 
demand for agricultural products without excessive increases in the land footprint of 
production. 
There has been increasing specialisation and intensification of production on the better quality 
agricultural land, in which mixed farming has been replaced by arable farming or livestock 
farming; increasing size of farms and production units within them, made possible by 
increasing mechanisation; a trend to housed livestock, and use of industrial units for pig and 
poultry production, relying on imported feed (with associated land use and other resource use 
implications elsewhere) and producing manure for disposal elsewhere; increased use of 
chemical fertilisers and plant protection products that have made it possible to replace crop 
rotations with almost continuous cultivation of a limited number of arable crops; intensification 
and concentration of livestock production (especially dairy and beef beef) on heavily fertilised 
lowland grasslands. These changes have taken place largely (but not exclusively) on 
potentially more productive agricultural land. 
Intensification of agricultural and husbandry practices are not the only sources of the adverse 
impacts on soils and water and the increasing biodiversity loss caused by the agricultural 
sector. A different process is at work in marginal agricultural areas (e.g., mountains, areas 
with poor soils or remote locations) where extensive traditional mixed farming systems are no 
longer economically viable because they cannot achieve the economies of scale or the 
intensity of production that are possible elsewhere. These marginal areas tend to be mostly 
semi-natural habitats with very high biodiversity values, and are degraded and eventually lost 
in the process of agricultural abandonment (Keenleyside and Tucker, 2010). 
These changes are still actively in progress in parts of the EU. In the next decades, a 
polarising process of greater intensification of more productive agricultural land and further 
abandonment of marginal land is expected, especially in some of the newer Member States, 
which currently hold a high proportion of high-quality semi-natural habitats (IEEP et al. 2012). 
In order to reduce the environmental impacts and resource use related to the agricultural 
sector, this policy mix will therefore need to stimulate a decrease in the use of chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides (including through better management of use to ensure nitrogen is 
used efficiently in production, and not wasted in air or water pollution), and a reduced use of 
water for irrigation (e.g., through the choice of crops adapted to local climate conditions and 
more efficient irrigation systems), while at the same time encouraging the employment of 
more traditional agricultural practices to improve soil fertility (e.g., crop rotation). Also, the 
policy mix will aim to halt land abandonment in those areas with high nature value which 
depends on low-intensity farming systems. 
This will call for a combined strategy of land sparing in some areas and land sharing in others. 
Land sparing is a term which is used to describe sustainable intensification of 
agricultural/husbandry activities in well-delineated areas only, with innovative practices aimed 
at increasing yields, while at the same time containing the environmental impacts. Land 
sharing indicates a management strategy aiming at delivering non provisioning ecosystem 
services (e.g., carbon storage, water retention, recreation activities) together with 
food/biomass production through extensive agriculture and husbandry practices (see for 
example Rey Benayas and Bullock (2012) and Tscharntke et al. (2012)). 
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Finally, carbon sequestration from agricultural land use, and emissions particularly of nitrous 
oxide and methane, will become an increasingly important issue in climate mitigation policy as 
progressive decarbonisation of the EU energy supply, industrial and transport sectors, leads 
to agriculture and land use representing a more significant proportion of remaining emissions. 
In addition, policy on emissions reductions in other sectors will have implications both for 
demand (including for biomass for energy purposes) and the costs of inputs to agricultural 
land use (including land itself, energy, fertilisers, and labour).  
Biodiversity 
Numerous studies have shown that, in general, the diversity and abundance of characteristic 
species declines with increasing agricultural improvement and intensification, and this is 
particularly relevant for threatened species (Poláková et al. 2011), as also shown in Table 10. 
As a result, the current farming systems with highest relevance for biodiversity maintenance 
are the remaining traditional low-intensity farming systems that maintain semi-natural 
habitats, especially those with diverse habitats and landscapes. Such farming systems are 
often referred to as High Nature Value Farming systems (HNV) (Baldock et al. 1993, Baldock 
1999, EEA 2004, Veen et al. 2009), and they still make up around a third of the EU 
agricultural area, i.e., 75 million hectares (Paracchini et al. 2008). 
Many semi-natural farmed habitats and their associated species are of European 
conservation importance and therefore the subject of conservation measures under the EU 
Habitats and Birds Directives, including through the protection of 10% of farmed land within 
the Natura 2000 network. But despite this, a particularly high proportion of these habitats 
have an unfavourable conservation status compared to non-agricultural habitats (EEA, 
2010b). Indeed, their loss and degradation is the most serious threat to agricultural 
biodiversity in most of the EU (Billeter et al. 2008). Such impacts are now mostly attributable 
to partial or complete abandonment of agricultural management, in particular in traditional 
extensive livestock systems, as a result of their low economic viability and social and 
agronomic change (IEEP and Veenecology, 2005; Keenleyside & Tucker, 2010). Overall, the 
EU lost 2.4% of semi-natural farmland since 1990, 40% of which has become scrub or forest, 
and a fifth converted to more intensive farming (EEA, 2010b).  
Most other important threats to biodiversity within semi-natural farmland habitats result 
directly or indirectly from agriculture, and include eutrophication as a result of airborne 
deposition of nitrogen, primarily ammonia originating from intensive livestock (Dise, 2011), 
over-grazing of sensitive habitats in some areas, such as tundra by reindeer in Finland 
(Kumpula et al. 2006, Raunio et al. 2008) and inappropriate burning management (Poláková 
et al. 2011). Practices such as drainage, the frequent use of fertilisers and reseeding 
effectively destroys semi-natural habitats and turns them into agriculturally improved habitats, 
but this practice is relatively uncommon at the moment due to the marginal economic value 
and lack of investment in such areas. But this could change, particularly in the longer term, as 
a result of increasing demand, impacts of climate change (reducing productivity in some 
areas) and policy drivers such as requirements for bioenergy. A greater potential threat under 
current EU policies is the risk of afforestation of semi-natural farmland habitats because of 
CAP policies for greening and climate mitigation, and possibly LULUCF accounting.  
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Table 10: Agricultural habitats in the EU, their importance for selected threatened habitats and species, and their overall 
importance for biodiversity maintenance 
Key: HD = Habitats Directive, BD = Birds Directive. Note: Habitat divisions for each taxa group reflect the habitat types distinguished in the available data. 
 






Semi-natural habitats Improved grassland Cultivated Permanent 
Pastures Meadows Organic Conventional Extensive Organic Intensive Extensive Organic Intensive 
HD Annex 1 
habitats*1 63 0 0 0 0 0 
BD Annex 1 
birds*2 54 32 5 
HD Annex II 



















Very high, these habitats 
tend to be species-rich 
and declining; some 
species are restricted to 
such habitats and 
dependant on specific 
agricultural practices 
Moderate, species diversity 
is much reduced compared 
to natural and semi-natural 
habitats, but some species of 
conservation importance use 










Low, especially in 
intensive farmland 
dominated landscapes, 
but biodiversity levels 










Low, especially in 
intensive farmland 
dominated landscapes, 
but biodiversity levels 
can be enhanced by 
appropriate measures 
Sources: Adapted from Poláková et al. (2011), 1 Halada et al. (2011); 2 adapted from Tucker and Evans (1997); 3 adapted from van Swaay et al. (2006) 
using updated an annexes available from Butterfly Conservation Europe (http://www.bc-europe.org/upload/Butterfly%20habitats%20-
%20Appendix%201.pdf): 4 (Temple and Cox 2009a); 5 (Temple and Cox 2009b) 
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Although the focus on biodiversity conservation in farmland is rightly on semi-natural habitats, 
it is important to remember that agriculturally improved ecosystems and even intensively 
managed systems, support significant biodiversity. Many of the remaining species are 
widespread generalists, but they are frequently encountered by people and therefore often of 
high cultural value. In contrast to semi-natural farmland the main threats to biodiversity within 
agriculturally improved systems relate to the impacts of further agricultural improvement, 
intensification and specialisation. Poláková et al. (2011) reviewed such impacts, and identified 
a range of practices which had the greatest impact.  
Agricultural practices with negative impacts on biodiversity have become widespread over 
much of the EU over the last 30-50 years, especially in the north-west. Consequently this has 
resulted in widespread and significant populations declines, which have been well 
documented for birds and butterflies , but also affect a wide range of farmland species. 
These trends are undermining the EU’s ability to meet its biodiversity conservation targets 
(and those of the Convention on Biological Diversity). Biodiversity loss also threatens the 
long-term sustainability of farming in some areas as a result of soil degradation (see below), 
declines in pollinators, increased outbreaks of pests and diseases, and the degradation of 
other ecosystem services (Underwood et al. 2013b). 
In addition, agriculture in the EU has indirect impacts on biodiversity outside the EU, most 
notably as a result of feed imports to sustain many intensive livestock systems (AEA, 2008; 
Lugschitz et al. 2011). Soybeans and maize are the main imported feeds, and it is estimated 
that EU soy imports account for 12 million hectares of soybean cultivation outside Europe 
(Westhoek et al. 2011), nearly all in Brazil and Argentina. This results in very high biodiversity 
impacts, because semi-natural habitats high in biodiversity (e.g., Cerrado in Brazil, Chaco in 
Argentina) are often converted to soy plantations (Kessler et al. 2007, Mann et al. 2010, 
Smaling et al. 2008, Zak et al. 2008). Soybean cultivation also causes indirect deforestation 
through the displacement of livestock farming into forest (FAO 2010, Nepstad et al. 2006). 
The net embodied deforestation associated with EU-27 imports of crop and livestock products 
between 1990 and 2008 was calculated at 7.4 million ha (European Commission 2013b), 
equivalent to 4% of the EU’s forest area. 
EU biofuel targets also result in significant biodiversity impacts outside the EU, because most 
of the demand is met by imports, mainly from North and South America, and to a lesser 
extent Southeast Asia. This is leading to frequent overlap between the sources of supply and 
areas with high biodiversity and weak protection regimes (Schmidt et al. 2012), consequently 
leading to high external biodiversity impacts. 
Soil functionality 
Society has an interest in maintaining functioning soils now and for future generations, not 
just as the basis for food production, but also to underpin the provision of carbon 
sequestration and storage, biodiversity and water management. The functionality of 
agricultural soils is threatened by a number of different pressures including:  
• Decline in soil biodiversity; compaction by heavy machinery (around one third of soils 
are susceptible). 
• Erosion by water (it is estimated 1.3 million km2 are affected in the EU-27) and also by 
wind. 
• Landslides triggered by agricultural land abandonment or land use change.  
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• Decline in organic matter (45% of soils in Europe have low or very low organic matter).  
• Salinization through inappropriate management of irrigated land.  
• Soil sealing by change of land use to built development and infrastructure (Jones et al. 
2012).  
In general, any form of agriculture is less favourable to soil functionality, compared to an 
undisturbed environmental state. However, impacts on agricultural soils can be mitigated 
through appropriate management practices. Although it is in the farmer’s interest to manage 
the soil resource in an environmentally sustainable way, this is often overridden by the short-
term economic incentive to maximise productivity.  
Common management practices such as heavy pesticide and fertiliser use and inappropriate 
cropping methods lead to longer term degradation (Cooper et al. 2009). Conversion of 
grassland, wetlands and forests to cropland results in a degradation of organic matter and 
organisms in the soil, and loss of carbon sequestration potential, and makes the soil more 
vulnerable to erosion, particularly in the case of permanent grassland (Turbé et al. 2010). Soil 
carbon content depends on the balance between the addition of carbon from plant growth 
against the rate of removal through cropping, and by the decomposition of organic matter, 
leaching and other soil related processes such as disturbance and erosion; the extent to 
which carbon is stored depends on factors such as soil type, moisture conditions, vegetation 
patterns and cultivation practices (Trumper et al. 2009).  
Water quality and quantity 
Overall, 30-40% of European water bodies are under significant pressure from diffuse water 
pollution, and 22% from point sources (EEA 2012b). The map in Figure 10 illustrates the 
scale of the problem across the EU.  
The main substances causing diffuse pollution are nitrogen compounds and phosphates and 
the principal source of these pollutants is run-off from agricultural fields resulting from fertiliser 
use and livestock manure. Such pollution extends beyond the area of land managed by 
individual farmers, and leads to eutrophication, with phosphorus generally having most impact 
on freshwater ecosystems, and nitrogen in marine and transitional waters (Bringezu et al. 
2014). It may affect not just surface waters but also long-term groundwater stores too (for 
example through nitrate leaching). 
The causes of diffuse pollution include: 
• Continuous arable cropping and conversion of grassland to cropland (especially on 
sloping land). 
• Grazing with high stocking rates during wet conditions (causing poaching – i.e., 
vegetation loss and soil disturbance).  
• Over-grazing (e.g., through high stocking rates, or inappropriate stock types), 
particularly on sensitive natural or semi-natural vegetation.  
• Poor soil management and cultivation techniques (such as leaving soil bare in winter 
and ploughing up and down slopes) leading to increased run-off.  
• Application of fertilisers and plant protection products at rates higher than the crop 
requires. 
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Figure 10: Map of surface water bodies affected by pollution pressures associated with 
agriculture. Source:http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-
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EU agriculture uses water both for crop irrigation and livestock production, supplied by natural 
precipitation stored in tanks and reservoirs and by abstraction from ground waters (aquifers) 
and surface waters. Agriculture accounts for 24% of total water abstraction in Europe, with 
only about a third of the abstracted water returned directly to the water body (EEA 2009). In 
some parts of southern Europe, agriculture accounts for more than 80% of water abstraction 
and typically this occurs mainly in the summer when water is least available (Cooper et al. 
2009). Some irrigation systems make inefficient use of the abstracted water, for example 
spray irrigation during daylight (when there are significant losses to evaporation) compared to 
trickle irrigation of crops at night. The risk of over-exploitation of finite water resources is likely 
to be exacerbated in the future, particularly in southern Europe, as climate change leads to 
more intensive periods of drought.  
Agricultural production also involves significant resource inputs. In addition to land (effectively 
a finite resource, and with high environmental costs of conversion to agricultural use) it also 
involves significant energy inputs (transport, production of fertilisers); in the case of livestock, 
significant inputs of agricultural commodities as feed; water; key nutrients, such as 
phosphorus and potassium, with associated extraction costs; and labour.  
5.2 Consumption  
5.2.1  Current Situation, trends and drivers 
A recent UNEP report (2014a) identifies three factors as the main drivers for the current 
increase in the use of land for agriculture at the global level: changing diets –especially 
increasing consumption of meat (Herrero et al. 2013, Herrero et al. 2009) -, food waste and 
the increasing consumption of first generation biofuels (see also Underwood et al. 2013a).  
Dietary habits 
The European per-capita consumption of animal food products increased by 50% between 
1961 and 2007. The consumption of meat and dairy products in Europe corresponds to two 
and three times the world average respectively. The total per-capita protein consumption 
(including vegetable sources) in Europe is about 70% higher than recommended by the World 
Health Organisation (Westhoek et al. 2011).  
Available life cycle assessment (LCA) studies show that production of meat requires more 
land than the production of vegetable based agricultural products per amount produced. 
However, equivalence of land use impacts is difficult to determine; one important factor is that 
extensive grazing of ruminants on poor-quality pastureland is likely to be the only viable 
means of producing protein from that land. Figure 11 gives an indication of the differences in 
land use based on different LCA studies.  
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*  de Vries and de Boer (2010) cited by Hallström et al. (2011)  
** Gerbens-Leenes and Nonhebel (2002) cited by Hallström et al. (2011)  
*** Wakamiya (2011) 
Figure 11: Land requirements for the production of different agricultural products. The 
light green areas indicate the span of land use in different LCA studies.  
  
Compared with soybean production, land requirements are roughly 6 to 17 times larger for 
meat protein production (Pimentel 1982, cited in (Reijnders & Soret, 2003)). Also by 
comparing land impacts using calories as a baseline, meat and dairy products have higher 
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Table 11.  
Table 12 illustrates the current protein supply quantities (in g/capita/day) in the EU. The 
protein intake from bovine, pork and poultry meat, milk and eggs correspond to 48% of total 
protein intake (FAO, 2014).  
According to the Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies (NDA) of the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the average daily protein intakes in European countries vary 
between 67 to 114 g for men adults and 59 to 102 g for female adults. NDA (2012) uses 0.66 
g/kg body weight as the average daily requirement for healthy adults. Average adult body 
weight in the EU is 70.8 kg (Walpole, Prieto-Merino, Edwards, Cleland, Stevens, & Roberts, 
2012). 
NDA (2012) uses 0.83 g/kg body weight as the daily population reference for intake of protein 
for healthy adults.  
Typical drivers for a high consumption of meat and dairy products are illustrated in Figure 12. 
The scope for change of the identified drivers for high consumption of meat and dairy 
products is indicated in Table 13. 
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Table 11: Land use requirements of food.  
Food product Land requirement (m²/MJ) 
Beef 2.09 
Pork 0.79 
Cow milk 0.72 
Eggs 0.60 
Poultry 0.54 
Vegetables (open land) 0.34 
Bread 0.19 
Apples 0.16 
Crop/ cereals 0.12 
Potatoes 0.11 
Source: Bringezu and Schütz 2009 (p. 139), cited and corrected in SRU 2012 (p.106), land 
requirements calculated for German consumption considering international land requirements due to 
global trade of agricultural products  
 
Table 12: Protein supply quantities in the EU 
  2005 2009 
Protein from animal sources (livestock and fish) g/capita/day 61.2 61.8 
Protein from vegetable sources (crops) g/capita/day 43.6 43.3 
Total protein g/capita/day 104.8 105.1 
Proportion of protein from bovine, pork and poultry 
meat, milk and eggs compared to total protein 
% 48 48 
Source: Based on data from (FAO, 2014) 
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Figure 12: Drivers for high consumption of meat and dairy products; adapted from Tan 
et al. (2013) 
 
Table 13: The level of change regarding drivers for high consumption of meat and dairy 
products 
Drivers Scope for change 
Preference for high protein diets that promote weight loss 
and builds muscle 
Some scope for 
change 
Short to medium 
term 
Low prioritisation of the negative impacts on health of 
overconsumption of meat and dairy products Medium term 
Low prioritisation of animal welfare and the environmental 
impact of intensive husbandry Medium term 
Personal tastes and habits (e.g., influences by marketing 
and generational desire for meat due to post-war 
shortages) 
Long-term 
Consumerism (e.g., due to social norms, status and 
marketing) 
Lower scope for change: Embedded 
into the reference scenario 
Food prices (e.g., due to global markets & production 
efficiencies from intensive animal farming) 
Increasing income and wealth (allowing for an increased 
share of high-price food products; e.g., meat and dairy 
products) 
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There appears to be a hierarchy of drivers, where the drivers at the top of Table 13 are to a 
large degree enabled by the drivers lower down the table. So for example, dietary 
preferences are enabled by low prioritisation of health, environmental and animal welfare 
concerns, which are in turn enabled by personal tastes, which are enabled by the underlying 
consumerism paradigm. This is further enabled by the structural affordability drivers of 
increasing production efficiencies and incomes. Policy in this area has typically targeted the 
drivers at the top of this hierarchy, challenging dietary choices and knowledge levels. To 
achieve significant changes called for in the long term targets will require policy mixes which 
additionally tackle the drivers underling preference formation, and ultimately the drivers which 
link consumption to affluence.  
Food waste 
A significant proportion of the food produced for consumption ends up as food waste. In the 
EU27 around 90 million tonnes of food waste is generated annually (agricultural food waste 
and fish discards not included), corresponding to approximately 179 kg per person and year 
(European Commission, 2010a).  
Food waste is generated throughout the food value chain, from agricultural production 
(farmer’s field) to household consumption (consumer’s plate) as illustrated in Figure 13. In 
medium- and high-income countries a higher proportion of food is wasted in the consumption 
stage. In the EU27 42%, of the food waste is generated in the household sector, 39% in the 
manufacturing sector, 14% in the food service/catering sector and 5% in wholesale/retail 
(European Commission 2010a). Evidence shows that up to 60% of the food waste is 
avoidable, i.e., could have been consumed as food (WRAP, 2013). Food waste inevitably 




Figure 13: Overview of food waste generated at different steps in the food value chain 
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Overall, on a per-capita basis, more food is wasted in the industrialised world than in 
developing countries (Wunder et al. 2013). The FAO (2011) estimates that the average per 
capita food waste by consumers in Europe and North-America is up to 19 times higher than in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia.  
Typical drivers for generation of food wastes in households are illustrated in Figure 14.  
The issues associated with the identified drivers for generation of food waste in households 




Figure 14: Drivers for generation of food waste in households. Source: own 
elaboration, based on Tan et al. (2013)  
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Table 14: Associated issues with and possible areas of response to the identified 
drivers for generation of food waste in households 
Driver Associated 
issue  
Possible area of 
response 
Packaging issues (e.g., use of packaging not suitable 
to protect the product during transportation) 
Cost trade-off Innovation 
Storage issues Storage 
infrastructure 
Regulation 
Socio-economic and demographic factors Socio-economic - 
Attitudes Cultural Multiple responses 
Personal preferences Cultural Multiple responses 
Portion sizes (e.g., not adjusted for small households) Habit Labelling 
Planning issues Option values Price of food 
Labelling issues (e.g., misinterpretation and/or 
confusion over date labels) 
Knowledge Reform/information 
Lack of knowledge (and interest) on the amounts of 




Some of the drivers in Table 14 are more easily influenced within the scope of the policy mix 
than others. The drivers most readily influenced within the scope of the policy mix are storage 
issues, planning issues, labelling issues and lack of knowledge of food waste. More 
challenging drivers which will require influencing if these targets are to be archived include 
attitudes and personal preferences. The drivers least easily influenced within the scope of the 
policy mix are socio-economic and demographic factors. 
Barriers for changing consumer behaviour 
A main barrier for changing consumer behaviour regarding food consumption and food waste 
generation is inertia in consumer patterns and habits. As the head of food product chains, 
consumers potentially offer a powerful point of intervention for change. However, there are a 
number of factors particular to the choice of foods which diminish the potential for present 
consumers to initiate change. Unlike any other product type, food consumption choices are 
strongly determined by cultural, emotional and biological factors. Food is deeply anchored 
into many cultural identities.  
Different (food) cultures pose a challenge for an EU wide policy mix with the objective of 
reducing consumption of meat and dairy products. A briefing note produced on behalf of the 
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European Commission19 explored why consumers make certain food purchasing decisions 
(PSI, 2009). It found that once formed, food preferences are resistant to change: so long as 
we are not aware of a food making us unwell, our desire for a particular food will often 
increase with consumption. In addition, as a regularly purchased range of products, food 
purchases are particularly prone to habit formation and other short-cut decision making 
processes. The briefing note also found that biological aversion to hunger, and the associated 
emotional response, can explain the emergence of some apparently irrational and unhealthy 
eating patterns. For example, when people go to buy food hungry they will tend to shop 
differently and buy more. Also, on a physiological level, simply viewing or smelling food can 
act as a reminder of an experience and can induce the release of hormones which stimulate 
appetite. When experienced in combination, these factors can act to ‘lock-in’ food preferences 
in the long term, potentially on a generational basis.  
Geographical and climate aspects might serve as barriers for decreased amounts of food 
waste. For example long transport routes (e.g., of fresh fruits and vegetables from Southern 
Europe to Northern Europe) might cause increasing amounts of food waste as could 
insufficient cooling chains in particularly warm countries. Generally, the increasing 
affordability of food represents a challenging context to implement policies intended at 
decreasing amounts of food waste. 
Bioenergy 
Bioenergy is the energy produced by biomass, including agricultural and forestry produced 
goods/commodities and waste/residues, and also natural vegetation available for harvesting. 
Biofuels are liquid fuels made from the processing of plant material or waste food products20. 
The use of biofuels has risen significantly over recent years, and in the EU it has increased by 
over twenty times between 2000 and 2011 (AEBIOM, 2013). According to a study from 
Ecofys et al. (2013), in 2010 5.7 million ha of land was needed to cover the demand for 
biofuels, out of which 3.2 million ha was within the EU (approximately 5% of total cropland) 
and 2.4 million ha outside. 
Our policy analysis considered bioenergy primarily as a consumption issue; in other words, 
we made a simplifying assumption that the nature of production impacts on the environment 
are largely indifferent to the source of demand, and it is therefore the total quantity of demand 
for land use that matters21. The EU policy has been a major driver for the increased use of 
land for the production of biofuels and bioenergy in general. In 2003, Directive 2003/30/EC 
set a standard of 5.75% for biofuels over the total energy used in the transport sector. In 2009 
this target was substantially increased, as Directive 2009/28/EC on Renewable Energy (RED) 
established that by 2020 10% of the energy used in the transport sector should be derived 
                                               
19
 A project under the Framework contract for economic analysis ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073 – 2nd 
20
 There are two main types of liquid biofuel: bioethanol, produced from the fermentation of plant 
biomass; and biodiesel extracted from oil-seed crops (e.g. maize, rapeseed, sugarcane).  
21
 In practice, of course, there are specific environmental issues associated with production of some 
bioenergy crops (for example, miscanthus), but it would have significantly expanded the scope of our 
work to address them. 
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from renewable sources, which in practice means from biofuels, as these represent the most 
important share of renewable sources used in the transport sector.  
Also, the Emission Trading Directive (ETS) establishes that CO2 emissions from the 
combustion of biomass are to be considered zero. This makes biomass combustion a very 
interesting option for installations covered by the ETS scheme, as bioenergy is relatively 
cheap and can be mixed with existing fossil fuels easily. 
The future trends of land use for biofuels will heavily depend on the policy targets and public 
support to the sector, and on the competitiveness of biofuels with other sources of energy 
(which in turn will be influenced by wider policy decisions on decarbonisation of energy 
supply) and is therefore difficult to forecast at this stage. In fact, the targets on biofuels set by 
the RED have been debated in the last years, because of their large land consumption and 
related environmental impacts.  
Biofuels are not the only bioenergy that is having an important impact in terms of land use. 
Currently, 43% of total demand of forest feedstock is used for energy purposes and the use of 
wood for energy generation continues to increase in Europe. The demand for woody biomass 
will increase in the future to reach the 20% target for renewable energy in 2020 established 
by the RED. In fact, the RED is playing an important role in the increased use of bioenergy in 
general, as 68% of renewable energy used in Europe in 2011 is obtained from biomass 
(Eurostat, 2013a). Based on the NREAPs, it has been calculated that the use of EU woody 
biomass for electricity production and for cooling and heating will double between 2010 and 
2020 (Hart et al. 2013, Hewitt 2011, UNECE and FAO 2011). 
5.3 Targets 
This section proposes policy targets for 2030 that are relevant to agricultural land use and 
consumption of agricultural products. There is a link between the rising demand for biomass 
products, intensification of agricultural practices and increasing environmental impacts of the 
agricultural sector, including loss of biodiversity (Haines-Young, 2009; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). For this reason, this policy mix will simultaneously tackle both the 
consumption side, including food consumption, food waste and use of bioenergy, and the 
production side of the agricultural sector (focussing on minimising the impact of agriculture on 
biodiversity, water quality and quantity and soil quality), in order to progress towards a more 
sustainable use of land both at the European and at the global level. An overall target, 
expressed in terms of the EU’s net land use impact (that is, the land use impact of EU 
agricultural consumption minus the land use impact of EU agricultural production) should be 
developed in due course, with the 2030 figure showing an improvement on the current figure, 
and a more ambitious approach for 2050; however, we lack the data to set precise targets at 
this stage. 
5.3.1 Targets relating to production 
Targets related to biodiversity 
Targets for 2030: 
The EU has existing targets for biodiversity and ecosystem services in place, which were 
endorsed by the European Council in March 2010. The immediate EU target, stated by the 
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EU Biodiversity Strategy, is to ‘halt biodiversity and ecosystem service loss by 2020, to 
restore ecosystems in so far as is feasible, and to step up the EU contribution to averting 
global biodiversity loss’.  
The policy mix should also take into account the relevant targets and associated actions 
included in the EU Biodiversity Strategy, which was developed by the Commission to support 
the achievement of the EU’s biodiversity targets. The targets of most relevance to this policy 
mix are listed in Box 5. 
 
Box 5: The EU 2020 Biodiversity Strategy targets 
Target 1: To halt the deterioration in the status of all species and habitats covered by EU nature 
legislation and achieve a significant and measurable improvement in their status so that, by 2020, 
compared to current assessments: (i) 100% more habitat assessments and 50% more species 
assessments under the Habitats Directive show an improved conservation status; and (ii) 50% more 
species assessments under the Birds Directive show a secure or improved status. 
Target 2: By 2020, ecosystems and their services are maintained and enhanced by establishing 
green infrastructure and restoring at least 15% of degraded ecosystems. 
Target 3:  
A) Agriculture: By 2020, maximise areas under agriculture across grasslands, arable land and 
permanent crops that are covered by biodiversity-related measures under the CAP so as to ensure 
the conservation of biodiversity and to bring about a measurable improvement in the conservation 
status of species and habitats that depend on or are affected by agriculture and in the provision of 
ecosystem services as compared to the EU2010 Baseline, thus contributing to enhance sustainable 
management.  
B) Forests: By 2020, Forest Management Plans or equivalent instruments, in line with Sustainable 
Forest Management (SFM)21, are in place for all forests that are publicly owned and for forest 
holdings above a certain size (to be defined by the Member States or regions and communicated in 
their Rural Development Programmes) that receive funding under the EU Rural Development Policy 
so as to bring about a measurable improvement in the conservation status of species and habitats 
that depend on or are affected by forestry and in the provision of related ecosystem services as 
compared to the EU 2010 Baseline. 
Target 6: By 2020, the EU has stepped up its contribution to averting global biodiversity loss. 
 
Progress with implementation of the existing Biodiversity Strategy and achievement of the 
2020 target is uncertain. The 2020 target was always considered to be ambitious, and political 
commitment to it is now probably weaker given the recent economic crisis and the resulting 
focus on stimulating economic growth.  
For example a recent study of the costs of restoring 15% of degraded ecosystems (i.e., 
Target 2) has indicated that, although many existing measures and funding instruments are 
contributing to the maintenance, restoration and re-creation of ecosystems in the EU, a 
substantial increase in funding will be required to achieve the target if the principal approach 
used is an expansion of incentive measures (Tucker et al. 2013). The costs of achieving 
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Target 2 could be reduced by adopting new and more ambitious EU level regulations, for 
example expanding the range of mandatory cross-compliance standards, but recent CAP 
reforms have not resulted in regulations that will give much stringer protection to biodiversity. 
Member States could also reduce costs further by establishing regulations beyond areas of 
existing EU competency (for example relating to spatial planning and forest management 
measures), but this appears to be opposite to the current political de-centralisation agenda. 
For these reasons the 2020 biodiversity headline target and sub-targets 1, 2, 3 and 6 are 
adopted for this policy mix study as being the targets for 2030 under the assumption that they 
will either not be fully achieved by 2030 or they will require further actions to maintain their 
progress in the face of growing pressures, such as climate change. 
Targets for 2050: 
The longer term vision of the EU Biodiversity Strategy is that ‘By 2050, EU biodiversity and 
the ecosystem services it provides – its natural capital – are protected, valued and 
appropriately restored for biodiversity's intrinsic value and for their essential contribution to 
human wellbeing and economic prosperity, and so that catastrophic changes caused by the 
loss of biodiversity are avoided.’ This is similar to the vision for biodiversity in 2050 adopted 
by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in its Global Strategy at its 10th meeting of 
the Conference of the Parties (held in Nagoya in October 2010), which is that by 2050 
‘biodiversity is valued, conserved, restored and wisely used, maintaining ecosystem services, 
sustaining a healthy planet and delivering benefits essential for all people’. This will be the 
target of this policy mix in terms of biodiversity conservation and improvement. 
Targets related to soil functionality 
Targets for 2030: 
As regards soil functionality, this policy mix aims to reduce the area of EU soils at risk of soil 
erosion and salinisation; causing soil sealing; halt and then reverse the loss of carbon through 
oxidation of organic (peat rich) agricultural soils (i.e., increase sequestration rate/ carbon 
stores of these soils); increase the proportion of EU agricultural land under organic production 
methods and close the gap in productivity between organic and conventional agriculture in the 
EU to avoid displacement of production to other parts of the world.  
In 2006 the EU developed a Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection and a proposal for a 
framework Soil Directive, setting out common principles for protecting soils across the EU and 
establishing a ten-year work program for the European Commission22. The intention was that 
within this common framework, the EU Member States will be in a position to decide how best 
to protect soil and how use it in a sustainable way on their territory. Since then progress on 
EU legislation has failed to achieve support of the Member States.  
The following proposals for targets for 2030 are based partly on the draft Soil Directive. 
                                               
22
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/soil/index_en.htm  
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• Using common guidance criteria developed by Commission services, to identify by 
2020 and thereafter every 5 years in each EU Member State/region the area and 
location of agricultural and forest land where soils are at risk from: 
(a) erosion by water or wind, and in the case of organic (peat) and organo-mineral 
soils by drying out and oxidation; 
(b) organic matter decline brought about by a steady downward trend in the organic 
fraction of the soil, excluding undecayed plant and animal residues, their partial 
decomposition products, and the soil biomass; 
(c) compaction through an increase in bulk density and a decrease in soil porosity; 
(e) salinisation through the accumulation in soil of soluble salts; 
(f) landslides brought about by the down-slope, moderately rapid to rapid movement of 
masses of soil and rock material 
• To prioritise the risks and areas identified at Member State/regional level and prepare 
national soil action plans (the relative significance of the different risks varies across 
the EU because of variation in soil types, climate, topography and land use) 
• To prevent ploughing, drainage, burning of (vegetation on) or afforestation of peat 
soils. 
• To convert all arable land on drained organic (peat) soils to land management which 
will halt losses of soil carbon.  
• To increase the proportion of agricultural land in the EU under organic production 
methods  
Targets for 2050: 
The targets of this policy mix for 2050 are the following: 
• To implement national soil action plans at Member State/regional level. 
• To convert all agricultural land on drained organic (peat] soils to land management 
which will ensure these soils function as long-term carbon sinks, including by 
rewetting.  
• To increase further the proportion of agricultural land in the EU under organic 
production methods.  
Targets related to water quality and water quantity 
The EU has a well-established policy framework for improving water quality and the 
sustainable use of water resources in the Water Framework Directive (WFD)23. The WFD 
introduced a new focus for water management by putting the protection of the aquatic 
environment and ecological targets at the heart of an integrated water management approach 
                                               
23
 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the 
Community action in the field of water policy 
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at the river basin scale24. The WFD’s objective is that all EU water bodies achieve good status 
by 2015, which includes the objectives of good ecological and chemical status for surface 
waters and good quantitative and chemical status for groundwater. This is necessary to 
ensure long term availability of sufficient water of good quality, to allow aquatic ecosystems to 
recover and to deliver the ecosystem services that are necessary to support life and 
economic activity that depend on water. 
The targets related to the fulfilment of the WFD objective of good status depend on the 
specific characteristics and conditions of each water body, and need to be defined by the 
River Basin authorities in the River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs). For this reasons it is 
impossible to set general quantitative targets. The WFD’s Annex 5 establishes the key 
parameters that should be used to assess the status of water bodies. 
It is important to underline that the WFD’s article 4.4 establishes that MS can benefit from 
exemptions if achieving a good status within the set timescale is technically infeasible or 
disproportionately costly, and are allowed to extend the deadline up to 2027 or beyond. This 
is because it is unlikely that all EU water bodies will reach a good status within such a limited 
timeframe. 
Targets for 2030: 
The WFD requirements are proving difficult to achieve in practice and to schedule. As clarified 
by the last Commission report on the implementation of the WFD (European Commission, 
2012d), a good status will not be reached in 2015 for a significant proportion of water bodies. 
This policy mix aims to ensure a good ecological and chemical status for most surface water 
bodies and a good quantitative and chemical status for groundwater bodies in all river basins 
where agriculture is the main land use and currently the main source of diffuse pollution. 
This target implies: 
• To ensure that agricultural abstraction rates from aquifers are less than replenishment 
rates, and that abstraction rates from surface waters are kept within sustainability 
limits. Achieving this target will require to eliminate the use of inefficient irrigation 
inefficient irrigation methods25 and to encourage the choice of crops adapted to the 
local climate. 
                                               
24
 Other relevant EU Directives are the Groundwater Directive (2006/118/EC) and the Nitrate Directive 
(91/676/EEC). The first one establishes that nitrate concentration in the EU groundwater bodies 
should not exceed the minimum level of 50mg/l (however several MS have set higher limits). The 
second one requires MS to establish action programmes for farmers, which include measures 
contained in the Codes of Good Agricultural Practices and other measures, such as limitations of 
fertilizer application and a maximum amount of livestock manure of 170 kg nitrogen/ha/yr. The Nitrate 
Directive is expected to contribute to a 14% reduction of ammonia (NH3) with respect to 2000 levels 
by 2020. 
25
 However, it must be kept in mind that more ‘efficient’ methods that have lower losses have actually 
been shown to sometimes lead to increased consumption of water and have even been associated 
with causing artificial droughts. For this reason, it is important to ensure that when installing more 
efficient irrigation systems, the water ‘saved’ has to go back to nature. 
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• To ensure that the nutrient concentration in each water body is compatible with the 
conservation of ecosystems. This will require the adoption of precision farming 
techniques, where fertiliser use is closely tailored to crop needs. 
• To limit the use of chemical pesticides in order to ensure that they do not have a 
negative impact on water ecosystems. This will be allowed by employing alternative 
methods for pest control, including improved cultivation methods, employment of 
natural antagonists to pests and crop rotation.  
Targets for 2050: 
It is to be expected that not all water bodies will achieve a good status by 2030, because for 
the most polluted or exploited ones this may be extremely expensive, difficult or impossible 
from a technical point of view, or politically unfeasible. 
Also, as regards fertilisers, time lag between the reduction of the discharge of nitrates and 
phosphates and the reduction of their concentration in the water is often observed, due to 
hydrological dynamics and ecosystem functions of natural water purification. This implies that 
policies aiming at reducing water pollution may take a long time to result in lower pollution 
levels. 
For this reason, this policy mix aims to reach a good status for all EU surface and 
groundwater bodies by 2050, including the ones that have not managed to reach the target by 
2030. This implies: 
• From a quantitative point of view, to ensure that water abstraction of groundwater do 
not exceed the recharge levels and that extraction of surface water is not above the 
thresholds needed for ensuring sustainability of aquatic ecosystems. 
• From a qualitative point of view, to ensure that the nutrient cycle in agriculture is 
closed, ensuring no leaking of nutrients into water bodies, and that pesticides are only 
used within sustainability limits. 
5.3.2 Targets relating to consumption 
Targets regarding dietary habits (food consumption) 
This policy mix focuses on policy instruments that aim to generate a shift in the consumption 
of agricultural food products towards less consumption of meat, dairy products and eggs, as 
the land use related to these commodities is higher than for other products (see  
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Table 11). The scope of the policy mix is limited to human consumption of these products 
(i.e., excluding animal feed and pet food).  
The scope for meat consumption is limited to the consumption of beef, pork and chicken, 
since these correspond to 98% of total meat production in the EU (Eurostat, 2014a). The 
scope for milk consumption is limited to the consumption of milk from cows since this 
corresponds to 98% of total milk production in the EU (Eurostat, 2014b).  
The targets for 2030 and for 2050 defined in the following are milestones on the road to 
change dietary habits with the objective to reduce the impacts on land use from food 
consumption, focussing on the consumption of meat, dairy products and eggs.  
Targets for 2030: 
The Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe sets out a 20% reduction target for the 
resource inputs within the food chain by 2020 (European Commission 2011a). 
This policy mix adopts the following targets that are set according to expert judgment: 
• Reduction of the total protein consumption:  
EU-wide a 20% reduction in the per capita intake of protein for adults compared to the 
level of 2009. 
• Reduction of the proportion of protein intake from meat, dairy products and 
eggs:  
In the EU not more than 35% of the total per capita protein intake should come from 
bovine, pork and poultry meat, milk and eggs.  
• Shift towards consumption of meat with lower land requirements:  
Beef should not exceed 10% of total meat consumption.  
Targets for 2050: 
NDA recommendation is daily intake of 0.66 g protein/kg body weight. 
This policy mix proposes the following targets, also derived from expert judgment: 
• Reduction of the total protein consumption:  
The EU-wide total per capita intake of protein for adults should not exceed the 
recommended levels (0.83 g protein / kg body weight). 
• Reduction of the proportion of protein intake from meat, dairy products and 
eggs:  
In the EU not more than 25% of the total per capita protein intake should come from 
bovine, pork and poultry meat, milk and eggs. 
• Shift towards consumption of meat with lower land requirements:   
Beef should not exceed 5% beef of total meat consumption.  
Tables 15-17 give an overview of the specific targets for 2030 and 2050. The targets 
mentioned above are highlighted in bold. Further figures for 2030 and 2050 are also included, 
either as interim indicators or as extrapolations of progress, but are not highlighted in bold. 
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Table 15: Targets regarding reduction of the total protein consumption  
 Unit 2009* 2030 2050 
Total protein intake g protein/ kg body 
weight/ day 
1.48 1.19 0.83 
Reduction compared to 2009 level % - -20 -44 
Source: *(FAO, 2014) 
 
Table 16: Targets regarding reduction of the proportion of protein intake from meat, 
dairy products and eggs 
 Unit 2009* 2030 2050 
Protein from animal sources (livestock and fish) g/capita/day 61.8 - - 
Protein from vegetable sources (crops) g/capita/day 43.3 - - 
Total protein g/capita/day 105.1 84.5 46.7 
Proportion of protein from bovine, pork and 
poultry meat, milk and eggs 
% 48 35 25 
Reduction compared to 2009 level % - -27 -48 
Source: *(FAO, 2014) 
 
Table 17: Targets regarding shift towards consumption of meat with lower land 
requirements 
 2012* 2030 2050 
Proportion of bovine meat (from total bovine, pork and poultry) 18% 10% 5% 
Proportion of pork meat (from total bovine, pork and poultry) 54% 40% 20% 
Proportion of poultry meat (from total bovine, pork and poultry) 28% 50% 75% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: *(Eurostat, 2014a) 
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Targets regarding food waste from households 
At the top of food product chains, consumers potentially offer a powerful point of intervention 
for change. Furthermore, the single largest share of food waste (42%) is generated in 
households (European Commission, 2011a). Therefore all food waste generated in 
households are considered within the scope of the policy mix.  
In addition, consumers can indirectly influence food waste from the food production chain 
(e.g., by accepting wonky fruit and vegetables). To the extent consumer behaviour can 
influence the generation of food waste before final consumption (retailer’s shelf), such food 
waste is considered within the scope of the policy mix.  
Policy instruments reducing the generation of waste are assumed to impact wastes from all 
types of food. Therefore, all types of food wastes (e.g., meat, bread, vegetables etc.) are 
included in the scope regarding the generation of food waste. The objective of this policy mix 
is to eliminate the avoidable (“lifestyle based”) food waste (e.g., careless buying, poor portion 
size etc.). 
The Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe sets out a 50% reduction target for edible 
(avoidable) food waste for 2020 (European Commission, 2011a). A 50% prevention target on 
avoidable food waste for 2025 was proposed by the European Parliament in 2012 (European 
Parliament, 2012). 
Targets for 2030: 
The targets for 2030 of this policy mix are the following:  
• EU-wide a 60% reduction of avoidable food waste compared to 2010 levels. This 
figure represents an increase with respect to the above mentioned EU targets and 
corresponds to 1-2% reduction per year between 2020/2025 and 2030 (a yearly 
reduction of 3-5% per year will be needed between 2010 and 2020/2025 if the 50% 
targets are to be achieved). 
• Maximum 30% higher generation of food waste per capita than the EU-wide average 
in all Member States. 
Targets for 2050: 
The long-term targets aim to: 
• EU-wide a 85% reduction of avoidable food waste compared to 2010 levels 
• Maximum 15% higher generation of food waste per capita than the EU-wide average 
for all Member States 
Targets related to bioenergy 
Targets for 2030: 
This policy mix aims at drastically reducing the EU consumption of conventional biofuels, i.e., 
those obtained from food or feed-based feedstock like maize, rapeseed and sugarcane. This 
will require phasing out the EU and MS support to conventional biofuels, and also avoiding 
setting new targets after 2020.  
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Even though not supported by public policies, conventional biofuels will still play a role in the 
EU transport sector in 2030, due to the legacy of past policies and a possible increase in the 
prices of fossil fuels. Therefore, this policy mix will aim to mitigate the environmental impacts 
associated with conventional biofuels. 
Another objective of this policy mix is to favour biofuels from more sustainable sources over 
conventional biofuels, like for example agricultural and forest waste and residues. However, 
the potential use and related environmental benefits of using an increasing share of these 
materials in the energy sector should be carefully analysed against other potential uses, as 
for example agricultural and forest residues are partly needed on the ground to maintain soil 
fertility and biodiversity. Also, energy and economic costs related to the collection and 
processing phase needs to be carefully analysed before setting quantitative standards. 
For these reasons, this policy mix aims at ensuring that bioenergy is used as to maximise the 
benefits of bioenergy in terms of GHG savings (estimated over the entire life cycle), while 
considering possible alternative uses of potential feedstocks and taking into account the 
environmental impacts of alternative options. 
Targets for 2050: 
The policy mix aims at a sustainable and holistic management of European bio-resources, 
i.e., the biomass used for food, feed, energy and materials. This will ensure that biomass is 
used in order to deliver the highest GHG savings possible and that waste and residues are 
employed in an appropriate way to meet a range of objectives (e.g., reducing GHG emissions 
and maintaining soil fertility). Also, a cascading use of bio-resources needs to be promoted, 
instead of focussing on only one use like energy production. 
5.4 The proposed policy mix for the production side 
The EU has a relatively comprehensive environmental policy framework, compared to other 
world regions (IEEP, 2011) and therefore a number of policy instruments can contribute to the 
achievement of the targets outlined above for biodiversity, soil functionality and water. Of 
particular importance within an agricultural context are the: 
• Birds and Habitats Directives,  
• Environmental Liability Directive,  
• Nitrates Directive, 
• Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive, 
• Water Framework Directive, and 
• National Emissions Ceilings Directive. 
These set standards, identify objectives and include legislative requirements for certain 
actions. They are supported by the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive and 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive, which set out procedures for assessing 
potential impacts, although they do not per se require impacts to be avoided or limited. The 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the most important instrument in terms of supporting the 
achievement of the aims of the Directives listed above, through its own regulations (which 
directly link to obligations in some of the environmental directives) and especially through the 
funding of measures that provide environmental benefits above and beyond those required 
under regulations (i.e., the reference level).  
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The policies selected for detailed assessment in work packages 5 and 6, building on the 
legislative framework set out above, are the following: 
1. Stronger and more effective environmental and climate dimension for EU land 
management in future CAP reforms – GHG emissions, soil quality, water quantity 
and quality, biodiversity. 
2. Revised emissions levels in the National Emissions Ceilings Directive (NECD) to 
reduce eutrophication; measures for better management of the nitrogen cycle on 
farmland (higher fertiliser use efficiency, improved crop and manure management 
that reduce emissions, low-protein animal feeding, improved manure storage). 
3. Strengthening of the pesticide reduction targets under the Pesticides Directive, and 
provision of guidance to farmers on integrated pest management. 
4. Promotion of PES programmes financed by private actors to reward farmers for 
producing ecosystem services. 
5. Development of a LULUCF regulation setting targets for net carbon emissions from 
the land use sector. 
While these primary instruments are the most significant, we recommend that they should be 
supported by a range of accompanying measures, which will not be subject to the same level 
of detailed assessment. These include: 
• Increased irrigation water prices to cover at least full supply costs. 
• Improved implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive on 
changes in agricultural or forestry land use. 
• Improved and increased management plans and measures for Natura 2000 areas 
dependent on agricultural activity. 
• The establishment of an EU soil legislation which mandates cost-effective action to 
tackle soil problems and to protect soil functions. 
• The promotion of research, monitoring, and data collection and survelliance. 
The following sections therefore set out in more detail the 5 production policies selected for 
more detailed assessment. That assessment will work on the assumption that the 
accompanying measures referred to above are also implemented.  
5.4.1 Stronger and more effective environmental and climate dimension 
for EU land management in the CAP. 
Brief summary of the measure 
The Common Agricultural Policy is one of the key drivers of agriculture in the European Union 
because it provides direct subsidies to farmers and also subsidises a range of agricultural 
activities that involve farmers. To a lesser extent it also influences forest management in the 
European Union because it provides the only significant source of EU funding for forests. This 
instrument contributes to achieving the policy mix targets for biodiversity, soil quality and 
water quality through targeted implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy measures. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced?  
The actions for the 2014 to 2020 period (aimed at achieving the 2020 targets) depend on 
Member States’ decisions on the design and planning of their Common Agricultural Policy 
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implementation, particularly in the definition of cross-compliance rules and other eligibility and 
targeting criteria, and in the design and implementation of rural development programmes. 
For the post 2020 Common Agricultural Policy (aimed at achieving the 2050 targets) actions 
must begin in the lead up to the 2020 policy reform, by influencing regulatory reform, and 
continue during the implementation phase of the 2021-2027 CAP. A further opportunity is 
provided by the 2027 CAP reform and the following implementation periods up to 2050 (2028-
2035, 2036-2041, 2042-2049), although the impacts will weaken the closer to the target year 
of 2050 (because of the increasing lack of time for measures to have an effect).  
b. What is its aim?  
This instrument contributes to achieving the policy mix targets for biodiversity, soil quality and 
water quality through targeted implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy measures. 
In order to achieve these targets, the agricultural authorities of Member States will need to 
design their agricultural programmes to enhance the long-term protection and management of 
permanent grassland and pastoral semi-natural habitats, and other High Nature Value 
farming systems and their species. 
c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
The actions for the 2014-2020 period must primarily be taken by Member State governments 
and agricultural authorities, but will also require the active participation of farmers, shepherds, 
forest managers, and other groups involved in land management. The actions for the post 
2020 period will need to be taken by the European bodies and the Member States during the 
negotiation of the next Common Agricultural Policy package, and then by the same 
stakeholders as above during the implementation phase. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
During 2014 to 2020, Member States governments and agricultural authorities will need to: 
• Define eligibility of agricultural land; minimum agricultural activity; requirements for the 
compulsory greening payment; and GAEC requirements within the cross-compliance 
regime so as to enhance the long-term protection and management of permanent 
grassland and pastoral semi-natural habitats (including all Habitats Directive Annex 1 
habitat types that depend on agricultural use), riparian buffer strips, and farmland 
features, as well as soil protection, water and nitrogen use efficiency. 
• Increase funding and targeting of agri-environment-climate and other support 
measures to semi-natural ecosystems (especially with Natura 2000 sites), and other 
areas of High Nature Value Farmland. 
• Increase support and investment in traditional agricultural management techniques 
and systems alongside the development of new approaches and adaptation to 
changing socio-economic conditions (e.g., organic farming, improved crop rotations, 
integrated weed and pest management, intercropping, better nutrient management, 
conservation tillage, unfarmed flower-rich buffer strips, and reduced livestock 
densities). 
• Ensure that agri-environment-climate and agro-forestry and forest conservation and 
protection schemes and habitat restoration initiatives maximise synergies between 
biodiversity, flood management and ecological status objectives at local and 
catchment scales. 
In the lead-up to the post 2020 period, Member States government representatives and the 
European bodies (Commission, Parliament and Council) will need to: 
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• Integrate a stronger and more effective environmental and climate dimension for EU 
land management in the CAP 2020 reform, including sufficient budget allocations, 
targeted rural development programmes, and measures that encourage farmers to 
identify and take appropriate actions to use water, soil, energy and waste resources 
more efficiently. Overall, it is unlikely that CAP expenditure will increase in real terms; 
however, even within a declining real-terms budget, a significant recfocusing of 
expenditure on the delivery of environmental objectives is capable of providing an 
adequate budget. 
• Define cross compliance standards that protect semi-natural habitats (especially 
grassland and peat-rich soils), contribute substantially to achieving WFD objectives, 
and improve soil protection. 
• Ensure the CAP and other EU funds supporting agricultural development fully 
integrate requirements relating to biodiversity and ecosystem services and are subject 
to biodiversity and climate proofing procedures. 
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
This policy instrument will have synergies with the policy instruments to reduce nitrogen 
emissions, pesticide and irrigation water use, and to improve soil quality, which will rely 
heavily on cross-compliance standards and advice and measures financed under the 
Common Agricultural Policy. The policy instruments on research (e.g., as regards innovation 
in agriculture) and on Natura 2000 management planning will support the implementation of 
this policy instrument.  
f. For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
The actions are financed through the Common Agricultural Policy funds (the European 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund EAGF and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development EAFRD), and Member State co-financing for rural development. It is expected 
that the policy changes proposed would not lead to a net increase in public expenditure, but 
to better targeting of funding on the delivering of public benefits, particularly environmental 
outcomes.  
g. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
None directly, but the policy instrument interacts closely with the other policy instruments that 
target soil, water, and pesticide flows. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
At Member State and regional level for the 2014 to 2020 period; at EU and Member State 
plus regional level for the post 2020 period and subsequent policy reforms. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Agricultural authorities, farmers, farmer organisations including cooperatives, other land 
managers including shepherds and commoners, conservation authorities, conservation land 
management groups, environmental groups, forest managers and forest organisations, 
consumers, stakeholders in rural development such as agriculture-related tourism and 
recreation.  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
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Farmers must comply with the cross-compliance obligations and the greening payment 
conditions, and can be sanctioned with removal of part or all of their direct farm payment if 
they do not comply. These include:  
• Compliance with any defined conservation objectives and measures in Natura 2000 
areas. 
• Compliance with any defined restrictions or management obligations with regard to 
nutrient management in nitrate vulnerable zones. 
• Follow groundwater protection rules.  
Farmers and other agricultural land managers must also comply with any conditions attached 
to payments they receive under rural development programme measures. Forest managers 
must implement a sustainable forest management plan if the forest area is above a threshold 
size.  
d.  Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Coordination at the EU level will be important, as the CAP reforms will be carried out at the 
EU level 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Farmers are currently hardly affected by actual fines for non-compliance as the current 
inspection rate for cross-compliance rules is low. However, compliance is also enforced 
through self-reporting and other administrative mechanisms, and farmer’s perception of 
restrictions also plays a very important role. There may be administrative barriers to change in 
public agricultural administration authorities, which mean that advice and enforcement are 
weaker than they should be.  
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Effectively protecting and managing semi-natural agricultural habitats (grassland, scrub and 
wetlands) through agricultural policy would have a large positive impact on the biodiversity 
value of European agricultural land. The policy changes would need to be supported by an 
effective system of mapping and recording all semi-natural habitats and landscape features 
on agricultural land. Improving productivity on intensively managed land will reduce the land 
requirement for agricultural activities elsewhere. 
Specific targets for a more effective CAP from 2020 onwards could be envisaged, and could 
include: 
• A 10% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. 
• No net loss of biodiversity from the farmed environment, with progressively more 
demanding targets for improved habitat management. 
• Reduced inputs of inorganic fertiliser, and of pesticides, in line with the policies included 
in this mix, and facilitated by an increased focus of rural development funding on 
improved and more targeted management of nutrients and pesticides.  
Key expected economic impacts  
Farmers’ increased compliance with environmental standards on air, water and soil-related 
pollution is expected to have significant economic benefits, for example associated with 
increased water quality. See the nitrogen measure for some quantified estimates. However, 
achieving higher environmental standards and also investing in high nature value farming will 
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require agriculture significant shift of funding away from instruments which have a significant 
benefit for farm incomes (because the funds provided significantly outweigh the costs of 
compliance with the criteria) and towards instruments which have a less direct benefit for a 
farm’s profitability. Overall, this would be likely to lead to a decrease in farm profitability and 
farm incomes, compensated for in part by market adjustments to input costs such as land 
prices, and costs of fertiliser and pesticides. 
Key expected social impacts  
An improvement in the management of semi-natural habitats will improve the livelihood of 
farmers owning high nature-value land, thereby reducing land abandonment and preserving 
the cultural identity and sense of community of rural areas. Many of the environmental 
measures required for an improved environmental focus have significant positive employment 
impacts. However, the reduction in incomes noted above is likely to lead to a consolidation of 
land holdings, and a reduction in the total level of employment in agriculture.  
5.4.2 Revised emissions levels in the National Emissions Ceilings 
Directive (NECD) and additional measures for better management 
of the nitrogen cycle on farmland 
Brief summary of the measure 
The instrument aims to establish revised emissions levels in the National Emissions Ceilings 
Directive (NECD) to reduce eutrophication; and implement measures for better management 
of the nitrogen cycle on farmland (higher fertiliser use efficiency, improved crop and manure 
management that reduce emissions, low-protein animal feeding, improved manure storage). 
The policy would involve (i) more ambitious targets for Member States in the National 
Emissions Ceilings Directive, with implications for emissions from the land use sector; (ii) 
possibly enhanced regulation at Member State level, or cross-compliance requirements at EU 
level (cross-compliance represents the minimum requirements a farm must meet to qualify for 
CAP payments); (iii) public funding in the form of CAP rural development programmes to 
subsidise or incentivise compliance; and potentially (iv) tax instruments introduced at the 
discretion of Member States. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced?  
Emission reduction targets for key airborne pollutants from agriculture apply to 2030, but will 
require measures to be introduced as soon as feasible if they are to be met. Further targets 
from 2020 onwards may be set if the National Emission Ceilings Directive is revised this year. 
b. What is its aim?  
• Review and revise emissions levels in the National Emission Ceiling Directive (NECD) 
so that they would reduce eutrophication to below critical levels, and integrate 
necessary measures into the CAP to reduce agricultural sources of nitrogen 
deposition to acceptable levels. 
• Ensure compliance with the Nitrates Directive and other EU legislation that reduces 
environmental emissions from farmland to water. 
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• Increase public funding to help overcome barriers to environmental action by farmers, 
particularly through modest support to upfront environmental investment costs and 
start-up costs where needed. For example, improvements in farm infrastructure or 
machinery to minimise ammonia emissions, increase energy efficiency & renewable 
energy use, reduce water use.  
• Encourage better management of the nitrogen cycle on farmland (maintaining yields 
while reducing pollution loads including greenhouse gas emissions), for example 
through more balanced fertiliser use, improved crop and manure management, 
precision farming techniques; low-protein animal feeding; and improved manure 
storage. 
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c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
The agricultural sector is a key source of nitrogen emissions to the air, water (surface water 
and groundwater) and soil. The main sources are intensive animal rearing facilities (livestock, 
poultry, pig and other intensive rearing units), fertiliser use on arable crops, and manure/slurry 
storage on livestock farms. The measure is therefore primarily targeted at farmers with 
intensive animal production systems and arable farmers. Additionally, tighter nitrogen 
pollution emission targets will affect the transport sector.  
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Farmers with intensive animal production systems will be required to invest in farm 
infrastructure and processes such as air filtration units, sealed slurry pits, biomass units to 
process slurry/manure. Farmers will also need to invest in more efficient feed conversion 
rates, for example through better feed materials and mixes (e.g., lower protein), better feeding 
practices, different animal breeds and husbandry practices. Arable farmers will be required to 
improve their fertilisation planning and management practices, through farm nutrient plans, 
soil quality mapping, better monitoring and crop practices (e.g., crop rotation and use of cover 
crops), as well as through more targeted and balanced fertiliser application (e.g., using 
precision farming techniques).  
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
The policy measure provides synergies to the soil measure, as it stimulates a demand for 
better arable farming practices that will benefit both nitrogen and soil targets. It provides 
benefits for the Natura 2000 measure, as it will reduce the pressure of eutrophication on 
Natura 2000 habitats and species, making restoration of favourable conservation status 
easier.  
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
Subsidies are provided under Rural Development Programmes for farmers to invest in better 
nitrogen management. There is a key role for more targeted subsidies to farmers to address 
the key barriers to the most beneficial but costly investments, such as slurry storage 
(Cardenas et al. 2011). These could be accompanied by tax instruments on inorganic 
fertiliser. 
 For tax: Who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used?  
Some Member States have applied a fertiliser tax, paid by the farmers who purchase the 
fertiliser (Withana et al. 2013). There is scope for hypothecation of revenues to services 
including enhanced advice to farms on fertiliser use; however, given state aid constraints and 
other administrative barriers, this may not be attractive.  
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
Rural Development Programme subsidies are financed half by EU funds and half by Member 
State public funding; as noted in the CAP fiche above, an improved targeting of existing 
funding could provide an adequate contribution to this policy objective. Additional funding is 
potentially available to farmers through payments for ecosystem services (for water quality). 
g. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
Nitrogen (energy use is indirectly targeted as fertiliser manufacture is a significant user of 
fossil fuel). 
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Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
Primarily at the level of the Rural Development Programmes (in some cases this is national, 
in some Member States it is regional) and of the River Basin Management Plans (local). The 
National Emission Ceilings Directive is currently under discussion for revision at the EU level, 
and there is also currently an opportunity to set further strategic goals on air pollution at the 
EU level. In the longer term, there is scope at the EU level for reform of other key policies 
affecting nitrogen emissions, including the Nitrates Directive, the Water Framework Directive, 
and the Common Agricultural Policy.  
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Livestock farmers and companies and private persons involved in intensive animal rearing are 
primarily affected, and should therefore be consulted. Fertiliser production companies and 
animal feed companies could make investments in products that allow more optimum use of 
nitrogen, as well as more support to farmers regarding good practices, but could also slow 
down change if they do not cooperate with higher standards.  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Farmers, primarily livestock farmers and companies and private persons involved in intensive 
animal rearing, are responsible for meeting minimum targets at the farm level. Fines for 
nitrogen pollution have so far not been heavily used, but this may change in future.  
d.  Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Action to reduce nitrogen emissions from the agricultural sector will require a combination of 
subsidies, advice and capacity building, regulatory targets, and enforcement. Otherwise the 
necessary actions will not be taken, as although some on farm actions can bring cost savings, 
others will require substantial investments and may reduce the profitability of intensive animal 
production systems (van den Broek, 2007; Schoumans et al. 2011).  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
The farming sector is currently wary of the possible consequences of tightening air pollution 
targets at the EU level. However, some Member States, notably The Netherlands, have set 
up action programmes for their agricultural sectors with ambitious aims, and have improved 
the acceptance of measures to reduce nitrogen emissions. Feedback on monitoring results to 
farmers in accessible and appropriate formats would help motivation and learning, as well as 
support enforcement. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
The strict and uniform implementation all over the EU of 1) balanced fertilisation (fertiliser use 
that does not lower crop yields but that decreases N leaching losses to less than 50 mg NO3- 
l-1), combined with improved crop and manure management; 2) low-protein animal feeding, 
combined with improved herd management; and 3) ammonia emissions abatement 
measures, including improved manure application and storage, would increase Nitrogen Use 
Efficiency by 25 per cent, while ammonia emissions would decrease by 31 per cent and N 
leaching by 41 per cent (Oenema et al. 2009). This would bring substantial benefits for 
biodiversity both on farmland and in freshwater and marine habitats in Europe; however, the 
nature and rate of recovery of biodiversity from nitrogen pollution is still poorly understood 
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(Dise et al. 2011). Actions to achieve balanced fertilisation may, however, introduce an 
increased risk of reduced yields under particularly favourable growing conditions when the N 
demand of crops is relatively high (Oenema et al. 2009). 
Key expected economic impacts  
A cost-benefit analysis estimated the total annual Nr-related damage in EU27 at between 70 
and 320 billion Euro, equivalent to 150-750 euro/capita, of which about 75% is related to 
health damage and air pollution (Brink & van Grinsven 2011). It also estimated that 
internalising the environmental costs of N-fertilisation would lower the optimal N-rate for 
profitability of arable production in North-West Europe by at least 50 kg/ha.  One baseline 
scenario calculated that strict implementation of balanced fertilisation in nitrate vulnerable 
zones, as defined in the Nitrates Directive, decreases total farmers' income in EU-27 by 1.7 
billion euros per year (Oenema et al. 2009). Implementation of all three measures decreases 
farmers income by 10.8 and total welfare by 17 billion euros per year, without valuing the 
environmental benefits. Livestock farming measures may be relatively more costly in the most 
intensive farming regions in the EU. 
Key expected social impacts  
Reduced nitrogen pollution in both air and water is expected to bring substantial long-term 
health benefits. The Commission’s policy impact assessment estimated the health benefits of 
the proposed Clean Air Package as around €40 billion per year to 2030. The European 
Nitrogen Assessment estimates that at least ten million people in Europe are potentially 
exposed to drinking water with nitrate concentrations above recommended levels (Sutton et 
al. 2011).  
There may also be some social impacts within the farming sector, if poorer farm businesses 
find it more difficult (notwithstanding support from rural development funding) to finance 
necessary investment; and if higher costs lead to consolidation of farm businesses, there 
could be initial localised impacts on employment which may require accompanying measures. 
5.4.3 Promotion of “Payment for Ecosystem Services” programmes 
Brief summary of the measure 
The measure consists in encouraging the establishment of PES programmes aiming at 
reducing the environmental impact of agricultural activities and financed by private actors 
(e.g., water companies, tourist operators). The development of new PES programmes will be 
financed by private companies, but public authorities will play a key role in the increased use 
of this kind of measures by offering 1) fiscal incentives and 2) support, including mediation, 
control activities, and also, when appropriate, guarantees to ensure a long term planning 
(e.g., guaranteeing the payment even in case the company goes bankrupt or cannot afford to 
pay). Sectors with potential for making such payments include the water sector (to encourage 
farms to avoid practices which lead to diffuse water pollution); energy undertakings or other 
businesses with an interest in offsetting carbon emissions; and tourism businesses which rely 
on high levels of landscape value and biodiversity. 
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Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
We suggest this policy measure is introduced in 2020, as it is relatively easy to implement. 
b. What is its aim?  
The policy aims to increase the sustainability of agricultural practices, and in particular to 
preserve or improve water quality (e.g., PES financed by water companies that are willing to 
remunerate farmers to reduce the use of fertilisers and pesticides, and thereby maintaining or 
improving water quality) and biodiversity/landscapes (e.g., PES financed by tourist companies 
that pay farmers to maintain biodiversity-rich semi-natural areas). Involving the private sector 
will increase the funding available for the maintenance/enhancement of the ecosystem 
services provided by the agricultural land, in order to complement regulation and public 
incentives. 
c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
The measure will be targeted at private companies in order to encourage them to finance the 
provision of ecosystem services. The establishment of information and support programmes 
run by public authorities will be key to extend the use of PES private PES schemes, and will 
be both targeted at the providers and buyers of ecosystem services - i.e., at farmers and 
private companies. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
The fiscal incentive would take the form of tax reliefs on payments for ecosystem services, 
and would require the beneficiaries (i.e., the private companies) to put in place PES 
programmes to qualify. As regards the support activities, the provision of information and 
mediation will not entail specific requirements, as they are they are meant to encourage 
interested stakeholders to engage in PES programme.  
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
PES programmes will help to improve the sustainability of agricultural activities, thereby 
contributing to meet many of the objectives of the policy mix. The links and synergies with 
other policies of the same policy mix are only indirect though, for example, PES measures 
could be included in the Rural Development Programmes of the future CAPs, and thereby can 
present synergies with the policy measure “Stronger and more effective environmental and 
climate dimension for EU land management in future CAP reforms”. Also, PES can be used to 
encourage a better management of the nitrogen cycle on farmland, a reduction in the use of 
pesticides and the employment of integrated pest management, an improvement of soil 
quality and carbon storage in soil, which are the aim of some of the other policies in the policy 
mix.  
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
This will depend on the targeted ecosystem services, and the available budget. 
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
A variety of financing sources can be used to encourage the development of payment 
schemes, and to facilitate farm participation them, including CAP rural development 
expenditure, EU research programmes (e.g., FP8), Life+ projects, Structural and Cohesion 
Funds, together with MS-specific sources of financing. 
g. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
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The policy mix will target crops, dairy products, meat, food waste and bioenergy. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
At the MS level for the fiscal incentives and the guarantees; at the local level for the 
information/mediation activities. The latter could be financed using EU and/or MS funds 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Representatives of famers and industry (e.g., water companies, tourism operators), and also 
the public authorities in charge of the mediation/controlling activities. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Not applicable. 
d.  Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
This is not key, as the programmes established in different countries and location will vary 
according to a variety of environmental, institutional, social and economic factors. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
If well designed, the instrument should be well accepted by companies (as it will allow them to 
benefit from ecosystem services with some public support) and by farmers (as it will represent 
an additional source of income for them). Criticisms could come from some environmental 
NGOs and researchers, as the measure could be seen as leading to a privatisation of the 
natural capital. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness 
The use of PES programmes can improve the ecosystem services provided by the 
agricultural sector by encouraging more sustainable agricultural practices, including the 
adoption/maintenance of extensive management in High Nature Value areas. However, PES 
programmes need to be intended as complementary to other kinds of environmental policies 
based on regulatory instruments or public subsidies. In fact, they will be put in place in 
specific locations where the environmental, institutional and socio-economic conditions allow, 
but will not provide EU or country-wide solutions. 
Key expected economic impacts  
Encouraging new PES measures can ensure new sources of financing for farmers, thereby 
improving the economic sustainability of their activities. It may also prove a way to increase 
profitability of some specific stakeholders (e.g., tourist operators; mineral water companies), 
by increasing their market share or reducing their costs. In some cases, PES may even 
ensure the survival of their business in the long run (e.g., by preserving the quality of the 
water sold by mineral water companies or the beauty of a landscape that attracts tourists). 
Key expected social impacts  
The measure can improve the livelihood of farmers carrying out more sustainable agricultural 
practices, including low-intensity farming in biodiversity-rich areas, thereby avoid land 
abandonment and preserving the cultural identity and social cohesion of rural areas. 
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5.4.4 Regulation for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry 
Brief summary of the measure 
Develop a Regulation for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) setting targets 
for carbon emissions and removals related to forest management, cropland management, 
grazing land management and revegetation, ensuring that this incorporates protection of 
farmed semi-natural habitats. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
We suggest this policy measure is introduced in the early 2020s, as part of the EU’s 
implementation of internationally agreed climate mitigation goals, provided that relevant 
conditions are met. Significant preparatory work will be necessary to ensure that Member 
States are all capable of reporting on LULUCF emissions to the degree of precision 
necessary to avoid perverse outcomes or perverse incentives; and it may be necessary first 
to ensure that adequate coverage of the EU’s land use by satellite or other aerial technology.  
b. What is its aim?  
To provide incentives for additional mitigation in the LULUCF sector (land use and forestry).  
c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
Agriculture, forestry, and other land use sectors. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Will depend on policy design: but likely to involve a set of targets for Member States forming 
an overall EU target for LULUCF net mitigation of GHG emissions; leading Member States to 
create incentives (funding, or offsetting mechanisms) for carbon sequestration. 
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
There are synergies with policies which involve incentives to convert land to pasture, or to 
maintain pasture; and with policies which encourage afforestation. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
It is too early to determine how Member States are most likely to aim to meet LULUCF 
commitments. It is likely that subsidy will be the main mechanism chosen, in which case the 
impact of the measure will depend on the level of funding made available, which in turn will 
depend on the extent to which Member States individually and the EU collectively wish to see 
their climate mitigation ambitions being delivered through land use policy, rather than through 
emissions reductions in other economic sectors. 
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
Either from Member State budgets, or through incentive payments under the Common 
Agricultural Policy 
g. What physical/resource flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
It may have a (marginal) positive impact on use of fertilisers, on production of timber within 
the EU, and on extensive production of milk and dairy. 
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Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
 An EU level decision facilitating/requiring the use of LULUCF emissions (both positive and 
negative, i.e., sequestration), as an integral part of the EU’s delivery of its wider UNFCCC 
commitments on mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Farmers, foresters, NGOs, other sectors affected by GHG emissions targets 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Will depend on MS choices in relation to implementation; but competent authorities would be 
responsible for accurate monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions; and may choose 
either to impose regulatory obligations on land managers, or to make subsidies available to 
encourage improved carbon management. 
d.  Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Essential to coordinate at EU level, to ensure a common level of stringency in acceptance of 
LULUCF emissions, and common standards for fungibility with emissions reductions from 
other sources (e.g., ETS or non-traded sector). 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Particular issues to be resolved will include: accuracy of measurement of LULUCF mitigation; 
the difficulty of combining LULUCF mitigation with non-temporary mitigation from avoided 
emissions; and limited understanding of the best approaches to delivering carbon 
sequestration in soils. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Unclear at this stage; there is potential to encourage land use changes which will have a 
positive impact on both climate change (by broadening the range of mitigation which can be 
encouraged by policy) and soil quality. However, there are also risks that, unless the design 
of an instrument is carefully managed, it will lead to mis-reporting (or over-generous reporting) 
of LULUCF emissions; and risks that if full fungibility is allowed of LULUCF emissions 
sequestrations (which are by their nature non-permanent) with emissions reductions in other 
sectors, the long-term impact on GHG concentrations in the atmosphere will be harmful.  
Key expected economic impacts  
Some costs of land conversion, including opportunity costs (e.g., from reduced production on 
marginal arable land); potential costs for infrastructure and building development on 
greenfield sites, although limited to internalising existing external costs; and an improved cost 
effectiveness of mitigation, leading either to more ambitious targets, or to reductions in the 
cost of mitigation for other sectors. 
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Key expected social impacts  
Relatively limited social impacts, mostly occurring as a result of the economic impacts noted 
above, although potential health impacts from increased afforestation, and some employment 
impacts from shifts in the balance of the land use sector. 
5.4.5 Strengthened pesticide reduction targets under the Pesticides 
Directive, and provision of guidance to farmers on integrated pest 
management. 
Brief summary of the measure 
Existing Member State National Action Plans under the Sustainable Use Directive could be 
strengthened; with more demanding requirements in terms of reduced use of pesticides, and 
improved pest management. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
In the absence of further measures on a voluntary basis by Member States, the policy would 
need to await the 2018 review of the Directive, to be accompanied by any necessary 
proposals. This indicates that new measures can come into force in 2020. 
b. What is its aim?  
Strengthen pesticide reduction targets in national pesticide action plans under the Sustainable 
Use of Pesticides Directive 
Improve pesticide licensing regimes to encourage full implementation of integrated pest 
management 
Ensure Farm Advisory Services provide all farmers with advice on integrated pest 
management; and improve the incentives for uptake of integrated pest management, 
including through links to the policy on a stronger environmental dimension to the CAP.  
c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
Agriculture, and upstream supply industries. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Reduction in the use of active substances in pesticides; and improved provision of advice and 
guidance on integrated pest management. 
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
Links to the policy on stronger environmental measures under the CAP. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
Potential for more Member States to introduce fiscal instruments in order to secure a 
reduction in pesticide use, and to remove VAT exemptions on pesticides. 
 For tax: Who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
Tax instruments would be likely to involve a simple volume tax on active ingredients in 
pesticides placed on the market, graded according to an environmental impact index. 
Pesticide taxes are currently in place in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and 
Sweden. Taxes were in place in the past in Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland but 
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were abolished). The Denmark pesticide tax has been applied since July 2013 using a 
Pesticide Load Indicator to grade the tax for each pesticide on the market, so that farmers are 
taxed according to the environment and health toxicity of pesticides used rather than their 
nominal value (Withana et al. 2013). Some scope for hypothecation of revenues to deliver 
improved advice/guidance for land managers in integrated pest management; although in 
practice receipts are unlikely to be at a sufficiently high level to justify the administrative costs 
of such an approach. 
 For subsidy: How would it be financed? 
Accompanying measures, including provision of information through Farm Advisory Services, 
are capable of being funded through rural development programmes as part of the improved 
environmental focus of the Common Agricultural Policy in the policy mix. As noted in the 
relevant fiche, this is achievable through reallocation of existing expenditure to new priorities. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
EU level, with some flexibility allowed on Member States’ implementation decisions. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Manufacturers of pesticides; farm businesses; environmental stakeholders; apiculturists. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Regulatory authorities, farmers and land managers, and pesticides manufacturers will be 
responsible for implementation. Consequences will depend on Member State choices on 
implementation, but could involve fines, or the compulsory withdrawal of some products from 
the market. The European Food Safety Authority has an ongoing programme to review 
pesticide active substances for their human and environmental safety according to the Plant 
Protection Products Regulation 1107/2009, which might result in the withdrawal of some 
active substances with proven or likely toxicity through, e.g., endocrine disrupting effects, by 
2020. The Water Framework Directive could also trigger the de-approval of active substances 
that are an obstacle to achieving good water status, such as metaldehyde.  
d. Suggestions for high legitimacy decision-making and optimal involvement of Member 
States 
Careful ex ante evaluation of potential impacts on production would be a valuable contribution 
to securing wider acceptability within the industry. Continued research into the impact of 
pesticide use on pollinators could also help to build legitimacy. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Increased availability of invertebrates as food source for wildlife in arable environments; 
potentially, increased pollination services; leading to agricultural systems which are more 
capable of maintaining or increasing productivity with reduced inputs.  
Key expected economic impacts  
Decrease in use of pesticides; increase in provision of advice to farm businesses on 
approaches to pest management that are less dependent on heavy use of pesticides. Some 
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potential risk of countervailing short-term pest damage to crops; if this turned out to be 
particularly significant, there could also be impacts on food prices and price volatility. 
Key expected social impacts  
Limited; some potential employment benefits from a shift from provision of plant protection 
products to provision of plant protection services. 
5.5 The proposed policy mix for the consumption side  
5.5.1 Context of the policy mix  
Changes in both consumption and production are important to ensure more sustainable food 
consumption patterns. To date, EU regulatory policy in the food and drink sector has largely 
focused on the production/process side of the chain, including in particular legislative 
requirements under the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP), and provisions relating to food processing under the Industrial Emissions Directive 
(previously the IPPC Directive).  
Interventions on the consumption side of food have been restricted to soft measures like 
education and awareness- raising activities, labelling schemes, as well as various voluntary 
and local-level/community- based initiatives. Although helpful, to date these initiatives have 
not been undertaken on a sufficient scale to trigger the substantial shift in consumption 
behaviour that is required to stimulate dietary change towards more sustainable patterns. 
Therefore, further efforts relating to the consumption side are needed, to strengthen, revise or 
complement initiatives already underway. In addition, it is important to note that there are very 
few, if any EU and national policies that address diets in terms of reduction of animal 
products.  
The policy mix addresses consumption of meat and dairy products and the reduction of food 
waste, which are the main drivers for the current increase in the use of agricultural land at the 
global level (see Section 5.2). In this context, diet and sustainability are closely connected, as 
reducing the consumption of meat and dairy products, the demand for bioenergy and the 
production of food waste will reduce the land requirement associated to agricultural products, 
thereby indirectly reducing the environmental impact of the agricultural sector.  
The section below describes a selection of policies that could contribute to meet the mid-term 
2030 targets (see Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). 
5.5.2 Development of the policy mix 
To the extent possible, the policy mix for the consumption side has been developed based on 
evidence available such as case studies of similar policy measures indicating success and 
lessons learned, and current research findings through a literature review and findings from 
ongoing large research projects such as FUSIONS and FOODLINKS, and on-going results 
from this current DYNAMIX research project (for example conclusions from Dynamix WP3). 
In a first step, a list of possible policy instruments was developed and included in a table that 
provides information on the aim, scale (geographic scale of application; i.e., EU level, 
Member State (MS) level and/or local level), type(s) of tool used, drivers addressed by the 
policy option (see Section 5.2), potential cross cutting sectors or other policies to consider 
Development of DYNAMIX Policy Mixes – Revised deliverable D4.2 
|  Page 152 
and key actors involved/impacted and their role. In a second step, this list was evaluated 
according to the four criteria: effectiveness, sustainability, cost-efficiency and feasibility. In a 
final step, the top 4 policy options that received the highest scores based on the scoring 
exercise were selected as the most promising instruments for the policy mixes. 
5.5.3 Priority policy options and selection of policy mixes  
A selection of priority policy options to fulfil the objectives set out for food consumption for 
2030 was developed, based on the four main criteria described in WP1 in the common 
approach report: Effectiveness, Sustainability, Cost-efficiency, and Feasibility.  
Based on those criteria, the policy instruments that seem the most promising were chosen for 
assessment in the DYNAMIX WPs 5 and 6:  
1. A targeted information campaign on changing diets, and on reducing food waste. 
2. The development of food redistribution programmes. 
3. VAT on meat products. 
Again, a range of accompanying and supporting measures is assumed to be put in place 
alongside these policies; these supporting measures will not be assessed in WPs 5 and 6, but 
include: 
 Public canteens supplying recommended dietary limits, and operating vegetarian 
days. 
 A sectoral agreement with large food retailers to display recommended healthy dietary 
limits for meat and dairy products. 
 A review of eat-by labelling. 
 Clear guidance on how to store products in the retail sector. 
 
The following sections therefore set out in more detail the 3 consumption policies selected for 
more detailed assessment. That assessment will work on the assumption that the 
accompanying measures referred to above are also implemented.  
5.5.4 Targeted information campaign to influence food behaviour 
towards: reducing food waste and changing diets 
Brief summary of the measure 
This measure is an awareness campaign that aims to encourage and achieve reduction in 
food waste and change in diets. The measure would provide information on the serious issue 
of food wastage in order to increase respect for food and promote healthy and more 
environmentally friendly/ less resource intensive diets. Advice and guidance could also be 
provided to consumers on how they could more efficiently consume food by providing 
information and tips on shopping, shelf life, storage, preparation, recovery and disposal 
options. 
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Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
This policy option could be introduced immediately.  
b. What is its aim?  
This policy instrument has a double aim: (1) to reduce the generation of food waste by raising 
awareness on the negative impacts of food waste and (2) promoting more environmental and 
health conscious diets by making transparent the environmental impacts and resources 
requirements of certain dietary patterns and food choices. The rationale behind this measure 
is that the provision of information and advice to consumers will create awareness and foster 
behaviour change. 
Given the comparably much larger resource requirements of meat and other animal products 
(dairy products, eggs) this will be one focus. However, other issues such as import/ regional 
production, food waste, production practices etc. should also be included in order to make it a 
comprehensive campaign about food. The campaign will actively need to take into account 
knowledge about behaviour change, as change in food practices does not rely on information 
only, but is largely influenced by habits and social/ cultural backgrounds. In this context, it 
would be important to ensure that information campaigns are tailored to the target audience in 
terms of the language used, visual design, modes of communication  television, radio, press, 
etc. and location. In other words, nutrition campaigns that pay attention to the specific 
behavioural goals of the intervention, target populations, communication activities and 
channels, message content and presentation, and techniques for feedback and evaluation 
should be able to change nutrition behaviours (Snyder, 2007). Furthermore, due to the 
limitations of using only information campaigns to achieve behaviour change , combining 
information campaigns with some of the other policy measures included in the fiches could 
produce more significant changes in behaviour.  
c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
This measure would be targeted at consumers as well as relevant actors of the food industry. 
It would target the food consumption phase, as the measure would seek to encourage 
changes in diet to reflect reduced environmental impact and encourage food waste reduction. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
As an information and action campaign, this instrument would not put into place any particular 
requirements, apart from encouraging the relevant actors (e.g., food retailers, schools, 
transport authorities, etc., based on the target audience) to participate in the campaign by 
displaying posters, carrying out animations, running TV ads, competitions, creation of food 
apps. etc.  
The type, complexity and amount of information provided, and the way in which it is 
presented, all have a significant impact on the likelihood of people reading, understanding 
and ultimately influencing their behaviour. Therefore, it is important to strike a balance 
between providing enough information to inform discerning consumers, while also meeting 
regulatory requirements (on information that has to be provided) and ensuring that less 
concerned consumers are not overwhelmed by information. The actors running or sponsoring 
the campaigns are also essential. For example based on the characteristics of the target 
audience, independent and high-reputed NGOs may be more trusted than industry or 
government.  
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e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
This measure could be linked with any of the other proposed measures in the consumption 
cluster for agricultural land use. This measure could be linked with the sectorial agreement 
with retailers, the measure on reviewing and harmonising eat-by labelling to reduce food 
waste and the measure on applying VAT on meat products. Retailers have an important role 
to play in food campaigns because of the retailer’s direct interaction with consumers. 
Synergies could be developed by also including a commitment by retailers to abandon 
quantity based marketing strategies such as buy one get one-free offers on perishable 
products, address food waste in the retail part of the product chain through establishing or 
supporting initiatives such as food banks or displaying recommended dietary information in 
their stores. Suppliers could be encouraged to develop healthy convenience foods with less 
packaging through the setting of relevant standards. Best practices on how to reduce or avoid 
food losses could be shared and new initiatives supported. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
Not applicable. 
g. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
Not applicable. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
It would be important for national governments or the EU to initiate the campaign in order to 
maximise the potential to reach a wide audience, and in close cooperation with retailers and 
key actors in the eating out and catering sector. Therefore, this measure could be deployed at 
all levels – local/MS/EU level – due to the diversity of the target audience, which in this case 
would be the general public. Food behaviour – in terms of what foods we buy, how much we 
buy, and how it is consumed is influenced by a number of factors – economic, educational, 
cultural, etc. therefore information campaigns should seek to address the diversity of the 
population groups concerned. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
• Advertisers 
• NGOs/civil society organisations 
• Public authorities at MS, regional and municipalty level (depending on pliot region/ 
target group) 
• EU level actors 
• Consumer associations 
• Retailers 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Those providing the information in the campaigns are responsible for ensuring that the 
information communicated is accurate, relevant, comprehensible and trustworthy. In the case 
that information in the campaigns is misleading or provide incorrect information, there is a risk 
of mistrust that could result from target audiences. Such reactions could discourage 
consumers from following the guidance communicated through such campaigns. 
 Development of DYNAMIX Policy Mixes – Revised deliverable D4.2 
Page 155  | 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
This measure would be enhanced and technically supported if coordinated at the EU level as 
it would help to ensure more widespread dissemination and visibility of the campaign. Many of 
the relevant attitudes and cultural practices are in common across EU and therefore a 
harmonising of strategy across the EU offers the possibility of a cultural consensus forming on 
some of the underlying attitudes. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
This measure would most likely be accepted by the general public as long as they are clearly 
aware of the objectives and benefits of the measure. On the other hand, meat producers and 
other food industry stakeholders may be more hesitant about accepting food campaigns that 
encourage consumers to eat less meat – even if aimed at promoting healthier diets and 
reduced environmental impacts. Public acceptance is crucial for the success of public health 
interventions. According to the EATWELL project, public acceptance of nutrition policies is 
influenced by age, economic wealth, political views, obesity attributions, and the willingness to 
pay for such policies. Some of the main findings of the project indicate that the two policy 
actions most accepted are the improvement of nutritional education in schools and nutrition 
labelling measures. In contrast, the least accepted policies are the control of the nutritional 
content of workplace meals and the introduction of food and drink advertising bans for adults . 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Depending on the scope and quality of the information campaign, for example how well the 
campaign is disseminated in terms of the number of people it reaches, environmental impacts 
related to the reduction in food waste and changes in dietary habits could be expected. The 
successful implementation of this initiative would depend to a great extent on the scope and 
magnitude of the campaign, as well as on the quality of the design of the campaign. 
Audiences must for example understand the information that is being communicated and/ or 
attracted to change their behaviour by other means of the campaign. The more people that 
the information campaign reaches, the greater chances that awareness will be raised on the 
importance of changing diets.  
Several studies have been carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of public health 
campaigns and initiatives. Some relevant findings can be extrapolated from the EATWELL 
project, an EU funded FP7 project that evaluated a range of the actions undertaken and 
identifying gaps, success and failure factors for these public health campaigns. For example, 
the project found that in general, information measures have a small but positive effect on 
healthy eating and, because they are relatively cheap, they are generally cost-effective. In 
particular, the project evaluated a Five-a-day campaign which was launched in 2003 by the 
British Government with the aim to increase awareness of the health benefits of fruits and 
vegetables consumption. The program has been providing a consistent message supporting 
the consumption of 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day. Using data from the 
Consumer Attitudes Survey, findings show that from 2004 (a year after the campaign was 
launched), there was a sustained yearly reported increase of 0.32 units of portions eaten, 
which could be attributable to the campaign (EATWELL, 2012).  
Further evidence can be drawn from a research paper that evaluated the effectiveness of 
health communication campaigns to inform future nutrition campaigns. Findings from the 
research show that in the United States, on average health communication campaigns that 
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include use of the mass media and avoid coercion have an average effect size of about 5 
percentage points (Snyder, 2007). Nutrition campaigns for fruit and vegetable consumption, 
fat intake, and breastfeeding, have been slightly more successful on average than for other 
health topics. Thus, if 60% of people were doing the target behaviour before the campaign, 
about 65% can be predicted to do the health behaviour after the campaign.  
Regarding food waste, based on the UK Love Food Hate Waste campaign’s the food waste 
prevention potential of a targeted waste campaign can be estimated at 1.8% of total food 
waste or 3% of avoidable food waste, (BIO, 2010).  
Some environmental benefits include for example: 
• Reduction of methane from landfills.  
• Reduction of resource use associated with food production. 
• Recycling food waste and turning it into compost or into renewable energy and a soil 
amendment through anaerobic digestion. 
Key expected economic impacts  
In terms of funding it would be necessary that enough funds are available to carry out the 
campaigns enabling it to reach the widest scope of the target audiences as possible. The 
campaign could be funded by the EU (e.g., through LIFE + funds) or through the revenue 
generated from VAT on meat products (see policy fiche on VAT for meat products). 
The measure would result in less food waste from households, which could result in some of 
the following economic impacts: 
• Lower disposal costs - by decreasing the amount of food wasted, businesses pay less 
to dispose of their trash.  
• Reduce Over-Purchasing and Labour Costs - businesses can reduce costs by 
purchasing only the food that will be used, or decreasing improperly prepared foods. 
Reducing food waste can also increase staff efficiency and reduce energy and labour 
associated with disposing of food. 
• Receive Tax Benefits by Donating Food - By donating wholesome and edible food to 
food banks or food rescue organisations, businesses can claim tax benefits as well as 
feed those in need. 
The cost of a similar targeted waste campaign for the EU was estimated at between €90,000 
and €180,000, based on the website and network costs of the Green Spider Network (BIO, 
2010). The cost for MS campaigns is estimated at €0.04 per inhabitant, based on the WRAP 
Love Food Hate Waste campaign, approximately € 20 million for EU27. In terms of macro-
economic impacts the campaign can have valuable side effects, as healthier diets save costs 
in the healthcare system. 
Key expected social impacts  
The measure would raise awareness and encourage behavioural change in diets and issues 
around food waste. Audiences will be more informed about the possible environmental and 
health benefits associated with changing their diet as well as receive guidance on how to 
change their diets.  
Several social impacts could be expected through the measure, such as contributing towards 
food security. A food waste campaign could encourage households and organisations to 
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reduce food sent to landfills and feed those in need. The campaign could also help to improve 
sanitation, public safety, and health because food waste deposited in residual waste 
containers can generate bad odours and attract vermin. Placing food scraps in a closed, leak-
proof, durable, and reusable container, and having it frequently emptied for donation or 
composting can significantly reduce such sanitation problems. It can also form an important 
part of increasing awareness among consumes about the amount of waste food that they 
generate and highlight that it is in issue taken seriously by the authorities. 
Finally, as the EATWELL project highlighted, it is important to recognise that informed choices 
are not necessarily healthy choices due to multiple other factors that can influence what 
people choose to eat. Therefore, a perfectly informed and fully educated populace will still 
impose social costs of unhealthy eating because diet-related ill health raises health care costs 
and causes lost economic output. 
5.5.5 Development of food redistribution programmes/food donation  
Brief summary of the measure 
This policy instrument aims to reduce the generation of food waste through the development 
of food redistribution programmes. Food donation provides a crucial support for the most 
deprived and is an important tool for the reduction of food waste in Europe. There is no 
common EU policy on food donation; policy frameworks in Member States (MS) vary, 
enabling donation to greater or lesser degrees. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
We suggest this policy measure is introduced in 2020, as it is relatively easy to implement. 
b. What is its aim?  
This policy instrument aims to reduce the generation of food waste by developing food 
distribution programmes. 
c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
This measure would be targeted at the retail (including food restaurateurs) and food supply 
chain sector. It would target the retail/use and disposal phase of food products. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
This measure would encourage households, retailers and other relevant food stakeholders to 
donate eligible food products to food distribution programmes. 
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
This measure could be linked with the other proposed measures on a food waste information 
campaign and work with retailers through a voluntary agreement to reduce food waste. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
Not applicable. 
g. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
Not applicable. 
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Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
This measure should be deployed at the MS level due to the specificities of organising food 
donation programmes, which more often takes place at the local and national level for 
example due to logistical aspects such as transportation and storage. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Food banks play a key role in the food donation process, recovering food from donors (food 
manufacturers, distributors, the restauration sector, retailers, or individuals) and redistributing 
it to civil society organisations and social services that support the most deprived. They 
operate using a variety of models and may be run by organisations such as charities, 
community groups and churches as well as individuals. 
Further, all manufacturers involved in the different life cycle stages of food products should be 
involved as food waste also occurs during the production phases (e.g., unharvested and 
overproduced products). Retailers and other relevant actors involved during the distribution 
and marketing phase of food products would also need to be involved because of the food left 
unsold at stores and markets. The interest of retailers are crucial as their support through 
participation in food donation programmes is vital. It is likely commercial donators will want to 
ensure that the schemes that they donate do not impact on their sales, particularly among 
their high-value consumers. Eligibility or restricted access therefore might be sought. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
The measure would entail a voluntary system for those donating food. Those coordinating the 
food donation programmes (e.g., charities, NGOS or government agencies) would be 
responsible for setting criteria (e.g., health and safety criteria) for the food that is donated. 
Those donating the food (whether it be from households, restaurants, retailers or other food 
businesses) would be responsible for donating food and ensuring that it corresponds to the 
rules set out. Finally, food banks would be responsible for the distribution, storage, and 
organisation of the distribution of the food donations. 
d.  Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
This measure would less important and technically necessary to coordinate at the EU level as 
most of the successful examples of food donation programmes are currently coordinated at 
the MS level. Nonetheless, issues such as transportation and storage would need to be 
carefully considered. The EU could coordinate in parallel a forum for the exchange of best 
practices and knowledge sharing. Guidance on funding opportunities and organisation 
support could be provided to participating MS.  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
A key barrier to overcome in terms of gaining acceptance and feasibility of the measure is that 
food donors may be driven to discard surplus food instead of distributing it to food banks or 
charity organisations in order to avoid risks associated with liability for donated food (BIO, 
2014). Therefore, governments could encourage the participation of manufacturers and 
retailers to participate in food redistribution programmes by providing financial incentives to 
stimulate the establishment of food banks or tax incentives for food donations. For example, 
in France, fiscal instruments have been used such that it is more expensive for companies to 
send unmarketable food to anaerobic digestion than to donate it to food banks. Food donors 
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qualify for a tax credit equal to 60% of the value of the food donated, to a limit of 5/1000€ of 
revenue of companies subject to corporate income tax. In the UK, VAT on food is generally 
zero-rated, as a consequence of the negotiation process prior to EU accession. Other fiscal 
tools that are being used successfully in the EU to support food donation, include the use of 
corporate tax credits for donated food. Another option is to consider the value of donated food 
as fairly low or zero for tax purposes, however this may negatively impact Member States that 
offer a (percentage) corporate tax credit to companies on the value of food they donate, 
nullifying the value of that tax credit. Therefore, it may be preferable to “abandon” VAT or 
significantly reducing VAT on donated food, rather than valuing donated food at zero, would 
be a more effective incentive, given its compatibility with other (potentially more significant) 
fiscal incentives such as tax credits. 
In countries such as the US and Italy “Good Samaritan” laws, such as the Bill Emerson Good 
Samaritan Act, protects food donors from civil and criminal liability if the product they 
redistributed in good faith to a charitable organisation later causes harm to the needy 
recipient. In Italy, the Good Samaritan Law identifies the food bank as the final consumer of 
donated products. Thus, food donors are liable for food safety and hygiene conditions only to 
food banks, rather than to individual consumers of food bank provisions. 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Food donation is an important tool in reducing generated food waste. It can be redirected for 
human consumption through donations to food banks and food charities or redistribution 
organisations.  
In the EU, according to the first pan-European study on food waste conducted in 2010 (BIO, 
2010), an estimated 89 million tonnes of food is wasted each year or about 180 kg per 
person, excluding the primary agricultural and fisheries production phases of the supply 
chain. The FAO study “Food Wastage Footprint. Impacts on Natural Resources” estimated 
that the global carbon footprint of food produced and not eaten is 3.3 billion tonnes of CO₂ 
equivalent: as such, food loss and waste ranks as the third top emitter of greenhouse gas 
emissions after USA and China. Moreover, around 250km3 of water and 1.4 billion hectares 
of land used annually to produce food are lost or wasted. In the EU, food production and 
consumption generate an estimated 20% to 30% of all EU environmental impacts.  
In the UK, around 3.4 million tonnes of food in manufacturing, distribution and retail is 
considered to be wasted each year . In 2013, FareShare one of the largest food redistribution 
charities in the UK received and redistributed 7, 150 tonnes of food which would otherwise 
have gone to waste. This amount only represents about 1.5% of the 300,000 to 400,000 
tonnes of surplus food believed to be available in the UK annually (BIO, 2014). 
In 2013, the European Federation of Food Banks (FEBA), which brings together 256 food 
banks in Europe, distributed 402 000 tons of food, equivalent to 804 million meals, to 5.7 
million people in partnership with 31 000 charitable organisations and social centres in 
Europe . Instead of being lost or wasted, the food donated was redistributed. 
Key expected economic impacts  
Besides its environmental cost, food loss and waste also represents a loss of economic value. 
On a global scale, the economic cost of the overall amount of food loss and waste in 2007 
totalled to around USD 750 billion. In the UK, WRAP estimated in 2009 that avoidable food 
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waste costs the average household £480 (€595) per year. In Sweden, there is only one food 
bank/social enterprise, Allwin in operation, which connects surplus food generated by 
producers and retailers with those in need via its own infrastructure. Allwin charges the same 
amount as the public waste management service (100 euros/tonne of surplus food on 
average) to recover surplus food from different sources and deliver it to charities. Edible food 
is thus redirected to people who need it rather than being disposed of. 
Food donation programmes currently lack funds for the organisation of logistics (e.g., 
transportation and storage), which is one of the most limiting factors in food redistribution. Tax 
legislation offers an opportunity to incentivise donation. According to the VAT Council 
Directive 2006/112/EC, food donations are taxable if the donation is made by a taxable 
person and if the VAT on acquisition of the goods is fully or partially deductible (BIO, 2014). 
The further donating to food banks represents an increase in social capital, and therefore 
society’s ability to tackle other challenges. 
Key expected social impacts  
The measure would raise awareness of the issues around food waste. Further, food donation 
provides a crucial support for the most deprived segments of society.  
5.5.6 Value added tax on meat products  
Brief summary of the measure 
This policy option would require national governments to implement and enforce the tax 
measure. Relevant actors from the meat industry would need to comply with VAT regulation 
by applying Value Added Tax (VAT) to their meat products. Currently, most MS apply a 
reduced VAT rate for meat products, with the exception of six MS (Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). There could be possible exemptions for certain 
types of meat products that promote environmental protection and health: e.g., organic meat 
products or meat that has been produced following very strict environmental criteria, meat 
being donated to charities and food donation programmes, etc. VAT on meat products would 
follow the already established rules on VAT – it applies more or less to all goods and services 
that are bought and sold for use or consumption in the Community, therefore goods which are 
sold for export are normally not subject to VAT. Conversely imports are taxed (to ensure 
competitiveness and a level playing field). This measure could influence consumer 
purchasing decision on meat products because of the increased price of meat.  
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
In principle, the measure could be introduced in 2020, assuming resistance at Member State 
level can be overcome. Our assessments are prepared on that basis. 
b. What is its aim?  
This policy instrument aims to change dietary habits by reducing meat consumption through 
the application of VAT on meat products. This would raise the price of meat products in most 
MS as they currently apply a reduced VAT rate on meat products. 
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c. What economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
This measure would be targeted at the food retail sector that sale meat. The measure would 
directly affect its sales price. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
The measure would require retailers to price their meat products in accordance with the VAT 
regulation by applying applicable VAT rates based on national and/or EU agreements. 
Suppliers of goods and services subject to VAT are normally subject to a standard rate of at 
least 15%. 
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments in the policy-mix  
This measure could be linked with a targeted information campaign on the importance of 
changing diets and information to consumers on why VAT has been increased for meat 
products. Campaigns would try and encourage public to change their level of meat 
consumption by clearly explaining the policy objective and societal advantages. Any such 
move should be accompanied by a wider awareness raising and educational campaign, 
promoting the health as well as the environmental benefits of consuming less meat. Given low 
consumer awareness of the issue, it is likely that the VAT change will be as important in its 
signalling effect as in its price effect. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
As a consumption tax, increased prices (through VAT) are ultimately paid for by the final 
consumer. The equivalent revenues of the tax could be hypothecated for a purpose deemed 
to support the objective of the policy and therefore increase public trust. Tax revenues from 
VAT on meat products could go the MS environmental funds to finance environmental 
protection initiatives and associated education and public campaigns. For example, tax 
revenues could be used to finance the information awareness campaigns on food waste 
reduction and changes in diet described in the first policy fiche above. 
g. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
Not applicable. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
This measure is best deployed at the EU level.  
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
• Meat producers and retailers and any other industry actors involved in the meat 
production process 
• Public authorities at both the national and EU level 
• Consumer associations 
• Health professionals  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
The main responsible stakeholders would be Member States and the retailers of meat. As a 
Directive, each Member State is responsible for the transposition of the VAT Directive’s 
provisions into national legislation and their correct application within its territory. As such, MS 
can set up their own VAT collection, recovery and penalty schemes. Failure to comply with an 
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amended VAT Directive on meat products could result in financial penalties being incurred 
and exposure to additional VAT costs which will directly affect profitability. There could also 
be problems with customer relationships if VAT is not accounted for correctly as companies 
will have to spend valuable time resolving issues. The Commission is currently working on 
amended measures to better enforce VAT requirements due to a recent report on the VAT 
gap, which estimates that €177 billion in VAT revenues was lost due to non-compliance or 
non-collection in 2012 .  
d.  Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Because VAT is set and regulated at the EU level, it is important and technically necessary to 
coordinate the instrument at the EU level to avoid fragmenting the internal market, to maintain 
a level playing field and to avoid the development of excessive tans-boundary purchases. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
There could be concerted political resistance to such a VAT increase on meat products, 
argued on the basis that meat is nutritionally important. Further, the meat sector is 
economically important and subject to considerable price competition. Applying the standard 
VAT rate for meat products may also be opposed by consumer groups who may see the 
measure as government interference in the dietary and lifestyle choices of individual 
consumers. However, public acceptability of a tax on meat can be increased if the tax is part 
of a well-designed (green) tax reform, which implies that it is not perceived as an additional 
burden but it helps reducing existing taxes. Public acceptability would also be supported if the 
health grounds of the tax were highlighted. 
A possible approach to overcome the above mentioned barriers is to apply the measure to a 
pilot set of MS where the measure is more likely to achieve success. Most Member States 
have reduced rate VAT on all basic food products, with some having zero rates (UK, Ireland, 
Cyprus, Malta) and others taxing food at the standard rate (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). As there are also variations in the standard rates of VAT, 
the differential between the standard rate and that applied to meat products varies from 0% 
(Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia) to 21% (Ireland). 
Therefore, in Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia meat products 
may already be subject to higher rates compared to the MS which have reduced rates for 
most food products. Further research could be carried out to determine how the standard VAT 
rate effects meat production and consumption in these six MS compared to those who use 
reduced MS. Furthermore, pilot testing could be performed for those MS whose price 
changes would be less significant should they apply standard VAT meat products. According 
to Table 18, such MS could be Finland, Greece, Spain and Austria as the price change would 
be from 1 to 10% maximum compared to larger meat markets which would experience price 
changes of more than 10%. The logic behind this is that a less significant price change may 
be more acceptable to producers and consumers compared to much higher price changes. 
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Table 18: Predicted price change from imposing standard rate VAT on meat and dairy 
products (IVM 2008). 
Price Change  Member States 
0% 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia 
<5% Finland 
5-10% Greece, Spain, Austria 
10-15% 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Sweden 
>15% Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Portugal, UK 
 
Environmental impacts and effectiveness 
Demand for meat and dairy products is price inelastic. According to the IVM study, a 12% 
price increase would be expected to reduce demand for meat in the EU between 2% and 7%, 
and for dairy products between 2% and 5%. This could bring about a gross reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions of between 9.2 and 27.5 million tonnes CO2 equivalent for meat 
and between 3.4 and 6.9 million tonnes CO2 equivalent for dairy products (IVM, 2008). It 
should be noted that there is just one set of estimates on the impact of meat production and 
consumption on climate change and that other estimations and sources exist. Other 
environmental benefits of reduced consumption would include reductions in eutrophication 
and acidification, and reduced pressure on land use. 
Key expected economic impacts  
Increasing the VAT rate on environmentally harmful products that are currently taxed at a 
reduced rate could steer demand and supply in a more sustainable direction. The measure 
could also generate significant revenue and represent a tax harmonising measure (though it 
would introduce differences in VAT treatment of meat and other food products). The health 
benefits would reduce the burden on the health systems supported by Member State’s public 
finances. 
Key expected social impacts  
A VAT increase on meat could yield health benefits if there is an overall reduction in meat 
consumption. On the other hand, lower income consumers would probably have difficulty in 
adjusting their diet in response to a price change and there might be a regressive impact of 
the measure including a shift towards cheaper product types (IVM, 2008).  
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5.6 Revisions after ex-ante assessment 
The ex-ante assessment reveals a number of areas where the policy mix could be 
strengthened. It also points at some proposed policies as having a limited impact on delivery 
of the targets in comparison to the challenges associated with their implementation. 
A key gap in the policy mix is a general absence of quantified objectives for the individual 
measures, particularly on the production side – for example, on reform of the CAP, on the 
introduction of a land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) regulation, on revised 
limits under the National Emissions Ceilings Directive. The absence of quantified objectives 
for the individual consumption measures, on the other hand, reflects their largely uncertain 
impact on actual behaviour. This challenge of quantification at an individual policy level in part 
reflects the lack of an overall metric focused on resource-efficiency issues in respect of land 
use. The development of an indicator to reflect the EU’s net land use impact is proposed as 
an accompanying measure to the policy mix; but should instead be treated as a key element 
in the policy mix itself, as a mechanism for focusing policymakers’ attention on resource 
efficiency in this sector.   
5.6.1 Production-side policies 
The production side policies we suggested appear to require a strengthening through clearer 
numerical targets. Accompanying this, we recommend an increased focus on accompanying 
measures for agricultural businesses and the agricultural workforce, in order both to ensure 
that environmental impacts are addressed in ways which improve resource use efficiency, 
and to address potential social impacts of the transition.  Moreover, the assessments, and the 
conclusions we draw from them below, point to the need for an integrated approach to land as 
a resource, given competing pressures for services (energy, food, recreation, and 
biodiversity). We recommend that the EU (insofar as its competences are affected) and its 
Member States address this need through the development of an integrated long-term 
strategy for land use.  
Particular changes to individual instruments that could be introduced include: 
Stronger and more effective environmental and climate dimension in the Common 
Agricultural Policy - Clear, quantified objectives should be developed for relevant 
environmental impacts of agriculture, and the allocation of funding under the CAP should be 
linked to the delivery of those objectives, broken down at national and regional level as 
appropriate. Objectives could cover issues such as (i) net greenhouse gas emissions; (ii) a 
reduction in emissions of key air and water pollutants; and, potentially, (iii) the sustainable 
productivity of agriculture, in order to ensure that other environmental objectives are not met 
at the expense of an increase in the EU’s net land use.  
Revised National Emissions Ceilings Directive targets -  In principle, clear targets for the 
agriculture sector under the National Emissions Ceilings Directive would be valuable. The 
Directive’s approach is to apply targets across sectors; however, for ammonia, the main 
source for emissions is the agriculture sector, particularly from fertiliser and manure 
application. The Commission proposal in its package of measures for revision of the Directive 
is for a 27% reduction, which seems to the policy mix authors to be appropriate, although 
greater ambition is also possible. Translating the NECD into clearer expectations of the need 
for reduced emissions from the agriculture sector in individual Member States would help to 
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create the conditions in which individual farmers, and the upstream supply chain in terms of 
manufacturers of fertiliser and other inputs, can plan and innovate.  
Payment for ecosystem services – the lack of precision in the policy as described makes it 
difficult to assess its potential impact. Indeed, it seems likely that in the relatively limited and 
voluntary approach set out, while it helps to avoid public acceptability risks, and also helps to 
avoid potential perverse incentives of a regulatory approach to payment for ecosystem 
services, limits its potential to effect change. While no changes are required to this policy 
instrument, further work to identify approaches which enable it to exert more leverage over 
environmental outcomes could be explored – for example, whether water undertakings might 
be required to develop such payment systems in certain circumstances. It also looks unlikely 
that the instrument would be capable of contributing significantly to improved resource 
efficiency. 
Regulation for Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry – the key finding from the 
qualitative assessment is the importance of careful design of this instrument to ensure that it 
delivers additional climate mitigation, rather than simply being used to offset the requirements 
for emissions reduction in other sectors of the economy. While, as noted by the social 
assessment, there are potential benefits in terms of reduced costs from broadening the scope 
of EU climate action, this would negate the contribution of a LULUCF regulation to increased 
mitigation ambition. Recent reports and policy papers (e.g., Nesbit et al. 2015b) have noted 
the importance of LULUCF action contributing to an increased level of EU mitigation ambition. 
The policy proposal therefore needs to be understood in this sense.  
Strengthened Pesticide Reduction Targets – The reliance on targets, combined with 
flexibility for implementation of supporting instruments at Member State level, means that it 
proved difficult to assess this instrument with precision. However, it seems likely from the 
economic, social and environmental assessments that the more effective element of the 
policy combination to support targets would be the provision of advice to farm businesses on 
improved pesticide management using significantly lower volumes of active ingredients. An 
enhanced emphasis on this aspect would therefore be valuable, as could improved 
integration into the separate measure for a stronger and more effective Common Agricultural 
Policy.  
5.6.2 Consumption-side policies 
A clear distinction emerges from the assessments between policies which are more 
constraining, or likely to increase prices (such as the imposition of VAT on meat products), 
and those which are based on voluntary measures (such as the information campaign). The 
former are likely to provoke significant public opposition. The physical and environmental 
component of the quantitative assessment, which (it is important to note) assumed that the 
policy instruments were fully effective in driving change, underlines the potential contribution 
to achieving environmental objectives, particularly climate change mitigation, of action on food 
consumption. The social assessment notes the potential benefits for health. However, it is 
clear from other areas of the qualitative assessement that significant shifts in behaviour are 
unlikely to be provoked by information instruments alone. The instruments in this policy mix 
should therefore be considered as a sequenced approach, ensuring, first, that there is an 
improved public understanding of the impact of food consumption on resource efficiency, land 
use, and climate change; using this improved understanding to drive voluntary change; and 
then allowing for the progressive introduction of more constraining measures (including 
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taxation) once a sufficient shift has occurred in public opinion. A parallel can be drawn to the 
shift in attitudes (and regulatory approaches) to tobacco consumption over recent decades. 
However, this is an optimistic scenario, and alternative approaches need to be considered in 
the event of delays in the paradigm shift. Approaches which, as explored below in relation to 
tax instruments, make clear the trade-off between action on food (including meat and dairy 
consumption and food waste) and increased action in other areas of the EU’s overall climate 
and resource use footprint, could be considered in this context.  
Targeted information campaign to influence food behaviour – The context of the findings 
from the assessments need to be considered carefully: for example, differences in approach 
explain the difference between the optimistic findings of the physical and environmental 
assessment, which considered the potential impact of this instrument assuming it was fully 
effective in driving a shift in consumption patterns, and the results of the qualitative 
assessments, which note that the provision of information is unlikely, on its own, to provoke a 
significant change in behaviour. The information campaign is therefore best considered as a 
contribution to progressively changing the terms of political debate, with the added benefit of 
an impact, in the short term, on behaviour. Moreover, it should best be considered as a range 
of targeted campaigns, using the techniques informed by a careful understanding of heuristics 
applied to purchasing, cooking and eating habits, targeted on individual countries, regions, 
and consumer groups.  
Development of food redistribution programmes -   This instrument is viewed positively by 
all the assessments, although differences emerge in assessment of the scale of the impact. It 
should be noted that the relatively high impacts noted in the qualitative environmental 
assessment (Besbit et al. 2015a) are based on consideration only of the food currently 
wasted in retail, rather than in relation to food consumption as a whole. A key element in 
improving the impact of such programmes emerges from the economic assessment as the 
need for a favourable VAT regime. Finally, the recent introduction of legislation in France26 
requiring food shops to make available unsold food for charitable redistribution suggests that 
a more direct approach may be possible – it will therefore be important for policymakers at EU 
level and in other Member States to take advantage of policy evaluations of the French 
legislation as its implementation progresses. 
Value added tax on meat products – the assessments suggest that this instrument is at the 
same potentially highly controversial, difficult to secure at EU level, regressive in its social 
impacts, and unlikely to be fully effective in shifting consumption patterns. It is therefore 
unlikely to be a good candidate for early implementation. However, it is the only constraining 
instrument in our policy mix, and (in the absence of signs of a voluntary shift in consumption 
behaviour) may need to be considered further; paradoxically, however, its introduction would 
be politically more challenging in the absence of a shift in attitudes to meat products. 
Adaptations including a progressive introduction focusing first on ruminant products with the 
highest greenhouse gas impacts could be considered as a means of facilitating its 
implementation. Policy work could also consider (given the need for progressively reduced 
hard limits on global greenhouse gas emissions, and the likelihood that food consumption will, 
in the absence of significant consumption shifts, take up an increasingly significant share of 
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 LOI n° 2016-138 du 11 février 2016 relative à la lutte contre le gaspillage alimentaire 
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the available budget for anthropogenic emissions) an approach which explicitly addressed the 
currently implicit trade-offs between mitigation action on food consumption and mitigation 
action in other areas of the economy. For example, targets could be set for a gradually 
declining level of consumption emissions from food, with a commitment to introduce taxation 
measures if consumption significantly exceeded those targets, and a recycling of the products 
of any such tax to social payments to compensate poorer households and/or the purchase of 
emissions reductions from other sectors of the economy in the form of emissions trading 
system permits.  
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6 A policy mix for metals and competing materials 
This policy mix aims to reduce the use of virgin metals, without significantly increasing the use 
of other resources or other environmental impacts. It aims to do so through an increase in 
materials recycling, improved material efficiency, the substitution of metals for other materials 
when this is environmentally justified, and environmental improvements in the processes and 
systems involved. The policy mix takes metals use as a starting point; however, in order to 
avoid burden-shifting, it accounts also for the use of other materials and, to some extent, for 
environmental impacts in general. The scope of the policy mix becomes so broad it resembles 
the scope of the overarching policy mix. However, there are important differences in the 
selection and design of the individual instruments.  
The aim to reduce the use of virgin metals relates directly to one of the overall targets for the 
DYNAMIX project: to reduce the consumption of virgin metals in the EU by 80 % compared to 
2010 levels, measured as tonnes of raw material consumption (RMC) (Umpfenbach 2013). 
The RMC is the quantity of material that is extracted anywhere in the world for producing 
products that are consumed in the EU, i.e., domestic extraction plus imports minus exports. 
For metals, the material extracted is the gross ore extracted from mines. This means that the 
policy mix does not primarily address the extraction of metal ores in the EU, but the use of 
metals and metal products within EU. 
It should be noted that the methodology for calculating RMC is still being developed and 
currently limited by the availability of data on trade flows. Trade statistics mainly track the 
economic value of products. Calculation of the RMC requires data on the mass flows, and the 
weight of materials is often estimated using average commodity prices that are typically not 
constant. 
6.1 The current problem situation, drivers and barriers 
Modern society uses a large number of metals in countless products: from buildings and 
infrastructure to electronics. Although often recyclable, metals are a finite resource. Some 
metals, like iron (the main component in steel) and aluminium, are abundant and used in very 
large quantities. Many metals are rare, however. They might be available only in very low 
concentrations and require resource intensive mining that causes severe pollution (Bringezu 
et al. 2009). Mineable ores might also exist at only a few locations globally, which can make 
them the driver of armed conflicts and other social problems.  
The production of metals from ores requires large quantities of energy resources. The metals 
industry is responsible for more than 6% of the global energy demand (IEA 2015). Much of 
this is coal for the iron and steel industry and electricity for aluminium production. Metals 
smelters are also important point sources for emissions of heavy metals.  
Making the use of metals more efficient could allow society to maintain or increase the well-
being while saving not only metals resources but also energy resources and reducing 
environmental impacts. 
6.1.1 Current trends in primary metal use  
The current RMC of metals in the EU-27 is 600-800 Mt/year (see Figure 15). It is dominated 
by iron, copper, and gold. Gold and copper are used in smaller quantities compared to, for 
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example aluminium. They are still important for the RMC total because the indicator is 
measured not by the weight of the finishes metal but by the weight of the gross ore. Large 
quantities of gold ore (in particular) are extracted to produce the gold used in Europe, 
because of the very low metal content in gold ore.  
This is apparent with gold. As gold is used for investment and to physically ‘store’ wealth, gold 
stocks in countries are constantly traded and not ‘consumed’ as such in an economy. Gross 
gold imports and exports can vary significantly from one year to another, due to fluctuations in 
central bank reserves, exchange traded funds and speculation. This results in a net import 
(shown in Figure 15) that is sometimes large and sometimes slightly negative.  
 
 
Figure 15: Metal use in the EU-27 (Eurostat 2013b). 
 
Over the rather short time period in Figure 15 (2000-2011), there was a general increase in 
metal ore consumption: +2.3% annual average growth. The consumption of almost all metals 
declined temporarily during the economic crisis. However, the net import of gold increased at 
the same time, keeping the total RMC of metals almost constant through the crisis. 
Figure 16 below shows a crude estimate of the metal uses and stocks in the EU-27 in 2003 
as well as projections for 2035. In 2003 the EU had accumulated about 3200 Mt of metal 
products. Besides the metals in use, estimates are also given for the amount of metal 
resources in society that are wasted and stored in landfills that potentially could be used. In 
2003 this unused metal stocks in landfills represented about 2250 Mt. With continued virgin 
metal consumption the metal stocks in society and landfills are expected to continue to 
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Figure 16: Metal stocks in the EU-27 (Schmidt 2010)27. 
 
6.1.2 Main drivers of metal use  
Since the metals RMC is dominated by iron, copper and gold, this section focusses on the 
drivers for the use of these metals. This will also capture important drivers for most other 
metals, since they are used at least in part in the same applications.  
Metals are used in all sectors of the economy. The use of metals has a very large number of 
drivers and these affect each other in a complex web of causal relationships. The Sensitivity 
Model allows us to present a simplified version of this web, where we select only 20-40 
variables out of the almost infinite number of variables in the real economy (see Figure 17 
below and Box 1 in Section 2.3.3). We can also select to present only the strongest causal 
relationships between these variables: the arrows in the Effect System in Figure 17. Note that 
besides these strong relationships, there are many more, weaker relationships between the 
variables in the Sensitivity Model. 
                                               
27
 Estimates measured in actual weight of product, does not take into consideration the actual metal 
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Figure 17: The Effect System from the Sensitivity Model illustrates a few of the most 
important causal relationships in the system affected by the metals policy mix. Solid 
arrows illustrate a positive causality, where an increase in one variable causes an 
increase in the other. Dotted arrows illustrate negative causality, where an increase in 
one variable causes a reduction in the other. 
 
All causal relationships in the Sensitivity Model are accounted for in the map of the systemic 
role of all variables in Figure 18. This map shows to what extent a variable affects other 
variables in the system and to what extent it is affected by other variables. For example, 
Figure 18 indicates that the economic instability (Variable 24) and the demand for short-term 
profit (Variable 25) are active variables that have a great impact on other variables but are not 
much affected by the other variables. In the other corner, the contribution to global warming 
(Variable 8) and the use of “other materials” (Variable 6) reactive variables, which means they 
are strongly affected by other variables but do not have a great impact on other variables. The 
economic growth (Variable 22) is the most critical variable, which means it is both strongly 
affected by other variables (e.g., competitiveness, rate of innovation, and economic instability; 
see Figure 17) and has a strong impact on other variables (e.g., use of energy, construction 
of buildings, and demand for short-term profit). In the opposite corner, the use of coins and 
bars (Variable 15) and jewellery (Variable 16) are buffering or isolated: they are affected by 
few other variables and have an impact on few other variables in the system.  
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Figure 18: map of the systemic role of the variables in Figure 17. Note that this map 
takes all causal relationships into account, while Figure 17 only includes the strongest 
relationships. 
 
Looking deeper into the causal relationships, iron is mainly used for the production of steel. 
Steel is to a large extent used for the construction and maintenance of buildings and 
infrastructure (56% globally, 35% in the EU), but also in machines, vehicles and many other 
products (Allwood and Cullen 2012; Eurofer 2014). This means that expansion and 
replacement of infrastructure, housing and commercial buildings are important drivers for 
steel use (Variable 1 in Figure 17). The growth of transport equipment, machinery and 
appliances is also a significant driver. All of these are closely linked to economic growth 
(Variable 22). However, according to Allwood et al. (2013), there is evidence that per capita 
requirements for steel stocks saturate around 10 tonnes per person. Figure 19 shows that 
beyond a certain level of economic development (measured by GDP per capita) iron ore 
consumption is not related to economic growth. For further discussion on the future use of 
steel, see Annex A. 
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Figure 19: Annual consumption of iron ore consumption per capita seems to stabilise 
after a certain level of GDP per capita is reached (based on data from Eurostat). 
 
If kept pure, steel can in theory be indefinitely recycled. It is estimated that some 80% of post-
consumer steel is recycled (DTI et al. 2013)28. The recycling rates are the highest for heavy 
structures, motor vehicles and machinery (85-95%) and lower for smaller appliances and 
packaging, etc. (around 50%). At present about 38% of high-alloyed steel and 41% of low-
alloyed steel used in the economy is from recycled iron and steel. That means 62% of high-
alloyed steel and 59% of low-alloyed steel is based on primary raw material (UNEP 2011a). 
The future potential for recycling rates is bounded by cumulated alloys in the metal. Many 
alloy metals can be removed from the steel in the recycling process but a few remain, for 
example, copper. An estimated 4 kg of copper contaminates the flow for each tonne of steel 
recycled from old machinery (Kakudate et al. 2000). This is not a problem as long as most of 
the steel is produced from ore (Allwood and Cullen 2012), but when global steel use no longer 
increases significantly, copper contamination is likely to limit the potential recycling rate of 
steel (Ekvall et al. 2014).  
Our application of the Sensitivity Model did not result in any strong causal relationships to the 
use of copper (Variable 2 in Figure 17). However, Figure 18 shows it to be almost as much 
affected by other variables as the use of aluminium (Variable 4). The explanation is that 
copper use is affected by several other variables in the Sensitivity Model, but that each driver 
for the use of copper is somewhat weaker, compared to the drivers for aluminium use. 
The major current applications of copper are in electrical wires (about 60%), construction 
(e.g., roofing and plumbing) (about 25%) and industrial machinery (about 10%) (European 
Copper Institute 2014). Wires are used to transport electric energy over long distances and 
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 The International Resource Panel provide global figures that range from 52% to 90% (UNEP 
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within most electric products. Hence, the expansion of electricity systems (including, for 
example, the requirement for connecting new renewables capacity to grids) and production of 
electrical products are important drivers for copper use. Similar to steel, the demand for new 
buildings, infrastructure, transport equipment, machinery and appliances (very much linked 
with economic growth) also drives the demand for copper. Copper consumption per capita 
seems to be linked to GDP per capita - at least until about 12-14 kg per capita29. For further 
discussion on the future use of copper, see Annex A. 
Because of its high value, most of the copper in used products is recovered for recycling. 
Copper recycling is not limited by alloys because all contamination is removed when recycling 
copper. However, the copper that ends up in steel scrap is lost and unavailable for recycling. 
Estimates of the total recycling of copper in global post-consumer scrap range from 43% to 
53% (UNEP 2011a). At present about 27% of copper demand is satisfied by secondary raw 
materials.   
The pattern of gold use is quite different from iron and copper. Most of it is used because of 
its symbolic value to produce jewellery (about 50%) and for investments such as coins and 
bars (about 40%) (World Gold Council 2014). Only smaller quantities of gold (10%) are used 
for its technical properties in electronic products, chemical industry, embroidery, etc. Coins 
and bars are used as safe investments during economic disruption. Such gold use is driven 
by the need for economic safety rather than by economic growth. The use of gold in jewellery, 
on the other hand, might be driven to a large extent by the desire to signal status, or by the 
urge to show love and affection. This is relatively independent from economic growth, 
although it might be affected by changes in the income inequalities and the distribution of 
wealth within a country. The gold in coins, bars and jewellery is easy to recycle. Gold on 
printed circuit boards from electronic products can also be recycled, but requires special 
sorting and dismantling. The recycling rate of gold in global post-consumer scrap has been 
estimated to be 96%, if remelting of jewellery and coins is accounted for. If gold in coins, bars 
and jewellery are excluded, the recycling rate might be as low as 15-20% (UNEP 2011a). 
Besides an expected increase in global demand (particularly from the emerging economies 
due to rises in income and GDP) for buildings, infrastructure, vehicles, machinery and 
appliances, the demand for both bulk and rare metals is also expected to rise for the 
emerging technologies (including renewable energy technologies) (European Commission 
2010b). 
Current EU policy influences the collection and recycling of metals through difference waste 
legislation such as the End of Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive and the Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive. This has helped to underpin the recovery 
infrastructure and scrap market in most EU Member States, including for metals with 
significant externalities but limited commercial recycling potential. Strict environmental 
regulation and high energy costs, however, result in much metal scrap being exported to 
countries outside the EU to be reprocessed (DTI et al. 2013).   
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 Based on domestic material consumption (DMC) data from Eurostat for EU from 2000 to 2011. 
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6.1.3 Main barriers to reducing consumption of virgin metal ores and to 
increasing material efficiency of metals  
According to Allwood and Cullen (2012), it is technically possible to reduce global metal 
production by 30% without loss of final service, simply through better design. McKinsey 
(2011) estimates that steel demand in 2030 could be reduced by 13% even when taking into 
consideration the increased global demand for steel for products, transport, buildings and 
infrastructure. Although a significant decrease, these figures are far from the DYNAMIX target 
to reduce the consumption of virgin metals in the EU by 80 % (Umpfenbach 2013). 
A barrier to decoupling consumption of virgin metals from economic growth is the 
predominant business model of current industrial systems. Companies base their revenue on 
the sale of products. The revenues and profit of the companies typically increase if they sell a 
greater number of products. This drives an increase in the use of metals and other materials. 
The responsibility and opportunity to recover and reuse the product or recover and recycle the 
material are transferred to the end of the service life of the product.  
There are many reasons why companies are not shifting to more service / functional /circular 
economy-based business models (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2012). These include 
financial barriers (e.g., investment costs, payback period, lack of capital, the fact that old 
products are written off), market failures (e.g., lacking information on the total cost of 
ownership30, split incentives31) as well as organisational reasons (e.g., developing new 
offerings, not seeing downstream activities as part of the business, redefining companies core 
business32, high risk33, access to end-users34, lack of reverse logistics infrastructure35, etc.) 
(Oakdene Hollins 2011). It is also challenging to generate demand for service-based 
equipment use, since individual and corporate consumers have assumptions which are 
potentially hard to shift about the need for ownership in order to ensure control and 
availability.  
                                               
30
 For example, when companies or consumers buy products, they do not have complete information of 
the life time and actual performance of the product, nor of, e.g., the costs of maintenance and repair. 
31
 Split incentives are when improvement efforts done by one value chain actor only benefits others and 
not themselves, e.g. design for disassembly does not benefit manufacturers, if they are not involved 
in end-of-life collection and waste management 
32
 For example, a manufacturing company is good at manufacturing products through mass production. 
A mining company is good at mining. Both types of firms would have to acquire new competencies to 
deal with the collection of used products as this is typically done by other types of companies. 
33
 When selling services instead of products, the ownership of the product remains with the service 
provider. The performance of the product is partly determined by the user, e.g. driving a car on a 
gravel road will increase the risk of stones hitting the car and damaging it, but it is the service provider 
that bears the costs if damages happen. Another example is a company that remanufactures 
products never knows exactly when used products will be returned. There is a higher risk of variability 
of supply. 
34
 A metal processing company does not always have direct access to end-users of final products. 
Consumers may only be in contact with manufacturers of final products or sometimes only retail 
companies. At the product's end-of-life, waste management firms collect used products, but the 
recycling and remanufacturing companies rarely have direct access to the end-users.  
35
 Reverse logistics is when a company set up its own take back system. It is an investment for a single 
company to establish a system that allows products to be sent directly back to the original producers.   
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Part of the metals produced is lost as production waste in the metals and the manufacturing 
industry. A barrier to reducing losses during production is the relatively low costs of materials 
compared to the (often perceived) high effort needed to reduce losses, in particular labour 
costs (Allwood and Cullen 2012). This is in part because external costs of environmental and 
social impacts are not included in the price of the metals. The external costs could in principle 
be internalised through environmental taxes and/or fees. However, as most of the metals 
consumed in the EU are mined outside the EU and sold on global commodity markets, it is 
not sufficient to internalise environmental and social costs that occur as a result of European 
mining. 
There are indications that developed economies could feasibly satisfy most of their demand 
for metals through recycling and other closed-loop strategies based on existing stocks in the 
economy36 (Allwood et al. 2013). Developing economies (including some EU Member States) 
may not be able to achieve a closed-loop economy until their metal stocks have grown to a 
sufficient size. This is related to investment in capital goods, new infrastructure and buildings.  
High income levels and the relatively low cost of materials (including metals) has led to 
consumption patterns where products are discarded before the end of their (functional) 
technical life. In some cases, for example where energy efficiency improvements have 
reduced both environmental impacts and economic costs in use, it may represent the most 
sustainable choice currently available. In most cases, though, it results in a higher resource 
use than necessary. One reason for these consumption patterns is that it may be less costly 
to buy a new product than to repair the old one. Or it can also be due to consumerism, where 
people strive to be visibly materially better off than others. A culture of high and continuously 
growing levels of consumption, generally associated with well-being and success, has 
become the norm in western European countries (EEA 2012). Conspicuous consumption, 
where there is heavy societal pressure to maintain high consumption patterns and where 
competitive spending and displays of wealth are encouraged by society, is becoming 
common-place around the world (WBCSD 2008).  
Metals are mostly used in durable goods. Private ownership of products and buildings 
sometimes results in infrequent use (e.g., power tools at home) and hoarding / storage of 
unused products. There are also barriers related to prolonging the life of products. For 
example, no market demand for second hand goods; lack of replacement / repair / 
refurbishment / upgrade possibilities; changing user needs; new products are more attractive 
(often driven by marketing). Technical barriers also exist such as the degradation of products 
(including corrosion / dirt / wear); increased risks of failure / decreased reliability; lacking skills 
in design for durability / refurbishment / upgrade; and, new more efficient technologies that 
encourage replacement.  
There is still significant scope for reuse and recycling, but it is expensive (and more time and 
labour intensive). A lack of supply for spare parts can also hinder reuse and remanufacturing 
business models. Moreover, reuse is discouraged by technical barriers in the form of safety 
                                               
36
 The EU exports a lot of its scrap metal, used products and cars. The amount of material corresponds 
to its imports. For steel, it is not so much the costs of collecting the waste materials, but the remelting 
facilities in the EU are old and expensive. Other countries have more modern facilities or pay less for 
the (often subsidized) energy. 
 Development of DYNAMIX Policy Mixes – Revised deliverable D4.2 
Page 177  | 
(and hygiene) standards; guarantees of quality; and, old products not designed for future 
reuse (e.g., forwards and backwards compatibility). 
The barriers to using less metals by design are, according to Allwood and Cullen (2012): 
• Economic – it is often cheaper to use a larger amount of metals than needed, instead 
of paying the costs of using less37 through, for example, better design. Manufacturing 
minimum weight designs may cost more. 
• Technical - requirements / over-specification of design loads (e.g., higher loads during 
installation than in service). Asymmetrical risks of using less metal (manufacturers, for 
example, often choose to use extra materials to ensure a robust and reliable 
component/product than to carry the risk of component/product failure38). Optimised 
components may be less robust than those with excess capacity. 
• Behavioural - customers may perceive lighter weight products as lower quality. With 
cars, customers expect more functionality or space. Consumers may be resistant to 
buying services rather than products because of lack of confidence in availability on 
demand. They may also be unaware of the negative impacts of the metals in the 
goods they buy because rare metals that are produced at a high environmental cost 
are hidden inside electric and electronic products. 
 
6.2 Targets and lines of intervention in the policy area 
6.2.1 Targets for 2050 
Baseline without the policy mix 
Gustavsson et al. (2013) developed a series of background scenarios that describe how 
society and the economy might develop without the intervention of any new policy (cf. Section 
2.5). The surprise-free Reference scenario includes a relative decoupling between the 
economy and resource use in general. This decoupling is due to technological innovations 
partly driven by the economy, where a global economic growth leads to increasing prices of 
natural resources. The technological progression and innovation is described by the variable 
Total Factor Productivity that, in the Reference scenario, increases by 1% annually while 
GDP increases by 1.4% annually in the EU. This means that total resource use increases 
slowly.  
For metals, we assume that metal use will continue to increase with GDP, without the policy 
mix for metals and other materials, but that it will level off and stabilise with the net additions 
of metals to societal stocks completed by 2050 (Umpfenbach 2013).  
                                               
37
 The costs of an architect or engineer to optimise a design is often much higher than the material 
savings that would be achieved. For mass production it might make sense, but for products produced 
in low quantities, e.g. buildings, the additional time of a designer is not justified. 
38
 E.g. a thinner wall thickness of a metal container risks being damaged more easily. 
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Alternative end-point sought 
The DYNAMIX policy target for metals is that the extraction of virgin metals for EU 
consumption, measured as RMC, is reduced by 80%: from above 700 Mtonnes in 2010 (see 
Figure 15) to 150 Mtonnes in 2050. An overall reduction as large as 80% requires a 
significant reduction in the use of the most common metal ores such as iron, copper and gold 
ores.  
We also want the 2050 target for metals to be met without a significant increase in the use of 
other resources or other environmental impacts. 
Although the reduction of the use of other metals is also an important goal, this policy mix will 
focus on the consumption of the main bulk metals such as ferrous metals, copper, 
aluminium39 and gold. The use of the other metals are already linked with the use of the main 
metals (they are used in the same applications) and some of the most important drivers for 
demand are the same. We acknowledge, however, that the measures for addressing 
resource efficiency of bulk metals and functional metals40 are not exactly the same. The policy 
assessment will include a specific focus on whether the proposed measures for bulk metals 
also contribute to improving the critical situation for rare metals. It will also address the risk of 
unintended consequences through increased use of alternative materials. 
Lines of intervention 
The decrease in the use of virgin metals can be achieved through a combination of reduced 
total use of metals in general and increased levels of recycling, which can be broken down 
into the following broad lines of intervention (with very rough estimates of their impacts): 
Reduced use of metals: 
• Technical redesign of existing metal products to use in average 30% less material (cf. 
Allwood and Cullen 2012).   
• Substitution of 20% of the metal with alternative materials when this is environmentally 
justified, or through a shift from metal products to services that deliver the same 
functions. 
• A 40% decrease in demand for metals products and services using metals products 
through a combination of changes in consumption patterns, greater longevity and 
increased reparability of products and/or their parts, etc.  
Increased recycling: 
• A 20% increase in the recycling rate of post-consumer metal scrap. 
 
                                               
39
 Aluminium is considered as a focus material to ensure that the consumption of steel and copper is 
not substituted with aluminium. Aluminium is also one of the major metals used in the economy and 
vital for many technologies in the future. 
40
 Bulk metals are metals such as steel, aluminium and copper that are used in large quantities mainly 
for their structural properties. Special or functional/technological metals are used in small quantities in 
alloys; magnets and electronics to enhance the properties of other materials. 
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6.2.2 Conditions conducive to the lines of intervention  
1) Improved data on metal flows, economic and environmental impacts attributable to metal 
flows, and awareness of the potential for reduced metal flows: 
• Increased resourcing for statistics agencies working on material flow accounts, and 
increased data collection on metal content in products. 
• Agreement at OECD or UN level on statistical conventions on methodology. 
• Economic research on the role of metal reduction in increasing balance of trade and 
productivity, and the consequent impact on economic performance. 
• Established procedures for an accurate assessment of the global environmental 
impacts of metals. 
2) Technical redesign for reduced use of material needs: 
• Increase in the relative price of metals and other materials (for example through the 
internalisation of external environmental and social costs),41 compared to the labour 
costs associated to the redesign (the redesign itself, and the use of the redesigned 
product). 
• Removal of barriers to adoption of redesigned products, such as compatibility with 
other related practices (e.g., house building), inertia in consumer choices, and lack of 
familiarity in new designs. 
3) Substitution of current metal products to alternative, less metal-intensive products and 
services (e.g., car sharing) needs: 
• The relative price of low-metal products and services becomes low enough to 
overcome inertia in the behaviours of consumers (NB: the cost of the metal is often a 
small part of final product cost). 
• Specific metal products (e.g., beams or water pipes in construction) are banned if they 
have readily-available and cost-effective alternatives (e.g., wooden beams and 
polymer pipes).  
• Supplier profits from lower-metal products/service are sufficiently higher than existing 
products and overcome transition costs/inertia (e.g., in business models, or promoting 
heavy marketing promoting change) and induce innovation into lower-metal products. 
• Creation of alternative forms of economic safety or trust to substitute the use of gold 
(or other high-value metals) for investment purposes or speculation. 
4) Decrease in the final demand for products/services containing metals, which can be 
obtained through: 
4i) Increased sharing of tools, vehicles and appliances, and more efficient use of transport 
infrastructure and buildings: 
• Relative price of ownership of good is sufficiently high compared to the costs of 
sharing, both actual and perceived, and including the costs/benefits of in/convenience. 
                                               
41
 The external costs should be internalized not only for metals but also for other materials to avoid 
shifting from metals to other materials when this is not environmentally justified. 
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• A mature market for equipment services is developed, with sufficient availability and 
awareness of goods that can be shared, and/or of business models for sharing, with 
increased individual and business confidence that fully satisfactory availability of 
equipment can be achieved.  
4ii) Reduced demand for transport and for the use of material products, such as appliances, 
furniture, cooking equipment, vehicles, and machinery: 
• Increased relative costs of material products compared to labour, sufficient to out-
weigh and go beyond the ongoing relative decrease in relative costs due to faster 
material productivity growth. 
• Alternative ways to satisfy individual drives for status, challenge, social-interaction, 
contribution, curiosity, which do not involve significant use of material products; and 
• Change in paradigm/mindset in what constitutes success or successful contribution. 
4iii) Increasing longevity of products and/or their parts: 
• The purchasing procedures avoids rewarding individual (or organisational) 
preferences for short-term decision making, so that longevity in a products with a long 
service-life can at least compete on equal footing (this could include internalising 
external environmental and social costs).  
• The market shifts so that introducing new products with short life doesn't pay. As an 
example of the problem to avoid, cellphone producers currently profit from releasing 
many new models and driving short-term demand. Potential drivers to change this 
would include a high-cost of full-product purchasing compared to leasing and upgrade, 
and also alternative ways (e.g., software) to demonstrate novelty or wealth. 
• New business models are developed based around leasing and sharing of products 
and equipment. 
5) Improved recycling rates, which will require: 
• Sufficiently secure and attractive rates of investment return in investments in high-
performance, integrated recycling technologies, taking into account the global virgin 
metal price. 
• Security of high volume supplies for high-performance recycling, including improved 
and expanded end-of-life collection (e.g., buildings, small WEEE). 
• Product design, end-of-life collection systems and dismantling technology that allows 
the separation of parts to allow increased recycling rates.42  
• Innovative and technically adept players in the recycling market. 
• Improved data on metals and other resource flows through the economy; and 
increased use of that data as a key variable to judge economic and sustainability 
performance of the EU and its Member States. 
                                               
42
 A high level of recycling requires that products are recovered after use and that the materials in the 
products are designed for recycling, carefully separated, and that integrated recycling processes are 
used (UN IRP/Reuter 2013). Particularly important is that almost all copper is separated from steel 
scrap in 2050. Any copper, from cables in machines etc., that remain in the steel scrap is lost from 
copper recycling and also reduces the maximum recycling rate of the steel (Ekvall et al. 2014).  
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6.2.3 Conditions for the mid-point 2030 
To reach the end-point outlined for the year 2050 in the previous subsection, policy and 
innovation will together have to have overcome 'systems lock-in' to the current patterns of 
(generally) increased use of metals. The drivers of that systems lock-in appear to be:  
On the macro-level 
• The growth of firms' profits through increased sales of material goods drives most of 
the economic behaviour (N.B. healthcare and software). 
• A large number of people, and invested capital, is engaged in greater sales of material 
goods. 
• Member States base their own financing (e.g., levels of taxation required to support 
provision of services) on economic growth. 
• Politics is highly influenced - through lobbies,voter paradigms, and assumptions about 
employment - by influences calling for more material growth. 
Micro-level 
• There is a need for improved skills and capacity, and perhaps also motivation, to 
supply low-metal solutions among, for example, architects and builders; skills and 
practical understanding are also unlikely to develop significantly without wider 
deployment of those solutions. 
• Consumers do not reward low-metal solutions (including the provision of metal 
products as services), but are highly influenced by other factors - including social 
norms and marketing. 
• Success and empowerment are often defined in terms of ownership (rather than 
access to) goods; until greater experience of leasing/shared ownership models 
changes cultural assumptions, individuals and businesses are likely to assume that 
secure access to equipment whenever needed requires them to have physical 
ownership. 
• Longer working hours place a higher value on convenience during leisure time (as well 
as during working hours) compared to cost-saving/environmental impacts. 
The lock-in has to be addressed before the final steps towards the end-point can be taken. To 
break the lock-in and be on the way to achievement of 2050 goals, it would be helpful if the 
following conditions (which themselves might be created without removing too much political 
or behavioural resistance) are fulfilled at the year 2030: 
• Statistics on metals and other resource flows through the economy have been 
improved and are used to assess the economic and sustainability performance of the 
EU and its Member States. 
• It has been convincingly demonstrated, and is widely (though not unanimously) 
accepted that the well-being of society is not dependent on increasing production and 
consumption of material goods. 
• Economic models for states exist (and are being used) which demonstrate sustainable 
economies do not need to rely on increasing material productivity for stability and 
success. 
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• At least in some significant mainstream areas, successful businesses are operating 
under regulatory conditions which reward ever less metals consumption. 
• A cohort of mechanical and materials engineers are able to design products for 
longevity, recyclability and repair/upgrade without any significant increase in costs; 
• Improved processes for recovery and separation of metals from used products have 
become widespread, and their costs reduced. 
• There are a wide range of well-understood, successful and popular business models 
based on leasing or shared ownership, with broadly positive customer experience; 
• Mainstream culture no longer views material wealth as the main criterion for success 
and status - as alternative ways to lead a connected, empowered, participatory life are 
widely available, and valued. Marketing promoting the alternative view is much less 
widespread. 
• The relative cost of metals for use in products is sufficiently high to trigger innovation 
in reducing use of metals - and there is a belief that it will continue to rise, relative to 
other costs. The cost of purchasing and using metals in the EU is not necessarily 
linked to the prices in the rest of the world (where prices are likely to have remained 
lower. 
• There is economic research, based on sufficiently reliable data, which shows the 
economic benefits of metals reduction as a significant, beneficial policy for economic 
progress. 
6.3 Policy objectives for the 2030 mid-point  
Various barriers need to be addressed to reach the conditions we wish for the year 2030 and 
the endpoint we aim for in 2050. There are many ways to address each barrier. This list is not 
exhaustive but gives some examples:  
• Economic barriers can be addressed through, for example: 
o Higher recovery value of metals. 
o Increased cost of metals and/or reduced relative cost of labour.  
• Business barriers: 
o Shifting to service-oriented business models. 
o Support businesses based on leasing and sharing of products. 
o Support repair, reuse and refurbishment businesses. 
• Infrastructure: 
o Develop infrastructure (e.g., recycling parks) to encourage take-back systems. 
o Standardise certain products and components (e.g., transformers and 
chargers), packaging, building elements to use as modules for a wide range of 
applications.  
• Conceptual/sociological barriers: 
o Change the view on material wealth as the main criteria for success and 
status.  
o Increase the desire for used goods and/or decrease the attractiveness of new 
consumption products (see, e.g., Norman 2004; Chapman 2005). 
o Invite consumers to make a more responsible use of metal-intensive 
commodities. 
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• Lack of information: 
o Clearly specify the material content on all products (cf. current declarations on 
food products). 
o Keep track of location and ownership of specific products (e.g., boats and cars) 
to be able to recover them for future use. 
o Develop instructions on how to best repair and/or dismantle products and 
include them in the purchase. 
o Report on failure / call back rates. 
• Lack of knowledge and skills: 
o Educated on new business models and life cycle thinking design such as 
design for reparability reuse, remanufacturing, recycling, etc. 
o Increase the ability to repair products through education and training. 
o Continue and strengthen the funding for research and development (R&D) in 
areas where increased knowledge and/or improved technology is vital for the 
aim of the policy. 
The financial crisis and increasing globalisation and delocalisation of production to countries 
with low production costs and reduced environmental regulation requires the stakeholders in 
EU-27 to look for new solutions. This can offer opportunities for changing the drivers and 
barriers and allow for increased resource efficiency. These might allow the policy-makers and 
the society to move the focus from the quantitative perspective (the more – consumption and 
production - the better) to the qualitative perspective (the better, the better ….). That is, 
producing less at a higher price to reflect the environmental costs, but high-quality products 
that can be well appreciated by final consumers (if they can afford them, thereby implying 
equity issues). 
6.4 The metals policy mix 
This section presents a set of policy instruments that could be implemented if the political will 
and sufficient stakeholder and public acceptance are there. It should be noted that there is as 
yet no plans to implement this policy mix. We do not yet know if the policy mix or the 
instruments in it are effective or feasible, because the mix has not yet been assessed. We do 
think, however, that the mix is promising enough to make the assessment interesting. 
Since the number of drivers and barriers at play is large, the number of potential policy 
instruments is very large. To allow for ex-ante assessment of the policy mix, we have striven 
to keep the number of instruments down. As a result, the policy mix is not likely to address all 
drivers and barriers mentioned above.  
We have selected five instruments that we think can be among the most important and/or 
where an assessment is particularly important or interesting. The five key instruments is a mix 
of economic instruments, public investments, and a regulatory instrument: 
• Internalisation of external environmental costs. 
• Tax on materials used in the EU. 
• Promotion of sharing systems. 
• Spending on research and development. 
• Product standards. 
Information on each of these main instruments is presented in a common structure below. 
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We have also outlined a mix of supporting and complementary instruments related to 
planning, information, economic instruments and public investments. These aim primarily to 
make the five main instruments more feasible to implement: 
• An EU strategy for dematerialisation. 
• Information campaigns. 
• Establishment of fora for communication. 
• Removal of environmentally harmful subsidies. 
• Establishment of advanced recycling centres. 
Although our policy mix includes most types of instruments, it does not include any clear-cut 
case of cooperation-based (voluntary) instruments. The internalisation of external costs, the 
materials tax, and the removal of harmful subsidies are all part of a green fiscal reform. The 
tax revenues and the reduced spending on harmful subsidies will be used by the 
governments for funding of other parts of the policy mix and for reducing labour taxes.  
Large parts of the policy mix do not have a clear focus on metals; instead they have an 
overarching touch. The reason for this is that we want to avoid simply shifting the burdens. If 
the policy mix makes the production and use of metals more expensive but does not affect 
the cost of polymers, wood, or concrete, there is a risk that material use shifts from metals to 
other materials in a way that increases total resource use and environmental impacts.  
6.4.1 Green fiscal reform: internalisation of external environmental costs  
Brief summary of the measure 
The internalisation of external environmental costs is part of a green fiscal reform in this policy 
mix. It entails a gradual increase in taxes and fees on emissions and natural resources until 
100% of the estimated environmental costs are internalised.  
The increased environmental taxes & fees (IET&F) discussed here are not metal-specific but 
include all natural resources that are extracted in Europe: raw materials, energy and water. It 
also includes emissions that occur in all economic sectors in Europe. This will help form a 
coherent package, increase material efficiency and, at the same time, avoid simply shifting of 
environmental burdens from the metals industry and metals products to other sectors or 
commodities: 
• Raw materials: these includes metal ores, but also the raw materials used to produce 
materials that clearly compete with metals (concrete, wood, etc.). Other raw materials 
(sand, gravel, etc.) are included in the instrument mainly to form a coherent whole but 
also to safeguard against burden shifting beyond what we expect today. 
• Energy resources: a significant share of the energy resources are used to produce 
commodities for metals production (coal used to produce coke for crude-iron 
production, fuel used to produce electricity for primary aluminium production, etc.; IEA 
2015). Oil and natural gas is used for producing polymers that compete with metals in 
certain applications. Energy resources used for other purposes are also relevant to 
include, because shifting from metals to other materials might affect the demand for 
energy resources in the manufacturing, use and waste management of the products. 
Including all energy resources in the instrument safeguards against simply shifting 
from metals products to products and services with a higher energy demand in these 
parts of the product life cycles. 
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• Water: water use could be affected when shifting from steel products to wood or other 
materials based on biomass. A shift from metals products to other solutions might also 
affect the water used in the manufacturing and use phase of the products. These 
effects might not be significant, and the external costs associated with the use of 
water are probably the least clearly connected to metals. However, the external costs 
of water use are still included in the instrument, partly to form a coherent whole and to 
safeguard against unknown risks of burden shifting.  
• Emissions: metals production and metals processing are important point sources for 
emissions of, for example, CO2 and heavy metals. The production of competing 
materials, such as concrete and polymers, is also associated with significant 
emissions. Shifting from metals to other materials will affect the emissions from 
manufacturing, use and/or waste management of the products. Including all emissions 
in the instrument safeguards against simply shifting from metals products to products 
and services with a higher environmental impact in the life cycle as a whole. 
In terms of economic flows and mechanisms, the words tax and fee are here synonymous. 
Policy-makers will choose to use the word that fits best in their political context. Both taxes 
and fees will be specified per kg of pollutant or ton of material. It will be paid to the national 
government. The revenues will be used to fund other policy instruments in the policy mix and 
to reduce taxes on labour.  
The implementation of IET&F will be spearheaded by a coalition of the willing Member States 
(MS). It will be expanded until, eventually, all of EU has implemented the instrument.  
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
Environmental taxes and fees already exist. This instrument means that they are gradually 
increased until 2050 (see below). They are also gradually expanded to further pollutants, 
resources, activities, sectors and countries until, in 2050, they cover the full scope of 
emissions and extracted resources in Europe. It is important that tax reforms are introduced 
gradually and have a long term perspective to allow time for those affected to adjust (UNEP 
2014b). Indexation of taxes is also important to maintain the real value of taxes over time and 
ensure government tax revenue as well as maintain the impact of the tax on relative prices 
and thereby on agents' behaviour (European Commission 2012a). 
b. What is its aim?  
In the context of the metals policy mix, the IET&F aim to increase material efficiency, reduce 
the demand for products and services that require metals and other materials, and also to 
increase recycling. Such effects can be expected because the production of materials is 
energy intensive compared to most other activities: it requires much energy and cause large 
emissions per MEUR of added value. The IET&F will affect the cost of materials production 
more than the cost of most other activities. This will increase the price of materials and quite 
possibly reduce the use of materials where such reductions are possible.  
In a broader context, the instrument also aims at increasing energy and water efficiency and 
at reducing pollution. Such effects can be expected because IET&F will make the use of 
energy and water and the emissions of pollutants more expensive. 
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Finally, the instrument aims at creating jobs. By making material and energy more expensive 
and reducing labour taxes, the instrument can shift the use of production factors in the 
economy from energy, water and materials to labour.  
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
All sectors and all points in the product life cycle where resources are used and pollutants 
emitted. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
In order to levy taxes, there must be a clear way of measuring or documenting the amount of 
resources used or emissions produced. Resource extraction and emissions of a large number 
of pollutants from factory chimneys and wastewater pipes can be measured with existing 
technology. Diffuse emissions from, e.g., landfills, agriculture and forestry would have to be 
estimated based on calculations. Methods for such calculations have to be harmonised and 
widely agreed upon.  
The external cost of each pollutant and resource has to be decided upon. This depends 
strongly on perspectives and methods used in the monetisation of health and environmental 
impacts. Deciding on the external costs will require a political consensus or negotiations 
procedure in EU-27. Scientific findings on the impacts of pollutants and resource extraction 
need to be used as basis or input to this procedure. 
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments within the same policy-mix 
There is an overlap with the other instruments in the green fiscal reform. In particular, if the 
materials tax is implemented, an IET&F can be regarded as a double punishment of materials 
use, because the IET&F will also affect the cost of using materials. This can reduce the 
acceptability of the instrument. 
The IET&F is likely to be more easily accepted if it is part of a coherent and more 
comprehensive policy package. If it is supported by information and combined with the 
removal of harmful subsidies and with environmental investments and subsidies in, e.g., 
sharing systems and in research and development, the coherency of the policy instrument 
might be more apparent and the acceptability of the IET&F might increase. These instruments 
are all part of the metals policy mix. The IET&F might also benefit from support through a joint 
EU strategy for sustainability, which has not been described as an element in this policy mix. 
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
As indicated above, the magnitude of external environmental costs cannot be objectively 
decided. The methods for estimating environmental costs vary widely depending on the 
source (e.g., Steen 1999a, Steen 1999b, Bickel & Friedrich 2005, Lindberg 2014).  
Several attempts to estimate total external costs have been made, using different methods. 
The EXIOPOL (2014) project estimated the global external costs to Euro 2.35 trillion in the 
year 2000, corresponding to less than 7% of the global GDP that year. In contrast, Trucost 
(2013, p.8) estimates the global external costs in 2009 to be US$7.3 trillion or 13% of global 
economic output that year. Referring to earlier sector-wise figures from Trucost, KPMG (2012) 
states that the global environmental impact in 2010 amounted to: 
• for mining: US$86 billion or 64% of sector earnings (p.113),  
• for metals production: US$69 billion or 71% of sector earnings (p.113), 
• for car manufacturing: US$33.7 billion or 22% of sector earnings (p.73), 
• for beverage production: US$35.4 billion or 42% of sector earnings (p.81), 
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• for chemicals production: US$43 billion or 43% of sector earnings (p.88), 
• for food production: US$200 billion or a full 224% of sector earnings (p.100), 
• for airlines: US$11.6 billion or 52% of sector earnings (p. 65), 
• for marine shipping: US$15.7 billion or 59% of sector earnings (p.106), and 
• for telecommunications, including internet: US$12 billion or just 2.5% of sector 
earnings (p.123).  
The level of the IET&F in the assessment models will be a very rough estimate of the 100% 
internalisation of external costs. This has several reasons: 
• The magnitude of external environmental costs cannot be objectively decided (as 
stated above).  
• Actual IET&F cannot be expected to accurately reflect the actual impacts on human 
health and environment. These impacts will often depend on the time and place when 
emissions occur. A policy instrument cannot take such detailed circumstances into 
account. Instead, actual IET&F are likely to be the same for a kg of a specific 
pollutant, regardless of where and when it is emitted, at least within the same country. 
• The assessment models do not include accurate estimates of the emissions of the 
large range of pollutants that affects human health and the environment. Instead, we 
need to use rough default values for the total external costs of different sectors or 
activities.  
Researchers at different universities and institutes have made widely diverging estimates of 
the environmental and external costs associated with different emissions and with the 
extraction of different resources. There is no objective method for concluding that one 
estimate is more accurate than another. For the purpose of the ex-ante assessment, it is 
useful to choose estimates of the environmental costs that are much higher than the current 
environmental taxes; otherwise there will be little external costs to internalise and the policy 
instrument will have little impact on the material flows etc. Even so, we can choose estimates 
from several different sources. For the initial policy mix we can, for example, assume that the 
level of taxes and fees are the potential IET&F identified by Hogg et al. (2014). The increase 
in green tax revenues will be 35 € billion in the year 2016, 88 € billion in 2020, and 101 € 
billion in 2025, in the twelve MS that we assumed to be involved in the first phase of the 
IET&F (see Hogg et al. 2014). Compared to total GDP of these countries, the IET&F 
corresponds to 0.63% in 2016 and 1.57% in 2025. This increases the cost of using any 
materials, since the production of materials is based on natural resources and also an 
important source of emissions. Using the revenues to reduce labour taxes will (probably 
slightly) reduce labour costs. 
From 2030, IET&F will be implemented in all MS and increase gradually until full 
internalisation is obtained in 2050. The level of the taxes at this point depends on the 
estimates of the environmental costs, as discussed above. Based on the figures from 
EXIOPOL, Trucost and KPMG above, we could simply assume that the external costs 
correspond to 35% of the value added for material goods and transports. For the purpose of 
our assessment, we would then neglect the rather small external costs from services other 
than transports. The simplistic 35% estimate is a bit lower than the global Trucost estimates 
for the relevant sectors, but the Trucost estimates are also a bit higher than the estimate from 
EXIOPOL.  
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If the models used in the ex-ante assessment allow for more refined modelling of the 
environmental costs, we could use the estimates of Alberici et al. (2014) for external costs of 
energy. They estimate the current external costs in EU-28 to be 122 € billion for electricity 
production (Table A3-6) and 77 € billion for heating excluding domestic heat pumps and solar 
thermal (Table A3-7). If sufficient data are available, we could alternatively use the estimates 
for specific emissions and resources that are used in the calculations of Trucost (2013) or 
Hogg et al. (2014), or estimates currently being developed by Steen. 
g. For tax: who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
• A tax on natural resources (raw materials, energy, and water) will be paid by 
companies extracting the resources or using the land. 
• The IET&F on emissions from the stacks and wastewater pipes of large production 
plants will be paid by the owners of each production plant. These owners will also pay 
the IET&F on estimated diffuse emissions from stockpiles. 
• The IET&F on diffuse emissions from landfills, agriculture, and forestry, will be paid by 
the companies responsible for these activities.  
• Energy-related IET&F on emissions from production facilities that are too small to 
have instruments for measuring actual emissions from stacks will be part of the fuel 
tax and included in the fuel price.  
• Energy-related IET&F on emissions from vehicles and residential buildings will also be 
part of the fuel tax and included in the fuel price. 
• Part of the revenues are used for funding other instruments in the dynamic policy mix: 
the sharing systems, increased spending on research and development, information 
campaigns, advanced recycling centres, etc. (see below). 
• The rest of the revenues will be used for reducing taxes and charges on labour that 
are paid by the employers. How much this will affect labour taxes, depends on the 
total IET&F revenues, on the total labour taxes, and on how much is spent on the 
other instruments. 
h. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
All physical flows to the extent that they are associated with emissions and resource use. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
Members States (MS) at least until 2030. After 2030: EU in the Safe Globe Scenario but still 
MS in all other scenarios. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Mainly MS governments, industrial associations, NGOs and researchers. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Owners of large production plants will be obliged to measure emissions from the stacks and 
drainpipes.  
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Coordination is important in order not to distort the common market more than necessary, 
which is likely to be a condition for political acceptability. 
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e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
IET&F can be feasible at a moderate level because they only mean an incremental change 
compared to the environmental taxes and fees that are already implemented. Resistance is 
likely to occur from the process and manufacturing industry, particularly those that compete 
on a global market for commodity products. This resistance can perhaps be reduced by the 
fact that the tax revenues are used for reducing taxes and charges on labour that are paid by 
the employers.  
Expected environmental impacts and effectiveness  
IET&F is likely to reduce various health and environmental impacts through the reduction of 
emissions of greenhouse gases, SOX, nitrogen, particulates, toxic substances, etc.; however, 
part of this effect is likely to be offset by polluting industry and use of virgin material moving 
outside EU or at least outside the MS that implement the IET&F. For example, the extraction 
of metal ores and other natural resources and the production of metals and other materials 
will be more expensive, but only in the MS that implement the IET&F. Such activities might 
then decrease in these countries but instead increase elsewhere in the world. The extent of 
such leakage is as yet unknown. 
Key expected economic impacts  
In MS that implement IET&F, parts of polluting industries (process industry, etc.) will be less 
competitive and is likely to lose market shares. More innovative parts may be able to respond 
over time through efficiency gains and product change. On the other hand, the 
competitiveness will increase in labour-intensive sectors (for example, most of the service 
sector). As a consequence, the structure of the economy in the MS, and eventually in the EU 
as a whole, is likely to change towards an increased share of services.  
Key expected social impacts  
In the long run, the IET&F is likely to increase the number of jobs since the reduction in labour 
taxes makes labour less expensive. This effect is likely to be small until 2030 but somewhat 
greater after that. However, distributional effects of tax reforms are also very important to 
consider, for example, how different industries are affected and between social-economic 
groups. 
A change in the structure of the economy is likely to cause temporal unemployment. We 
expect the scale of job losses not to be significant compared to usual rates of job turnover in 
the economy as a whole. However, at the local level unemployment and associated social 
impacts can be significant. 
People might have to move to find new jobs. Since process industry to a large extent is 
located in rural areas and service sector to a larger extent is concentrated to cities, this might 
increase the urbanisation with associated social challenges.  
A new job in, e.g., the service sector is likely to require different skills, compared to an old job 
in, e.g., the process industry. This means people might have to expand their education to find 
new jobs. It might be relevant to combine this instrument with the complementary skill 
enhancement measure in the overarching policy mix. 
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6.4.2 Green fiscal reform: materials tax 
Brief summary of the measure 
This is a value-based tax on all materials that are used in the EU: steel, concrete, paper, 
polymers, glass, textiles, etc. The materials tax is to be levied on all types of materials in 
order to avoid burden shifting from metals to other materials. It is levied even on renewable 
materials because also renewable material resources need to be used efficiently.  
The materials tax is levied regardless of whether the material is produced from virgin, natural 
resources or from recycled raw material. The tax is applied also on recycled material for two 
reasons: 
• Recycled metals, paper and plastics are globally traded goods. Implementing a tax on 
virgin materials only will make recycled materials relatively cheaper to use in the EU 
(compared to virgin material). This is likely to shift the use of recycled materials to the 
EU from the rest of the world. However, it is not likely to significantly increase total 
recycling. This is because the supply of recycled material is rather insensitive to 
changes in demand.  
• If the tax is applied also on imported material, as we suggest, it is much more difficult 
to implement on virgin materials only. This is because virgin and recycled materials 
are often mixed and sometimes impossible to distinguish from each other. 
The tax will be levied on the material regardless of where it is produced. It is levied on 
imported as well as domestic materials in order not to distort the competitiveness of domestic 
material production in the EU. Exported materials are exempt from the tax in order not to 
distort the competitiveness of domestic material production outside the EU. 
Eckermann et al. (2012) distinguish between three types of materials tax: taxation of 
extraction, taxation of the first industrial use of the materials, and taxation of the consumption. 
The materials tax presented here is not an extraction tax, nor a taxation of the consumtion. It 
resembles a tax of the first industrial use of the materials (steel, concrete, paper, etc.). 
However, the tax also applies on simple imported products such as wires, pipes, etc. (for 
details, see below). The tax exemption is not only for exported materials but also for similarly 
simple products. 
The material tax takes the form of an ad-valorem tax, which is levied on the traded quantities 
of raw materials and finished materials to and within the EU. As usual in the case of taxes, the 
total tax burden falls on both buyers and sellers. Similar to the value-added tax (VAT) the 
level of the materials tax is a proportion of the value added in the value chain. However, while 
VAT is added all through the value chain, the materials tax only applies to value added in the 
materials production (i.e., up to and including steel mills, cement mixer, paper mill, etc.) and 
not to value added in the manufacturing industry or the wholesale and retail sector.  
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
As mentioned in section 6.4.1, it is important that tax reforms are introduced gradually and 
have a long term perspective to allow time for those affected to adjust (UNEP 2014b). Policy 
makers need to allow for a long time to pass from when the tax is introduced to when it 
reaches levels that are high enough to significantly change material flows. We suggest here 
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that the material tax is introduced in 2020, increases slowly until 2030 and then more rapidly 
until 2050.  
b. What is its aim?  
The materials tax aims to reduce material use in the EU through reduced production losses, 
more material-lean products and increased material efficiency in general.  
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
The primary target of the materials tax is the manufacturing industry in EU-27. This is part of 
the production phase of products that are manufactured in the EU. The tax will increase the 
material cost of the manufacturing industry, which, hopefully, results in an increase in the 
material efficiency of their processes and a reduction in the quantity of redundant material in 
the manufactured products.  
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
The EU negotiators within WTO have to find an agreement that allows the EU to levy taxes on 
imported goods. Such an agreement can be justified by arguments related to environmental 
and health protection. It can also be defended by the argument that the import duty will not 
distort the competition but rather level the ground since the tax is also levied on domestically 
produced materials. 
In order to levy import duties, the material value must be estimated for products where this 
material value is a large share of the total import price. This will require an agreement on 
default values for each kg of different materials. A procedure to estimate the material value of 
products containing a mix of materials has to be developed. Note, however, that imported 
complex products such as cars and electronics are not likely to be affected by the materials 
tax. The share of the material value is likely to be below the threshold level (see below).  
The companies in the extraction (e.g., mines) and materials production industry (e.g., metals 
smelters) will have to declare payments and revenues of materials tax, similar to the current 
VAT declarations. Companies in the manufacturing industry will have to declare exports of 
products that are exempt from the materials tax (see below).  
e. Links/synergies/ interlinkages with other instruments within the same policy-mix 
The combination of materials tax and increased environmental taxes and fees can be 
regarded as a double punishment of materials use, because the IET&F will also affect the 
cost of producing and using materials. This can reduce the acceptability of the instrument.  
The materials tax is likely to be more easily accepted if it is part of a coherent and more 
comprehensive policy package. It can be supported by an EU strategy for dematerialisation, 
by information, and by the establishment of fora for communication. It can be combined with 
the removal of harmful subsidies and with environmental investments and subsidies in, for 
example, sharing systems and in research and development for material efficiency. These 
instruments are all part of the metals policy mix.  
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
The material tax will be very low when introduced at 2020. It increases linearly to 30% of the 
materials value in 2030. From 2030 it increases linearly until, at 2050, it reaches 200% of the 
value of the materials.  
g. For tax: who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
Similar to VAT each producer in the extraction and materials production industry pays in 
proportion to the value added by that producer. However, while the full VAT in the end is paid 
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by the final consumer, the full materials tax is paid already by the manufacturing and 
construction industry that uses the material. 
The materials tax is also paid by importers of materials and by importers of simple products 
(wire, pipes, body parts for cars, etc.) where the value of the material is a sufficiently large 
share of the product value. The threshold is 50% of the product value in 2020, decreasing 
linearly to 20% in 2030 and to 10% in 2050. This will make it possible for EU manufacturers to 
compete on the European market: 
• EU manufacturers of the simple products (wire, pipes, etc.) will compete at an equal 
footing with manufacturers outside the EU.  
• EU manufacturers of more complex products (cars, cell phones, etc.) will not compete 
at an equal footing, but for them the cost of material, and thereby the tax, is a smaller 
share of the total production cost. 
• As the tax increase over time to 30% and eventually to 200% of the material value, the 
threshold is gradually lowered to allow manufacturers of slightly more complex 
products (simple car parts, etc.) to compete at an equal footing with manufacturers 
outside the EU.  
Exported material and products where the materials value is above the threshold are exempt 
from the materials tax, because they are not used in the EU. This will make it possible not 
only for material producers but also for European manufacturers to compete outside the EU. 
The revenues from the materials tax will be used for reducing taxes on labour. 
h. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
All materials used in EU-27 and the products that are used in EU-27 where the materials 
value is above the threshold above. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
The tax is from the start implemented in each individual Member State (MS). After 2030, it 
becomes an EU tax in the Safe Globe Scenario but remains a national tax in all other 
scenarios. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Within the EU, at least MS governments and industrial associations and unions related to the 
extraction, materials production and manufacturing industry. Taxes on imported materials and 
tax exemptions for exported materials probably need to be negotiated within the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Not applicable. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Coordination is important in order not to distort the common market more than necessary. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
This instrument is likely to be controversial. Resistance from the materials production industry 
is likely to be particularly severe until it has been made sure that the tax will also be levied on 
imported materials and that exempt will be made for exported materials.  
 Development of DYNAMIX Policy Mixes – Revised deliverable D4.2 
Page 193  | 
Expected environmental impacts and effectiveness  
The materials tax aims at reducing the production of materials. If it is effective, natural 
resources will be saved for future generations, the climate impact is likely to be reduced and 
emissions of toxic substances are also likely to be reduced, reducing impacts on both human 
health and ecosystems. This is because production of materials typically is energy intensive 
compared to most other activities: it requires much energy and cause large energy-related 
emissions per MEUR of added value. In addition, materials production includes the most 
important point sources of several toxic substances.  
Key expected economic impacts  
With the design above, the overall economic growth is not likely to be significantly affected. It 
might even be beneficial for the economy. Meyer (2011) found that a tax on the use of metals 
in investment goods industries (if combined with an international agreement on recycling for 
metals; and with information and consulting program concerning material inputs in sectors 
with high concentration of small and medium sized firms) is likely to increase GDP. 
The European manufacturing industry will at least initially be less competitive because of 
higher material costs. Over time, however, this is likely to be at least partly off-set through the 
use of more material-efficient techniques. As the tax will eventually be levied also on imported 
manufacturing products where the value of the material is above 10% of total product value 
(see above), the more efficient European industry might even gain an advantage on the 
European market.  
The structure of the economy might be affected, with a greater emphasis on services and 
high-value goods and less production and consumption of cheap goods where the cost of 
materials is a significant share of the total product price. Housing and constructions are likely 
to be more expensive, because materials cost is a relatively large share of the total cost in 
this sector.  
Key expected social impacts  
A change in the structure of the economy is likely to cause temporal unemployment. Also 
people might have to move to find new jobs. Such transitions are associated with social 
challenges.  
In the long run, the materials tax is likely to increase the total number of jobs since it makes 
labour less expensive. 
6.4.3 Promotion of sharing systems 
Brief summary of the measure 
Sharing systems for cars, bicycles, tools, and equipment are established by local authorities 
or through economic support to private initiatives. The sharing systems for bicycles, cars and 
tools will mainly be set up in urban areas, including cities, towns and larger villages. Sharing 
systems for agricultural equipment will be established in rural areas. 
A combination of the following options will be implemented, depending on local and national 
conditions, etc.:  
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1) Local authorities set up a scheme for sharing of cars, bicycles, tools, and equipment.  
2) Local authorities support the setting up of private sharing systems through funding of part 
of the investment cost.  
3) National authorities support the private sharing systems  
a) through deductions in income tax to consumers for the renting costs, or  
b) through a differentiation in VAT between goods and services. 
This is part of a package to make leasing and sharing of products more convenient, 
compared to owning the same products. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
We suggest this policy measure is introduced in 2020, as it is relatively easy to implement.  
b. What is its aim?  
The aim is to reduce the use of metals and other materials through a reduction in the number 
of products used.  
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
The measure targets primarily households but also commercial leasing companies as well as 
non-profit organisations. It focusses on the use phase of the product life-cycles. However, the 
measure will indirectly affect also the production phase, where manufacturing firms may see 
demand for their products decrease. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Consumers have to pay an annual membership fee to be allowed to borrow the products in 
the sharing scheme. They also have to return borrowed products intact within a given time. In 
countries that introduce a tax deduction for renting costs (Option 3a above), consumers have 
to document and declare how much they spend on renting to get the tax deduction. 
e. Links/synergies/ interlinkages with other instruments within the same policy-mix 
Options 2 and 3 above can easily be combined. However, public sharing systems (Option 1) 
can counteract public support for similar private initiatives (Options 2 & 3). Coordination 
among national and local authorities is required to avoid a case where the national authorities 
support private sharing systems and local authorities set up competing public sharing 
systems.  
The establishment of sharing systems is likely to be more effective if it is part of a coherent 
and more comprehensive policy package. It needs to be supported by information. It can also 
be combined with, for example, a green fiscal reform. These instruments are part of the 
metals policy mix.  
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
The type and level of subsidy will depend on the option chosen above. For Option 1, the set-
up of the sharing system will be fully funded by the municipality. The running of the public 
sharing system (reinvestments, maintenance, administration, communication, etc.) will be 
funded in the following way: 
• from 2020 to 2030: to 50% through membership fees and to 50% through public 
funding.  
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• from 2030 to 2050 in the scenarios Economic bonanza and Divided we trudge: still 
50/50 through membership fees and public funding. 
• from 2030 to 2050 in the Reference scenario and the scenarios Safe globe and Back 
to nature: 100% through membership fees. 
For Option 2, 25% of investment and reinvestment costs will be covered by public funds in the 
period 2020 to 2030 to get the system started and growing.  
For Option 3a, tax deductions will be 50% of renting costs between 2020 and 2030. From 
2030 and on, tax deductions will be reduced to 25%. 
For Options 3b, the lowest available VAT will be applied on renting services. This level of VAT 
will vary between Member States. 
g. For tax: who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
Membership will be individual and the fees are paid by the individual consumer. Money for the 
public funding and tax deductions will be collected as part of the local and national income tax 
on households. The level of the tax increase will depend on the cost of the sharing systems. 
The distribution of the tax increase will be the same as the already existing local tax.  
h. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
Cars, bicycles, tools, and equipment. 
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
Municipality (Options 1 & 2) and national (Option 3) level. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Municipal and national authorities and also potentially competing private initiatives, such as 
car rentals and private car-sharing systems. In addition, manufacturing firms should be 
involved to encourage them to adapt to these new business models. 
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Consumers that do not fulfil their obligations will be charged an extra fee. After repeated 
failures they can be excluded from the sharing system. Consumers that do not document and 
declare renting costs will not be allowed the tax deduction in Option 3a. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Coordination at EU level is not important. Coordination between municipalities and national 
authorities is important (see above). 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
If this measure becomes very expensive, it can encounter resistance from tax payers. Public 
sharing systems are likely to encounter resistance mainly from competing private initiatives.  
Public sharing systems are likely to be particularly popular among consumers in the scenarios 
Safe globe and Back to nature. On the other hand, more competing private initiatives are also 
likely in these scenarios.  
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Expected environmental impacts and effectiveness  
As a first estimate, the sharing systems are likely to have a limited impact on the total use of 
materials. This is because a relatively small share of the materials is used for producing cars, 
bicycles, tools, and equipment. The materials affected, however, are mainly metals and 
polymers, which are associated with relatively high environmental impact in the production 
phase.  
Key expected economic impacts  
The overall economic growth is not likely to be significantly affected. The overall structure of 
the economy is also not likely to be affected before 2030 and in most scenarios after that. 
However, in the scenarios Safe globe and Back to nature the sharing systems can become 
widely used and result in a shift in the economy from manufacturing industry to the service 
sector, particularly to the sharing systems themselves.  
Key expected social impacts  
Public sharing systems can potentially contribute to a stronger sense of community among 
citizens and increase the legitimacy of the municipality and its authorities. A widespread use 
of sharing systems can potentially contribute to enforcing the social norm that owning the 
products you use is not important.  
On the other hand, sharing systems might lead to increased social stratification, where 
specific social groups stick together and share their higher/lower value belongings. 
6.4.4 Increased spending on research and development 
Brief summary of the measure 
This instrument implies continued and strengthened public funding of research and 
development (R&D) in EU-27 for recycling and material efficiency. The R&D for recycling will 
include: 
• Design for recycling; 
• Efficient and consumer-adapted systems for collection, and identification of the role for 
the public sector in ensuring their provision; 
• Technology for dismantling and separation of components and material; and 
• Technology for recycling. 
The R&D for material efficiency will include, for example: 
• improved processes and products; 
• new business models; and 
• non-material alternatives for safe investments.  
The objective of the last item in the list is to find ways to substitute metals, particularly gold, 
with other ways of delivering the service safe investments.  
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Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
We suggest this policy measure is introduced in 2020, as it is relatively easy to implement.  
b. What is its aim?  
The aim is to increase recycling and material efficiency through improved technology, 
systems and knowledge. This serves to reduce the use of virgin material. It also serves to 
enhance the competitiveness of the European industry. 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
The measure targets primarily research at universities and institutes and R&D in the 
manufacturing industry. The results of the research are expected to directly affect the 
manufacturing industry, the wholesale and retail sectors, and the waste management. All of 
the economy is expected to be indirectly affected.  
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
Not applicable. 
e. Links/synergies/ interlinkages with other instruments within the same policy-mix 
The materials tax might be more easily accepted if it is combined with an increased R&D on 
material efficiency. Increased R&D on recycling can make it easier to have ambitious long-
term targets in the extended producer responsibility (EPR; part of the overarching mix). It can 
also help expanding the EPR to textiles and other new products and flows where the recycling 
technology is not yet well established.  
Spending on R&D for material efficiency might be more accurate if supported by an EU 
strategy for dematerialisation. The R&D spending on recycling might be more effective if 
supported by the establishment of fora for communication. These instruments are also part of 
the metals policy mix.  
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
For the purpose of this project, we assume that the public spending on R&D for recycling and 
material efficiency is doubled at 2020 and that its share of total public R&D spending is kept 
constant after that.  
g. For tax: who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
Money for the public funding will be collected as part of the local and national income tax on 
households. The level of the tax increase will depend on the level of R&D spending. The 
distribution of the tax increase will be the same as the already existing local tax.  
h. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
Products that are manufactured in EU-27; the materials that are used for the manufacturing; 
and the waste from products that are used in EU-27.  
Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
At all levels. The greatest impact will probably be at the EU level through Horizon 2020 and 
future EU research frameworks and in Member States through national research funding. 
However, regional and municipal funding of R&D would also be affected. 
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b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
The European Commission (DG Environment, at least); national, regional and municipal 
authorities; researchers; associations for the manufacturing industry and waste management.  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Not applicable. 
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Some coordination at EU level would be valuable to increase the likelihood that the R&D 
funds are used efficiently. 
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Increased spending on R&D are likely to be widely accepted, particularly if it aims to improve 
not only the environment but also the competitiveness of European industry.  
Expected environmental impacts and effectiveness 
The effectiveness of research is difficult to predict. Little impact is expected before the year 
2030. On the other hand, if the R&D is effective and results in increased recycling and 
material efficiency in the EU-27, knowledge transfer to other parts of the world will, in the long 
term, contribute to recycling and material efficiency also in other parts of the world. This will 
reduce the energy-intensive production of virgin materials and the associated environmental 
impacts.  
Key expected economic impacts  
If the R&D activities are successful, this will temporarily increase the competitiveness of 
European industry through reduced raw-material costs, until the knowledge transfer makes 
the technology and systems available also in other parts of the world. If the R&D activities are 
continuously successful, delivering a continuous flow if efficient innovations, it will allow 
European industry to stay one step ahead of its competitors.  
Key expected social impacts 
The social impacts are difficult for the author team to predict. 
6.4.5 Product standards 
Brief summary of the measure 
This instrument entails the development of standards for specific metals products and metals 
components that regulate the design to, for example: 
• Improve the modularity to increase reparability and reuse of components, taking into 
account impacts on energy efficiency. 
• Reduce the unnecessary use of material. 
• Substitute metals for other materials when appropriate, for example shifting from 
copper water-piping to polymer piping. 
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The EU should attempt to initiate the development of international standards within the 
framework of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). If and when this fails, 
European standards should still be developed within the framework of the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN). The standards could be based on, for example, the 
best practices from value-chain co-operation in the preceding 10 years. 
Brief description of the design and scope 
a. When would it be introduced? 
Time might be needed to gain acceptance among policy-makers and in the industry for the 
idea of product standards with an explicit environmental purpose. Several years will also be 
needed to develop the first standards. We suggest that a set of product standards can be 
completed by the year 2030. 
b. What is its aim?  
The aim is to reduce the use of virgin metals through product redesign, increased longevity, 
and increased reuse. 
c. Which economic sectors and point(s) in the lifecycle would it be targeted at? 
The product standards will primarily affect the manufacturing industry. It may also affect 
importers of manufactured goods to EU-27. 
d. What requirements does it place on relevant players? 
The requirements will be stipulated in each product standard. They might include material 
choices and/or other aspects of product design. 
e. Links/synergies/interlinkages with other instruments within the same policy-mix 
The idea of product standards with an explicit environmental purpose might be more easily 
accepted if such standards are part of a dynamic policy package that begins with the 
establishment of EU strategies for dematerialisation. This package could also include a green 
fiscal reform that includes, for example, a materials tax and the removal of environmentally 
harmful subsidies. Increased R&D on recycling and material efficiency and the establishment 
of discussion fora might allow for more ambitious product standards, which would make this 
instrument more effective. All of these supporting instruments are part of the metals policy 
mix.  
f. For taxes and subsidies: what is the level of the tax/subsidy? 
Not applicable. 
g. For tax: who is to pay it and how are the revenues to be used? 
Not applicable. 
h. What physical flows (if any) are directly targeted by the policy instrument? 
Selected metals products. The standards should initially cover a few select products or 
components only, where there is little economic or functional cost of reducing material use, 
shifting material or increasing the ability to reuse and recycle the product. Water piping might 
be a good example of such a product. 
The instrument should be gradually extended to more and more products and include also 
products where the functionality etc. is affected. In the long-term a product standard might, for 
example, set a limit to the quantity of material in a passenger car.  
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Governance 
a. At what level scale should the instrument be deployed (EU, MS, etc.)? 
Globally, if possible. Otherwise EU. 
b. What stakeholders should be involved in the negotiations and agreement? 
Associations for the manufacturing industry, national authorities, researchers and the 
European Commission (DG Environment, at least).  
c. For obligations: what stakeholders are responsible? What consequences do they face 
if they fail to comply? 
Producers are responsible for adhering to the standards that have been developed and 
accepted. If not, their products will not be allowed at the EU market.  
d. Is it important and technically necessary to coordinate the instrument at EU-level? 
Coordination at EU level is essential. It is important to make a common effort to establish 
international standards within the framework of ISO. If this does not succeed, cooperation 
within CEN is necessary to establish a European standard.  
e. What is the perceived feasibility and acceptance among key actors? 
Product standards are likely to meet resistance from the associations of manufacturing 
industries and from manufacturers of products that do not meet the standards.  
Expected environmental impacts and effectiveness  
The environmental benefits will differ widely between standards, depending on the volume of 
products affected and on the requirements of the standard. A very rough estimate is that the 
product standards will affect 1-10%, by weight, of new metals products in the year 2030 and 
5-20% of new metals products in the year 2050. These figures are global, if the standards are 
global. They are European if the standards are European. 
Product standards are likely to be effective when they specify the type or quantity of material 
in the product, in the sense that the environmental benefit from reduced material use can be 
estimated in advance. The environmental benefits are more difficult to predict for standards 
that aim at modularity to increase reparability and reuse of components.  
Key expected economic impacts  
The overall economic growth is not likely to be significantly affected. The overall structure of 
the economy is also not likely to be affected. However, individual companies and 
manufacturing plants will be excluded from the European market if they cannot meet the 
requirements of the product standards. They will be dependent on the demand of markets 
outside EU, which is likely to affect their revenues and production volume. 
Key expected social impacts  
Increased unemployment can cause social problems in areas where affected manufacturing 
plants are important to the local economy. 
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6.4.6 Supporting and complementary instruments 
EU strategy for dematerialisation  
This instrument aims to change the mind-set of national policy-makers and to pave the way 
for the material tax (see below) and other ambitious policy instruments. The strategy is an 
official EU document and is primarily an industrial and economic strategy. The process for 
agreement of the strategy is essential for its political credibility - involving engagement of 
major industrial groups and Member State economics and finance ministries.  
It makes explicit links to the impact of greater resource productivity on macroeconomic 
change, employment and well-being, in the context of expected low, future EU GDP growth. 
The development of the strategy should begin immediately, and inform economic 
performance assessment under the European Semester. The document should be ready and 
agreed upon by the Member States around the year 2020. It includes the plans for 
achievement of certain dematerialisation objectives in the context of strategic structural 
change, in particular pointing to the price trends and other market changes which policy will 
look to deliver to bring about dematerialisation. Its goal is to create credible market 
expectations of change, to give economic actors ample time to prepare for them and change 
their investment, innovation and depreciation strategies. The document will therefore agree 
the nature of the instruments to be used to achieve change in market conditions.  
Information campaigns  
This instrument aims to change the mind-set of the public, authorities, and companies. One 
goal is to increase public acceptance of the other policy instruments. Another goal is to 
influence the consumption pattern and related behaviour. This can be beneficial for all 
strategies for reducing the use of all virgin metals through product redesign, increased 
longevity, and increased recycling. The information campaigns can have broad or narrow 
topics and targets, for example: 
• Counteracting commercials by pointing at alternative routes to well-being that do not 
involve increased consumption. 
• Encourage people to buy jewellery produced from materials with lower environmental 
impacts than gold. 
Fora for communication 
This instrument aims to facilitate communication throughout the value chain of priority 
products, to enable innovation, where current co-ordination structures do not yet exist (as 
they already do in the vehicle industry). The EU will co-fund the establishment of fora for 
nations and regions where appropriate, depending on the industrial structure of the value 
chain. It will co-ordinate an EU level mechanism for value-chain co-operation and co-
ordination. Such co-ordination can fulfil several purposes, for example: 
• Giving producers and recyclers the opportunity to discuss what quality of the recycled 
materials can be obtained and what quality of the material is required for different 
applications. This can serve to establish or strengthen the markets for recycled 
material and increase recycling level. 
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• Creating critical mass between purchasers and suppliers in value chains, that allow 
sufficient purchasers and suppliers to innovate - in the knowledge that their innovation 
will have a market (suppliers) or will be able to benefit from innovative components 
(purchasers).  
Removal of harmful subsidies  
A complementary part of the green fiscal reform is the removal of two environmentally harmful 
subsidies (EHS): limited liability for accidents related to metals extraction, and subsidies 
associated with the purchase of company cars. These subsidies are selected here because 
they are both related to metals. They affect they mining of metals ores and the size and 
number of cars.  
The money saved through the removal of these EHS will be use for reducing the tax on 
labour, just like the environmental taxes and fees (Section 6.4.1) and the materials tax 
(Section 6.4.2). The monetary flows are likely to be small. The economic and environmental 
impacts of the EHS removal are also likely to be small. However the instrument can still be 
important to form a coherent and comprehensive green fiscal reform. 
Advanced recycling centres and reuse mechanisms 
This instrument aims to increase reuse and recycling and also to decrease the demand for 
products through increased longevity. Its objective is to increase collection of waste for 
recycling and also to facilitate second-hand trade, repairs and redesign of used goods. 
This instrument implies that local or national governments support community initiatives 
aimed at enhanced reuse, and invest in advanced recycling/reuse centres that include: 
• Facilities for collection of recyclable fractions. 
• Second-hand shops of building components, clothes, furniture, etc. 
• Repair shops for furniture, bicycles, tools, etc. 
• Shops for redesign of waste products into art or new useful products. 
Visitors to the recycling centre are welcomed by personnel who help them to search the 
waste for items that can be reused, repaired or redesigned rather than discarded (cf. 
Ljunggren Söderman et al. 2011). In addition, businesses are encouraged to work with the 
recycling/ reuse centres to identify products capable of reuse, reconditioning, and re-entering 
the market. 
6.5 Adaptation of the policy path to different scenarios 
As stated above (Section 2.5) the policy mixes should be adaptive. Until 2030 the EU and the 
world will have changed for other reasons than the initial policy mix. Policy-makers should be 
prepared for new barriers that might occur and also to take advantage of opportunities that 
might arise.  
Gustavsson et al. (2013) developed five background scenarios for the purpose of testing the 
robustness of the policy mixes. We use these background scenarios also to describe how the 
second phase of the policy mix can adapt to external developments.  
The outline of the policy mix above is relevant for the Reference scenario. In the scenario 
Safe Globe EU develops towards a federal state. This makes it possible for EU to levy the 
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environmental taxes and fees and the materials tax, instead of requiring the members states 
to do so. 
In the scenario Divided We Trudge, however, EU becomes weak and divided. It will not be 
able to require Member States to implement the green taxes. Instead, will be implemented by 
a coalition of the willing Member States.  
6.6 Revisions after ex-ante assessment 
The policy mix on metals and other materials presented in Sections 6.4-6.5 was essentially 
included in the first edition of this report, which was published in February 2015. The policy 
mix has evolved since then, thanks to feedback and food-for-thought from many directions. 
The metals author team continued to reflect on the policy mix, in part inspired by the other 
DYNAMIX policy mixes. We also received feedback from stakeholders, from the DYNAMIX 
Advisory Board, and from an external scientific reviewer at the European Commission. Last 
but not least, results from the quantitative and qualitative ex-ante assessment of the different 
instruments of the policy mix affirmed some parts of it but also called for a few changes. The 
feedback, the revisions and the final version of the policy mix are all summarised in this 
section. 
6.6.1 Reflections and feedback on the policy mix  
The overarching policy mix (Chapter 4) includes elements that we found useful also in this 
chapter: the extended producer responsibility and programmes for skill enhancement. We 
added adapted versions of these instruments to the policy mix on metals and other materials 
to form a more coherent policy package. 
The author team presented revised versions of the policy mix at the 4th DYNAMIX Policy 
Platform, at the World Resources Forum (Ekvall et al. 2015), and in a scientific paper (Ekvall 
et al. 2016a). While preparing these presentations, the role of primary and supporting 
instruments became more clear to us. Primary instruments aim at shifting the material flows in 
the society, while supportive instruments aim at making the primary instruments more 
effective, efficient and feasible. Some of the instruments that are presented as key 
instruments in Section 6.4 are really supportive instruments more than primary instruments. 
Learning this affected the structure in which the final policy mix is presented in this section.  
We also found it necessary to better define the scope of the policy mix: what materials are 
covered by the materials tax, etc. The original scope (metals) was expanded to other 
materials in order to avoid burden-shifting from metals to other materials. Hence the relevant 
scope of this policy mix is metals and materials that significantly compete with metals. This 
affects, for example, the name of the policy mix.  
Stakeholders at the 4th DYNAMIX Policy Platform argued that high environmental taxes 
cannot be implemented in the EU only, because it will seriously affect the competitiveness of 
EU industry and shift environmentally harmful activities outside the EU, rather than stop them. 
The materials tax above includes border tax adjustments to reduce impacts on the 
competitiveness and also to reduce shifting of environmental burdens from the EU to the rest 
of the world. To further improve the policy mix, we propose that border tax adjustments are 
introduced also for the environmental taxes and fees, where this is possible. 
Stakeholders at the DYNAMIX Policy Platforms and final conference also questioned the 
target of 80% reduction in virgin metals use, stating that a) metal resources are more 
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abundant than we know, because we have not searched much of the Earth’s crust for metals, 
and b) metal resources are not depleted when they are extracted because metals can easily 
be recycled. This affected our arguments for reducing the use of virgin metals. 
The DYNAMIX Advisory Board suggested that this report should include a narrative to 
present and explain each of the policy mixes. Such a narrative for the policy mix on metals 
and competing materials is presented in Subsection 6.6.2. 
The external reviewer stated that the choice of policy instruments should be better advocated. 
The narrative below is an attempt to do this. The external reviewer also found a lack of 
justification for the proposed timing of implementation of the different policy instruments. We 
have added brief justifications. To make it easier for the reader, we have added these in 
Section 6.4 rather than here. 
The quantitative assessment of the policy mix indicates that it can be effective as well as 
efficient. The results from the economic models (Bukowski and Sniegocki 2016, Antosiewicz 
et al. 2016) indicate that economic instruments need to be broad and very strong to have a 
significant impact on the total use of materials resources. High taxes on material use and 
environmental burdens are likely to have a negative impact on the economy if the tax 
revenues are recycled back to the households as lump sums, as often assumed in economic 
models; however, when these taxes are part of a green fiscal reform, they are used for 
reducing labour taxes. The models indicate that such a fiscal reform stimulates economic 
growth. They also indicate that a radical green fiscal reform can significantly reduce climate 
impacts and increase the efficiency in the use of material resources, at least if the materials 
tax and environmental taxes affect the technology used in the industry. All this affirm the 
decision to include a radical green fiscal reform in this policy mix. 
One of the quantitative environmental models illustrates that successful spending on R&D on 
improved dismantling processes for vehicles and machines can have significant impact on the 
recycling of, for example, copper (Ekvall et al. 2014, Ekvall et al. 2016b). This affirms the 
decision to include R&D spending in the policy mix. 
The qualitative part of the ex-ante assessment included a legal assessment (Luca and 
Roberts 2015). It concluded that all instruments in this mix seem to be compatible with WTO 
treaties. This includes the border-tax adjustments, since these aim at no more than leveling 
the ground for competition between EU and non-EU producers. The categories of instruments 
in the policy mix have, at least in part, predecessors in EU legislation. However, the 
introduction of EU-wide taxes requires a unanimous vote in the Council, which makes them 
difficult to implement. Luca and Roberts (2015) recommend that the protection of human 
health and the environment should be explicitly mentioned to justify the policy instruments. 
These conclusions are taken into consideration in the narrative below. 
Luca and Roberts (2015) remark that compliance with standards is voluntary. Technical 
requirements should be more effective because they are mandatory. For this reason, we 
exchanged product standards for technical requirements in the policy mix. 
The qualitative assessment also included an investigation of the public acceptability of the 
policy instruments and policy mix (Vanner et al. 2016). They found that the internalisation of 
external costs, the materials tax, and product standards are likely to be contentious or even 
highly contentious and, hence, politically difficult to implement. They recommend that 
measures be taken to ensure that the environmental and material taxes do not threaten the 
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competitiveness of the EU industry. This is the purpose of the border-tax adjustments, and we 
expanded them to account not only for the material tax but also for environmental taxes. 
To increase the acceptability of the taxes, Vanner et al. (2016) also recommend that the 
green fiscal refom be presented in a way that makes the benefits of the reform apparent for 
the public. To make the reduced labour tax more clearly visible in the policy mix, we 
presented it as an explicit policy instrument in the revised policy mix, and not as an integrated 
part of the description of the materials and environmental taxes. 
Regarding the product standards, Vanner et al. (2016) recommend that individual Member 
States that are sceptic to certain product standards be allowed temporal exemptions from 
these standards. This is now included in the description of the technical requirements that 
displaced product standards in the policy mix.  
6.6.2 The revised policy mix for metals and competing materials 
Aim and objectives 
Human consumption of renewable and non-renewable material resources is skyrocketing. 
Rising global population and affluence levels, ever more widespread adoption of westernised 
lifestyles and production and consumption patterns risk contribute to future increases in 
resource consumption. The resource use and associated environmental impacts contribute to 
transgressing existing planetary boundaries. Human activities are expected to require two 
planet Earths around 2030 (Moore et al. 2012). 
Umpfenbach (2013) indicates, based on Bringezu (2009) and UNEP’s International Resource 
Panel (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2011) that the use of virgin metals in the EU need to be 
reduced by 80%, calculated as RMC, to reach a sustainable level. The level of this target can 
be disputed; however, the extraction and production of metals are responsible for a significant 
share of the energy demand, GHG emissions and toxic impacts of human society. Reducing 
the dependency on virgin metals can also counteract risks related to future supply of certain 
metals, because the mineral reserves and/or mines are located at very few places in the 
world (relevant for, e.g., several rare earth metals; European Commission 2014e). Increasing 
the efficiency in the use of metal resources is, in addition, important for generating as much 
economic value and/or well-being and serving as many functions as possible with a given 
resource base. For these reasons, our policy mix aims at significantly reducing the use of 
virgin metals in the EU. 
A policy mix that simply shifts the use of virgin metals or associated environmental impacts 
from the EU to other parts of the world does not address global environmental justice or 
sustainability. To reach a sustainable future, the global recycling rate is, for example, more 
relevant than the recycling that takes place within the EU. Hence, the policy needs to also 
account for impacts beyond the EU boundaries. 
Metals compete with other materials in important applications: with concrete and wood in 
constructions, with paper and glass in packaging, with polymers in packaging and in 
components in machinery, and with textiles in furniture. However, shifting to the use of other 
materials sometimes is detrimental for the environment, the economy or other societal goals. 
A reduced use of reinforcement (steel) bars in concrete buildings is, for example, likely to 
result in an increase in the use of concrete large enough to increase total GHG emissions. To 
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avoid burden-shifting to other material resources, the scope of the policy needs to be 
expanded to include not just metals but also the competing materials. 
In conclusion, our policy mix aims to steer the EU towards the 80% target in reduced use of 
virgin metals, without significantly hampering the economy, without increasing the use of 
virgin metals in other parts of the world, and without significantly increasing the use of other 
material resources and environmental impacts. This aim serves the purpose to reduce the 
impacts on human health and environment. It also contributes to making the economy more 
robust with respect to risks related to future supply of metals.  
For this aim, the policy mix on metals and competing materials has the following objectives: 
• Increase the efficiency in the use of metals and all competing materials 
• Increase the global recycling rate of these materials 
• Substitute metals by other materials, where this is beneficial for the environment and 
well-being 
The policy mix includes a few strong primary instruments, aiming to achieve these objectives: 
a materials tax, extended producer responsibility, technical requirements, and general 
environmental taxes (see Primary instruments below and Figure 20). It also includes a larger 
set of supportive instruments that are less controversial and that aim to reduce the negative 
side-effects of the primary instruments. The supportive instruments include, but are not limited 
to: 
• Border tax adjustments, to reduce the impact on the competitiveness of EU industry 
• Retraining programmes, to facilitate a change in the structure of the labour market  
• Spending on research and development (R&D), to facilitate changes in technology 
• Information campaigns and infrastructure to facilitate changes in behaviour 
 
 
Figure 20: Illustration of the policy mix on metals and competing materials. The four 
primary instruments are embedded in a larger set of supportive instruments. 
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Figure 21: Qualitative illustration of the dynamics of the green fiscal reform. 
 
An important part of the combined policy mix is a radical green fiscal reform where taxes on 
rmaterials use, pollution etc. are introduced and gradually raised while labour taxes are 
reduced (see Figure 21). The policy mix overall is dynamic in order to first create a shift in 
paradigms, available technology, and other important conditions, and then a significant 
increase in material efficiency and recycling. The first steps includes R&D spending and the 
creation of a common EU strategy. The tougher instruments, notably the material and 
environmental taxes, are gradually introduced with willing Members States leading the 
development. To what extent they can be harmonised within the EU will depend on whether 
the EU becomes a stronger or a weaker union. 
Primary instruments 
The primary instruments in the policy mix are chosen to achieve the objectives of material 
efficiency, recycling and justified substitution. They are designed to be effective but not more 
controversial than necessary. 
a. A substantial materials tax (to increase material efficiency) 
A tax on metals and all competing materials that are used in the EU is introduced in 2020 and 
then gradually increases to 30% of the net price of the finished material in 2030 and 200% of 
the net price in 2050. This tax aims specifically at increasing material efficiency, primarily in 
the manufacturing and construction industry. It is gradually increased over 30 years to allow 
for the industry to adapt to the tax. The materials tax is to be levied on all types of materials in 
order to avoid burden shifting from metals to other materials. It is levied even on renewable 
and recycled materials because also these need to be used efficiently. 
The material tax can take either of two different forms. It could be a value-based tax, which is 
levied on the traded quantities of finished materials to and within the EU. Alternatively, it could 
be a weight-based tax levied on the extraction of raw materials from nature and the traded 
quantities of recovered recyclables to and within the EU. A value-based tax is simpler to 
decide on and revise because the tax rate is negotiated and decided for all materials at the 
same time. A value-based tax also automatically reflects the scarcity of different materials to 
the extent that the scarcity affects the net price of the material. The drawback is that it is not 
just a tax on the (virgin and recyclable) material resources but also a tax on the labor and 
capital costs of the materials industry.  
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The weight-based tax has the advantage that it is a tax on virgin and recyclable raw materials 
only. In addition, it reduces the volatility of the material costs in the manufacturing and 
construction industry. This makes it easier for the industry to invest in and plan for material 
efficient processes and procedures. However, the level of a weight-based tax needs to be 
separately decided for each raw material and each flow of recyclables. When applied on 
recyclables it might also create barriers to the collection of recyclable material in the EU. 
More information on the materials tax can be found in Subsection 6.4.2 and Section 6.5. 
b. Extended producer responsibility (to increase global recycling) 
The extended producer responsibility (EPR) is the instrument in the mix that specifically aims 
at increasing materials recycling. A supply of recyclable material is a prerequisite for recycling 
of all materials. For metals and paper, where a global market for recycled materials is well 
established and where recycled and virgin materials compete in many applications, an 
increase in the supply of recyclable material is the most effective way to increase global 
recycling. This is because the global supply of recyclable material is limited. 
The EPR means that producers in a broad sense are given the responsibility for securing a 
specified level of collection and recycling of their own products and packaging. A system of 
EPR is already implemented in the legislation of several Member States. Our policy mix 
includes an expansion of EPR to additional product groups (and to materials rather than 
product groups) in all Member States.  
The EPR scheme is funded through fees from the producers. For packaging and some 
products, a material-specific fee is charged per kg of mass. For other products, a specific fee 
will be charged per item. This basic set-up will be common all through EU. However, 
individual Member States are allowed to organise the EPR scheme in a way that fit the 
national conditions. They can also vary the charge per item or kg depending on the design of 
the product to stimulate design for recycling and material efficiency. 
c. Technical requirements (substitution and material efficiency) 
This instrument entails the development of technical requirements for specific metals products 
and components that are sold and used in the EU. These documents regulate the design of 
these products and components to: 
• Improve the modularity to increase reparability and reuse of components, taking into 
account impacts on energy efficiency. 
• Reduce the unnecessary use of material. 
• Substitute metals for other materials when appropriate, for example shifting from 
copper water-piping to polymer piping. 
Compliance to the technical requirements is mandatory; however, we propose that Members 
States be allowed to negotiate temporary exemptions from specific technical requirements 
that they find difficult to accept. In other respect, this instrument is similar to the product 
standards described in Subsection 6.4.5. 
d. Increased environmental taxes (all objectives and reduced environmental impact) 
The idea of environmental taxes is based on the Polluter Pays Principle. In this policy mix, 
already existing environmental taxes are gradually increased and expanded with an aim to 
fully internalise all external environmental costs by the year 2050. The environmental taxes 
are not metal-specific but also levied on other natural resources that are extracted in Europe 
(raw materials, energy, and water) and on emissions that occur in all economic sectors in 
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Europe. This will increase material efficiency and recycling, and, at the same time, avoid 
simply shifting environmental burdens from the metals industry and metals products to other 
sectors or commodities.  
Implementing the environmental taxes alongside the materials tax result in a double taxation 
of, for example, the emissions and resource use from the production of material. Such 
overtaxation can perhaps be justified as a measure to overcome the barriers to investments in 
material-efficient technology and systems. 
More information on the environmental taxes can be found in Subsection 6.4.1 and Section 
6.5. 
Supportive instruments 
There are many barriers to implementing the primary instruments above. If implemented 
without additional measures, they can significantly reduce the industrial competitiveness, 
hamper economic growth, increase unemployment in the EU, and shift polluting activities and 
resource use to other parts of the world. This would make them ineffective in increasing 
sustainability, unacceptable for the public, and politically unfeasible. Supportive instruments 
are designed to reduce the barriers of implementing the primary instruments, for example by 
reducing the negative side-effects. In addition, the supportive instruments can give direct 
contributions to the objectives of the policy mix. 
a. Border-tax adjustments (to reduce impacts on competitiveness) 
As described in Subsection 6.4.2, the materials tax is levied also on imported materials and 
simple manufactured products. Exported materials and corresponding products are exempt 
from the tax. With such border-tax adjustments, the materials tax does not distort the 
competitiveness of domestic materials production within nor outside the EU.  
To reduce the impacts of environmental taxes on the competitiveness, border-tax adjustments 
can in principle be implemented also for the environmental taxes. This would ideally result in 
a full internalisation of external costs of production oustide the EU, when the products are 
imported to the EU. It would also mean an exemption from environmental taxes for products 
that are exported from the EU. In practice, border-tax adjustments with respect to external 
costs are difficult to implement, because it requires that the external costs are agreed upon. 
To reduce distortions to the competitiveness caused by environmental taxes, we propose that 
EU strives in this direction. 
b. Labour tax reductions (to stimulate employment) 
Part of the revenues from the materials tax and the environmental taxes will be used for 
funding the rest of the policy mix. As a very crude estimate, this might require half of the 
materials tax and half of the increase in environmental taxes until the year 2030 and then 
remain at the same level. The rest of the revenues will be used for reducing labour taxes (cf. 
Subsections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). This means labour taxes can decline slowly until 2030 and 
more rapidly after that.  
c. Removal of harmful subsidies (for a coherent fiscal reform)  
A green fiscal reform is likely to be more easily communicated, understood and accepted if it 
includes the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies. This policy mix includes the 
removal of two subsidies related to metals: the limited liability for accidents related to metals 
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extraction and subsidies associated with the purchase of company cars. More information on 
this instrument can be found in Subsection 6.4.6. 
d. R&D spending (to facilitate technological improvements) 
The primary instruments make material use and pollution more expensive. This serves to 
increase the competitiveness of resource-efficient and clean products, production processes 
and systems. When the materials tax and the environmental taxes result in the use of more 
efficient technology, these instruments can stimulate economic growth (Bukowski and 
Sniegocki 2016). 
However, for the industry and consumers to choose resource-efficient and clean options, 
these must be available at a cost that is not prohibitive. Successful public spending on R&D 
for material efficiency and recycling contributes to making the technology and systems more 
resource-efficient and cleaner. It also contributes to reducing the cost of these options. This 
can increase the positive impact of the materials tax on resource efficiency as well as the 
economy. Successful R&D can also can contribute to increasing resource efficiency without 
the need for materials and environmental taxes. At any rate, the positive impact of the policy 
mix is likely to be greater when R&D is added. 
More information on the R&D can be found in Subsection 6.4.4.  
e. Education programmes (to facilitate an shift in employment structure shift) 
The policy mix is likely to shifts the structure of the economy, for example from production of 
materials and goods to services and new business models. This can cause a mismatch 
between the workforce and the required skills. The proposed instrument includes the 
development and implementation of programmes for retraining of workers in sectors where 
unemployment is likely to occur in order to provide them with the skills required in sectors that 
are likely to grow. 
The educational programmes also encompasses a strategy for including resource-efficiency 
aspects into relevant academic and vocational curricula, as described in Subsection 4.4.5. 
f. information campaigns (to stimulate and facilitate behavioural change) 
Changes in consumption patterns and source separation are needed to achieve a shift to 
more efficient products and services, and to increased recycling. Information can be effective, 
when combined with other instruments, at different stages of a shift in behaviour. It can be 
used to explain why a change is needed, how to go about it, and to what extent a change has 
been successful. 
A few further thoughts on information campaigns can be found in Subsection 6.4.6. 
g. Sharing systems (to facilitate behavioural change) 
A shift to sharing of products means that fewer products need to be produced, which 
contributes to increased material efficiency. This instrument includes the establishment of 
public sharing systems for cars, bicycles, tools and equipment, or economic support to private 
sharing systems. For more information, see Subsection 6.4.3. 
h. Advanced recycling centres (to facilitate behavioural change) 
To stimulate recycling and reuse, local or national governments invest in centres for recycling 
and reuse (see Subsection 6.4.6). 
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i. Fora for communication (to stimulate networking) 
The EU will co-fund the establishment of fora for communication between actors throughout 
the value-chain of important products and recycled materials. This can contribute to 
establishing markets for new recycled materials such as textiles. It can also contribute to 
products becoming more resource-efficient from a life cycle perspective. For more 
information, see Subsection 6.4.6. 
j. A common EU strategy (to harmonise legislation in Member States)  
An EU policy mix on metals and competing materials require that the Member States agree 
on what should be included in this policy mix. The development of an EU action plan or 
strategy can be a way to initiate such harmonisation of views and legislation. This could be 
part of a revision of the Circular Economy Package, but it could also be a separate document 
– a strategy for dematerialisation – as discussed in Subsection 6.4.6. 
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Annex A: 
Some quantitative notes on metal use in Europe 
Steel 
The use of steel per capita in the EU does not show any clear trends in recent years. 
Therefore, it is difficult to predict how the use of steel will evolve in the EU in the next few 
decades. This section presents the business as usual (BAU) scenario. It shows indicative 
dynamics of steel use in the EU in the case when a) no additional decoupling policies are 
introduced, and b) the trends observed in the EU and the US do not change until 2050. 
 
 
Figure 22: Apparent steel use (crude 
steel equivalent), kg per capita. Source: 
World Steel Association (2009, 2015). 
Figure 23: Changes of residential floor 
space per capita in OECD countries. 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of 
data from the national statistical offices, 
WISE Institute. 
Steel is predominantly used in the construction sector, but also for transport equipment 
(vehicles, trains and ships), machinery and containers. 
When considering future steel use in construction sector, three trends must be taken into 
account. Firstly, in most developed countries residential floor space per capita is increasing at 
least since 1970s. Rising income leads to higher demand for living space. Reversing this 
trend requires a significant behaviour change. Secondly, demographic projections for the 
EU28 (EUROPOP201043) indicate that the European population is likely to slightly increase 
(+3%) by 2050. This is an effect of immigration outweighing natural population decline. In the 
BAU scenario, more conservative scenario is employed, with zero net migration leading to 
population decline. Thirdly, the use of steel in construction sector depends on the future 
technology trends. Recent developments focus on making buildings more energy and water 
efficient, rather than limiting the use of construction materials. Therefore, it is assumed for the 
BAU scenario that the use of steel per square meter of new buildings will remain constant, 
while the amount of infrastructure and other buildings will develop proportionally to the 
residential floor space. 
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Another key consumer of steel is transport equipment industry. BAU scenario assumptions 
concentrate on vehicles, which are responsible for the majority of steel use in that sector.  
The weight of new cars is declining. While their average age is roughly constant (and is even 
increasing for LDV and HDV), their mileage is increasing. Therefore, it is assumed that 
increasing demand for transport in BAU scenario will result in higher mileage and fuel use, but 
not in increased vehicle sales (see, e.g., Campestrini and Mock (2011) for an overview of 
vehicle market trends). Moreover, the use of steel per passenger car is constant – vehicle 
manufacturers are using other materials to increase the size of a car (mostly aluminium) and 
adding safety features. Assuming a continued decline in European population, it should be 
expected that the transport sector demand for steel will also slightly decrease. 
  
Figure 24: Steel use in construction and 
transportation equipment – BAU 
assumptions. Source: Own calculations, 
WISE Institute. 
Figure 25: Average age of vehicle fleet in 
Europe. Source: EEA (2011b). 
The steel use trends in machinery sector are very difficult to predict. While the trend towards 
miniaturization and slimming of products decreases the demand for steel, increasing 
mechanization of production leads to more steel used in the machines. Past trends in the US 
do not clearly indicate which of these effects will be more important in a long-term 
perspective. Although the consumption of steel in machinery sector has increased since 
1980s, that change was rather modest and the growth trend has reversed during the last 
decade. After the households and industry reach a saturation point, they tend to replace their 
old machines and appliances with new ones rather than buy more of them. Therefore, the 
related steel consumption tends to flatten out. 
The highest decline of steel use is assumed in packaging and containers. Despite the rapid 
growth of the population and GDP in the US during the last 30 years, the consumption of steel 
for packaging declined by 40%. It is assumed that a similar trend will be present in Europe 
and in the next couple of decades packaging steel will be replaced by more sustainable 
alternatives. 
Demographic trends and a constant steel intensity of buildings and transport equipment 
assumed in BAU scenario imply a slight increase of steel use in both sectors. Since the data 
are not conclusive about the technology trends in machinery and equipment, it is assumed 
that the steel use will remain constant in that sector. Therefore, construction will become the 
main consumer of steel in the next decades according to the BAU scenario. 
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Figure 26: Weight of an average US car 
(kg) and its steel content. Source: U.S. 
Geological Survey (2006). 
Figure 27: Steel use in Europe – BAU 
scenario (2015=1). Source: Own 
calculations, WISE Institute. 
 
One important caveat is that steel in both machinery and transport sectors is to some extent 
replaced by other metals like aluminium. The possibility of substitution by other metals and 
materials must be kept in mind when designing policies to reduce steel use. 
 
Copper 
Copper is mostly used to produce wires and plumbing for the construction sector, but is also 
used in electronic products, machinery and transport equipment. Therefore, the use of copper 
is closely related on one hand to the technology processes and on the other hand to the 
development of infrastructure and buildings. Due to its effectiveness as a conductor of 
electricity, copper is relatively easy to recycle. However, this property also drives demand for 
this metal and it can be substituted with other metals, but currently it is uneconomical 
(alternatives are more expensive). 
To estimate the future demand for copper in BAU scenario, several assumptions were 
adopted about the development of the main sectors in which it is used, including the “copper 
intensity” of each sector. Copper is mainly used in construction sector, transportation vehicles 
and machinery and equipment. Therefore, we can use estimates of future volume of 
construction and the number of cars produced in Europe. 
The consumption of copper in the construction sector (mainly wires and tubes) is difficult to 
predict. The amount of copper needed to deliver electric energy does not change over time, 
while tubes used in plumbing are relatively easily substitutable by other materials such as 
plastic or PCV. However, the expected increase in the use of heating and cooling appliances 
in BAU scenario also results in a higher demand for copper.44 Therefore, in BAU scenario we 
assume an increase of copper use per square meter by 20%. 
There is little data on consumption of copper per passenger car. However, combining data on 
copper use in production of transport equipment in the US and on the number of cars 
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produced indicates that the amount of copper needed per one car is close to saturation. 
Similar conclusions can be derived from the analysis of technological reasons for using 
copper in cars – it is needed to produce cables and wires. Vehicle equipment becomes more 
energy efficient and might increasingly rely on wireless communication. However, there is 
twice as much copper in hybrid and electric cars in comparison to a conventional vehicle 
(Weed and Morand 2010). Assuming that mitigation policies will put an increasing pressure 
on limiting greenhouse gases in transport, it is likely that hybrid and electric vehicles will 
become more widespread in the long-term perspective. Therefore, BAU scenario assumes 




Figure 28: Evolution of the use of copper 
in different sectors in the US (1980=1). 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey (2005). 
Figure 29: Copper use in Europe – BAU 
scenario (2015=1). Source: Own 
calculations, WISE Institute. 
Because of the assumptions about copper intensity in future buildings, the increase of the 
copper use in that sector is more visible than the rise in steel consumption. The amount of 
copper required to produce transport equipment likewise is expected to be larger than 
presently. Broad adoption of hybrid and electric vehicles will drive the increase of the demand 
for that metal. However, since vehicles are responsible for only approximately 10% of total 
copper use, this will have a limited impact on the overall copper use in the EU. 
